Due to the deep distrust that exists between Iran and the United States, Iran will take its steps cautiously in negotiations and will show flexibility to the extent that sanctions are lifted and Iran’s frozen assets and properties are released. Iran does not want to accept commitments without receiving specific and tangible concessions, Vali Kaleji writes.
While US President Donald Trump said there is “no timeline” for the conflict with Iran and has rejected suggestions that political considerations are influencing his approach, there are many uncertainties and questions about the current fragile ceasefire. While on the one hand, the Strait of Hormuz has been closed by Iran, and on the other hand, the US naval blockade of the Islamic Republic continues, the situation remains very fragile, and in recent days ships from both sides have been attacked and seized. Under such circumstances, various scenarios could occur, each of which would have its own effects and consequences for Iran, the United States, Israel, and the rest of the Middle East. The following four possible scenarios are worth exploring in further detail:
First Scenario: Continuation of the Ceasefire and “Neither War nor Peace”
This scenario is actually a repeat of the conditions that prevailed after the 12-Day War in June 2025, when Israel and the US attacked Iran. Tehran, as it has repeatedly stated, strongly opposes this scenario. The continuation of the ceasefire, and neither war nor peace, places Iran in a state of uncertainty that, in addition to compelling the armed forces to maintain a heightened state of readiness for a long time, will have negative political, economic, and especially psychological consequences for Iranian society. Iran experienced these conditions during the 8-month period between the 12-day war in June 2025 and the 40-day war, which started in late February 2026, and it does not want to repeat this experience.
On the other hand, this scenario could be favourable for Israel and the United States, which hopes to co-host the World Cup without the heavy shadow of the Iran war in June. The White House hopes to secure a Republican majority in the US Congressional midterm elections in November and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is seeking re-election in the October parliamentary elections, which could result in greater military preparedness for another attack on Iran. Therefore, from Iran’s perspective, the continuation of the ceasefire will only lead to the continuation of the threat of war and greater preparation for further attacks. Therefore, such a scenario, which will open the way to war, may be desirable for the United States and Israel but is definitely not desirable for Iran.
Second Scenario: The Return of War
This scenario is definitely favourable to Israel because from Benjamin Netanyahu’s perspective, the war is not over yet and Israel has not achieved all of its goals in Iran. In addition, the resumption of the war would also end the fragile ceasefire in Lebanon, and Israel could resume its massive air and ground attacks against Hezbollah. Therefore, this scenario is a return to April 8, 2026, when the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire. Donald Trump’s threat to destroy Iran’s infrastructure, including all power plants and bridges, and return Iran to what he called the Stone Age, was followed by Iran’s counter-threat to attack the infrastructure of countries hosting American bases in the region. With concerns at their highest, Iran and the United States reached an agreement for a two-week ceasefire in the final hours of Donald Trump’s deadline, brokered by Pakistan.
There is no doubt that the new round of war will be more intense. Possible US and Israeli attacks on energy infrastructure, including power plants and refineries, will certainly lead to a reciprocal response from Iran on energy infrastructure and desalination facilities in Arab countries hosting American and Israeli bases. The complete blockage of the Strait of Hormuz and the expansion of the scope of mine laying in the Strait of Hormuz and even the Persian Gulf, as well as the simultaneous blockage of the Bab al-Mandab Strait by the Houthis in Yemen, will also be among the measures that will cause a huge shock to the world’s energy and trade markets.
In such a situation, not only Arab countries but also European countries, East Asian countries, China, India, and Pakistan will be severely affected, and with the high increase in gasoline prices in the United States, the likelihood of Republicans losing the congressional elections will also increase. The consequence of this defeat and the Democrats’ rise to power in Congress could halt or at least seriously disrupt many of Donald Trump’s domestic and foreign policies and programmes in his final two years. Therefore, a new round of war will not benefit any of the parties, the countries of the region, or other Asian and European powers. For this reason, all countries, including Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, have worked to their maximum capacity to prolong the ceasefire and reach an agreement between Iran and the United States.
