Valdai Club

Why the 2026 War Has Become a Reason to Revise the Analytical Model for Understanding Iran

Part I

Every war tests more than just armies. It also tests the analytical models through which states, societies, and international crises become objects of political analysis. Some wars change borders. Others reshape the balance of power. But there are wars that, above all, reveal the limits of the explanatory power of the analytical models themselves. The 2026 war against Iran appears to fall into this category.

Throughout the campaign, analysts have focused primarily on a familiar set of factors: power structure, military potential, strategic command and control, the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, sanctions pressure, economic resilience, domestic social problems, and political contradictions. All of these variables are undoubtedly important. Without them, an analysis of contemporary Iran is impossible. However, the war itself has raised a question that proves no less significant than all of these factors: Is understanding the state sufficient to understand society? It seems not.

The problem is not whether anyone correctly or incorrectly predicted the outcome of the war. There were analysts in the Russian expert community who, even in the early days of the conflict, suggested that external pressure could lead to increased internal consolidation in Iran rather than disintegration. Such assessments deserve separate analysis. However, they were never developed into a coherent analytical model explaining why such a scenario was possible.

This is where the main methodological question arises. Why did a society that had faced economic difficulties, social demands, governance problems, and internal political discord for many years not choose the path of national disintegration when presented with an external threat? The answer to this question cannot be sought solely in state institutions, but an analysis that excludes the role of the Islamic Republic itself from the explanation would be equally incomplete.

During the war, the Islamic Republic of Iran acted as more than just a system of state governance. It was able to coordinate the country’s defensive, institutional, political, religious, and national resources, transforming them into a unified mechanism for protecting the state. Ignoring this function renders the analysis as incomplete as ignoring society itself.

This is where the limitations of some existing analytical models become apparent. Many of them study Iran primarily as a political system, while society is viewed as derivative of the state. Meanwhile, Iranian society possesses its own historical memory, political culture, civilisational continuity, and a unique logic of collective behaviour. These deep-seated characteristics remain subtle under normal circumstances but acquire decisive significance when the state’s existence is threatened.

Therefore, a linear relationship between dissatisfaction with government performance, criticism of individual institutions, and rejection of the state does not always reflect the actual social dynamics of Iran. Iranian society has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to distinguish between internal political disagreements and external threats. Under normal circumstances, it operates within the logic of domestic politics. However, when faced with an existential threat, it begins to operate within the logic of preserving the nation-state.

This does not mean the disappearance of internal contradictions. Only the hierarchy of societal priorities changes. When a country’s independence, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity are threatened, their defence becomes a priority capable of temporarily uniting various social groups. That is why the main question the 2026 war posed for the expert community is not why Iran has remained resilient. The main question is: did existing analytical models have the necessary tools to explain such societal behaviour even before the war?

Part II: Iran’s Invisible Variable

If the experience of the 2026 war has revealed the limitations of some existing analytical models, a logical question arises: which element, specifically, has been overlooked? To answer this question, the analytical model must be supplemented by another variable, the significance of which is virtually invisible under normal conditions but becomes decisive in times of existential threat. To describe this mechanism, it seems appropriate to use the term “Iran’s invisible variable.”

This is neither a political slogan, nor an emotional category, nor an attempt to attribute an exceptional character to the Iranian experience. The “invisible variable” is a sociopolitical mechanism that, in peacetime, has virtually no impact on the everyday political behaviour of society, but becomes a key factor in collective mobilisation when state sovereignty, territorial integrity, or the very existence of the state are threatened. This is precisely why it is extremely difficult to detect this variable in advance.

Classic analytical tools—economic indicators, levels of public discontent, protest activity, electoral behaviour, social and generational differences—capture the state of society under conditions of political normality. However, they are far from always able to explain its behaviour during an existential crisis. It is at this moment that the logic of social behaviour changes.

Under normal circumstances, society operates within the logic of domestic politics. Economic demands, political competition, criticism of government bodies, and public debate are a natural part of political life. But when a significant portion of society perceives events as a threat to the country’s independence, state sovereignty, or territorial integrity, a reorganisation of social priorities occurs. This does not mean the disappearance of internal contradictions. They persist. However, their place in the system of social priorities changes.

Therefore, support for defence and state institutions in such conditions cannot be explained solely by the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with domestic policy. These are two distinct levels of political behaviour. One relates to current domestic politics. The other concerns the logic of preserving the nation-state. It is precisely this distinction that remains insufficiently reflected in some existing models of Iran analysis. Many of them assume that increasing external pressure inevitably leads to increased internal contradictions. However, the experience of the 2026 war shows that such a relationship is not always linear. In the case of Iran, an external threat can also have the opposite effect—not because internal differences disappear, but because society itself begins to view them in a different frame of reference.

This is where the “invisible variable” comes into play. Its function is not to politically unify society. It does not eliminate existing differences. It does not eliminate political competition. Its primary function is to reorder societal priorities in the face of an existential threat to the state. The result is a kind of defensive convergence—a form of social consolidation based not on a shared political outlook, but on a shared understanding of the need to preserve Iran, its state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the continuity of statehood.

The role of the Islamic Republic in this process also requires separate analysis. During the war, it acted not only as a system of state governance. It succeeded in coordinating the country’s defensive, institutional, political, religious, and national resources, transforming them into a mutually reinforcing mechanism for state defence. It was precisely this capacity for coordination that enabled the emergence of the “invisible variable.” Ignoring this function renders the analysis as incomplete as ignoring society itself.

Thus, Iran’s “invisible variable” does not replace the classical parameters of analysis. Military potential, state institutions, the economy, foreign policy, public sentiment, and social contradictions retain their fundamental significance. However, the experience of the 2026 war demonstrates that without including this variable, the explanatory power of existing models remains limited. Perhaps the most important methodological conclusion is that Iranian society cannot be fully understood solely based on peacetime data. Some of the most significant factors in its political behaviour become visible only when the preservation of the nation-state becomes the central issue for society.

Part III: What Changes When This Variable Is Included in the Analytical Model?

Including the “invisible Iranian variable” alters not just individual conclusions, but the very logic of the analysis. This is not a matter of adjusting a single forecast or revising the assessment of a specific war. Rather, it alters the underlying analytical framework within which the behaviour of Iranian society under external pressure is explained.

For many years, a significant number of analytical models have assumed that increasing external pressure inevitably leads to deepening internal contradictions, followed by a gradual weakening of the state’s resilience. This logic may be applicable to a number of political systems. However, when applied to Iran, it requires significant clarification. It is not only the scale of external pressure that matters, but also the nature of its public perception. Equally important is how society itself interprets the nature of this threat. If external pressure is perceived as a tool of political influence, public reaction follows one logic. If it is perceived as a threat to state independence, national sovereignty, or the country’s territorial integrity, the logic of public behaviour changes.

It is here that the explanatory potential of the proposed model becomes apparent. It allows us to consider external pressure not as an automatically destabilising factor, but as a variable whose consequences depend on the nature of its public perception. Therefore, increased external pressure in the case of Iran does not necessarily mean increased internal disintegration. Under certain conditions, it can lead to the opposite result—to increased social consolidation around the task of preserving the state. It is at this point that linear models of analysis begin to lose their explanatory power.

If society is viewed solely through economic indicators, protest activity, or domestic political competition, a significant portion of its behaviour under conditions of existential threat remains unexplained.

If the proposed variable is included in the analytical model, many processes receive a consistent explanation. The defensive consolidation of society, changing societal priorities, and the ability of state institutions to coordinate existing national resources begin to be viewed not as isolated phenomena, but as elements of a single socio-political mechanism. This changes the interpretation of the 2026 war as well as the very approach to studying contemporary Iran.

This conclusion is significant not only for Iranian studies. If the Russian expert school views Iran as a long-term strategic partner, then the analytical model must take into account the specific characteristics of a society with its own historical memory, civilisational continuity, and unique logic of collective behaviour. Just as it is impossible to understand Russia by limiting oneself solely to an analysis of state institutions, it is impossible to fully explain Iran by examining only its political system. Society must become an independent analytical category, not a derivative of the state. Ignoring this circumstance inevitably limits the explanatory power of any analytical model.

Perhaps the main conclusion of the 2026 war lies not in the military, but in the methodological realm. It demonstrated that understanding the state does not necessarily mean understanding society. Consequently, the further development of Russian analysis of Iran requires not a revision of individual assessments, but rather an expansion of the analytical model itself. Perhaps the time has come for Russian studies of Iran to stop treating society as an auxiliary object of observation and instead consider it an independent strategic variable of analysis.

Conclusion

The 2026 war tested not only Iran’s military potential but also the analytical models used to explain its behaviour. It demonstrated that even a sufficiently thorough understanding of the Islamic Republic’s state institutions, defensive capabilities, and foreign policy strategy does not guarantee an understanding of society’s behaviour under existential threat.

The concept of “Iran’s invisible variable” proposed in this article represents an attempt to describe a level of social reality that remains largely unnoticed under normal circumstances but acquires decisive significance when state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the very existence of the state are threatened. This does not mean the disappearance of internal contradictions. The logic of public choice changes. When the question of state preservation becomes paramount, it is precisely this shift in priorities that creates the conditions for social consolidation.

Therefore, understanding contemporary Iran can no longer be limited to an analysis of state institutions alone. Like any state-civilisation, Iran requires the study of not only its political system but also society as an independent analytical category. This, apparently, is the main methodological conclusion of the 2026 war. This is not a question of revising individual assessments. It is a question of the need to expand the analytical model for understanding Iran itself.

Iran has not collapsed; the analytical model for understanding it requires revision.

Sources for editorial and factual support:

• Valdai Discussion Club report, “Stuck in Mid-Sentence: The Middle East at the Start of the 21st Century’s Second Quarter”, February 2026. Even before the full-scale conflict, the document noted the natural consolidation of Iranian society around the current government during military confrontation, while internal societal divisions persisted.

• Valdai Club report, “Attack on Iran: A Balance of Results”, March 2026. The author noted Iran’s will to resist, the ability of society and the political system to consolidate in the face of an external threat, and the existential nature of the war for the country.

• Profile magazine report, “What Will International Relations Be Like in 2026”, January 2026. The material reflects a common type of analysis focusing on economic discontent, protests, a possible crisis of power, leadership succession, and the strengthening of the IRGC’s role.