Third Scenario: Temporary Agreement
Given the four decades of differences and hostility between Iran and the United States, the complexity of the differences, as well as the two sides’ very different perceptions and expectations of the negotiations, an interim agreement has been proposed as a pragmatic scenario. The Islamabad talks, held at the highest level between Iranian and US officials since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, clearly demonstrated that the differences between the two sides could not be expected to be resolved in 21 hours of negotiations. US Vice President JD Vance said following the negotiations, “there was a lot of mistrust between Washington and Tehran that cannot be resolved overnight.” In addition, former EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini emphasised the complex nature of the Iranian nuclear issue and said that achieving the JCPOA was the result of 12 years of negotiations and the accumulation of technical and political knowledge, but such a process is not observed in the current negotiations.
Hamid Aboutalebi, political advisor to former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, also believes that “the idea of resolving four decades of fundamental differences in one round of negotiations reflects a lack of a clear picture of the diplomatic mission. The only way to overcome this impasse is to ‘move from the part to the whole’ with ‘micro-agreements’ so that by achieving small, concrete results and reducing global pressure, this critical equation can be overcome.”
Therefore, within the framework of this scenario, negotiations to reach an interim agreement that could begin with the simultaneous opening of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and the end of the naval blockade of Iran could create a general and temporary framework that would serve as a prelude to subsequent negotiations and agreements.
Forth Scenario: Comprehensive Agreement
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 was limited only to nuclear issues and did not cover other disputes between Iran and the United States. Moreover, this was not a bilateral agreement between the two countries, and Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China also participated in it. But ever since Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA on May 18, 2018, he has been calling for a comprehensive agreement with Iran. Returning from the Islamabad talks, US Vice President JD Vance said that “President Donald Trump is pursuing a sweeping agreement with Iran rather than a narrower deal.”
But while Donald Trump is insisting and rushing to reach a comprehensive agreement, there is no doubt that reaching a comprehensive agreement is very difficult and requires at least several rounds of talks and the formation of technical and expert committees on nuclear issues, the lifting of sanctions, the release of blocked Iranian assets and properties, and the legal regime of the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, while Tehran strongly opposes negotiations on missile capabilities as the most important element of defence and deterrence, the degree of Iran’s flexibility in other areas is directly related to the process and extent to which sanctions on Iran are lifted, as well as the release of Iranian property and assets.
Iran sanctions are multi-layered, varied, and complex. The return of UN sanctions after the activation of the trigger mechanism includes the primary US sanctions imposed on Iran since 1980 and renewed annually as well as secondary sanctions, especially the comprehensive sanctions of the first and second Trump administrations, European Union sanctions and British sanctions. These cover a very wide range of areas, including banking (SWIFT), insurance, shipping, oil, gas, steel, petrochemicals, and many institutions, such as the Central Bank of Iran. The value of Iran’s frozen assets and properties in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, China, Iraq, India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar is also estimated to be between $100 billion and $120 billion.
Therefore, there is a very complex political, legal, military-security, and financial-economic process that can be negotiated and agreed upon in a comprehensive agreement, but it requires sufficient time and several rounds of negotiations, and most importantly, the political will and flexibility necessary to achieve such an agreement.
Conclusion
Due to the deep distrust that exists between Iran and the United States, Iran will take its steps cautiously in negotiations and will show flexibility to the extent that sanctions are lifted and Iran’s frozen assets and properties are released. In fact, Iran does not want to accept commitments without receiving specific and tangible concessions. It seems that the first step to overcome the current fragile ceasefire (scenario one) and prevent a return to war (scenario two) would be an end to the naval blockade of Iran by the United States and a continuation of the ceasefire in Lebanon by Israel, in return for an end to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, which would pave the way for a third scenario (temporary agreement) or a fourth scenario (comprehensive agreement).
