The military strategy of the US administration has reached an impasse. The chaotic alternation of military strikes and ceasefires has had no effect whatsoever on Iran’s firmly stated determination to pursue its objectives. The Hormuz trap, at least for the time being, provides the necessary conditions for it to do so, writes Alexander Maryasov.
The escalation of US armed aggression against Iran, accompanied by the serious weakening of regional pro-Iranian groups as a result of parallel Israeli military actions, forced Tehran to abandon its policy of strategic patience and switch to a tactic of direct, asymmetric strikes on US military infrastructure in the Middle East.
In order to discredit Washington’s role as a security umbrella for its regional allies, Iran began striking not only American bases in these countries but also their own economic and infrastructure facilities—something the United States proved unable to prevent.
But the most effective and unexpected step taken by Iran to defend its political and economic interests was the closure of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping, which led to a serious crisis on the international oil and gas market and a rise in energy prices. In essence, Iran has set a geopolitical trap that will be difficult to defuse without meeting a number of Tehran’s demands.
For a long time, the Islamic Republic of Iran responded relatively mildly to American and Israeli provocations, and even to limited military actions on their part, fearing military escalation and counting on retaliatory strikes by its proxy groups—Hamas, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shia militias.
However, the shift by the United States and Israel to direct, full-scale aggression against Iran, the killing of a number of senior military and political leaders—including the Supreme Leader and spiritual guide Ali Khamenei—and the massive bombing of not only military but also civilian infrastructure, with extensive destruction and human casualties, led to a fundamental hardening of the country’s military-political doctrine.
The United States and Israel proved unprepared for Iran’s asymmetric yet effective response of missile and drone strikes on American military bases in the region. Despite months of bombing across virtually the entire territory of the country, the United States never achieved military victory or the capitulation of the Islamic Republic.
Alongside widening the geography of its strikes to include facilities belonging to America’s regional allies, Tehran moved to close the Strait of Hormuz as a tool for pressuring the United States, aiming to force Washington to accept a number of Iran’s military-political and financial demands. These include an end to hostilities and guarantees of non-aggression in future, the lifting of the blockade on Iranian ports and the withdrawal of US forces from areas surrounding Iran, the removal or easing of sanctions, compensation for the damage inflicted on Iran and the establishment of a corresponding fund, and the unfreezing of frozen financial assets.
These demands were set out in an Iran–US memorandum of understanding, which the United States, as soon became clear, had no intention of honouring. As an alternative to the collapse of financial assistance, Tehran sees the introduction of a fee for passage through the Strait of Hormuz (in return for the provision of navigational and other services).
The Iranian parliament is currently considering a bill on the terms under which Tehran would regulate transit through the Strait of Hormuz. It will set out the arrangements for ensuring the safe passage of vessels, as well as the financial and other measures Iran will take to control the strait.
Iran has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, but has observed its provisions. The American–Israeli aggression gave Tehran a pretext to close the Strait of Hormuz, citing the provision in the Convention allowing for such a step in the event of “a threat to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state.” Iran responded harshly to attempts by vessels to pass through the strait without its sanction, firing on “violators” and mining shipping lanes. This led to a large build-up of vessels at the entrance and exit of the Gulf, a sharp rise in insurance premiums, and shipowners abandoning the Hormuz transit route altogether. The inevitable result was a sharp rise in oil and gas prices and a search for alternative routes for delivering energy resources.
US attempts to unblock shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, including the military escorting of vessels, ended in failure. Washington responded by imposing a blockade on Iranian ports.
Iran proposed to Oman that the two countries jointly establish a paid system for controlling transit. The Omanis put forward their own version of how shipping should be organised, proposing the creation of two corridors. A southern corridor, running through Omani territorial waters, would allow vessels to pass freely, on pre-war terms. A northern corridor would run through Iranian territorial waters, with passage requiring prior authorisation from Tehran, free of charge. This option did not suit Tehran. After a series of intensive bilateral negotiations, the two sides reached an agreement on the parameters of temporary transit through the Strait of Hormuz. The fee would be charged not for passage as such, but for “navigational services,” and would be split equally between Iran and Oman.
According to Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Gharibabadi, both the northern route through Iranian territorial waters and the southern route through Omani waters are being closed. The new route will pass through Iranian territorial waters on entry into the Strait of Hormuz, and will exit partly through the same Iranian waters and then through Omani territorial waters. Such arrangements effectively give Iran the right to control this route.
Mohammad Zolghadr, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, stated that the Iran–Oman agreement will only come into force once the United States fulfils its obligations under the Memorandum of Understanding signed in June. At the same time, the Iranians called on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states to dissuade the Americans from resuming military action against Iran, unless they wished to face new and even more devastating Iranian bombardments.
Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain have no comparable bypass infrastructure and will, it appears, be forced to negotiate with Saudi Arabia and the UAE over the construction of new pipelines—a process that will require agreement on a whole range of political, legal, and financial issues. Yet all of this infrastructure could itself become a target for Iranian bombardment, should hostilities between the United States and Iran continue. Iraq, for its part, is considering a Lebanese proposal to lay pipelines through Syrian and Lebanese territory to the Mediterranean.
Yemen’s Houthis, aligned with Iran, have declared a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia and are, in effect, already closing the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait to Saudi vessels, firing on ships that attempt to pass through. This, in turn, automatically diminishes the prospects for transit via the Suez Canal as well.
Finding and establishing new routes for delivering oil products to the world market, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, will require a great deal of time and considerable financial outlay, and their safety will remain in question for as long as the Iran–US armed conflict continues. Moreover, Iran’s introduction of transit fees could prompt other countries controlling maritime straits to introduce similar charges under various pretexts. Indeed, in April 2026, Indonesia’s finance minister put forward the idea of establishing a joint Indonesian–Malaysian–Singaporean payment point in the Strait of Malacca.
Should Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz continue and problems with alternative transit routes intensify, shipowners may end up appealing directly to the Iranian authorities for permission to transit on Iran’s own terms.
Tehran is banking on the deepening crisis in the global oil and gas market forcing European and Asian consumers of Middle Eastern hydrocarbons to step up pressure on the United States to resolve the Hormuz problem.
There is also a calculation that President Donald Trump cannot fail to take into account the volatility of oil product prices, the growing unpopularity of the war with Iran among Americans, and the mounting criticism of foreign policy from both Democrats and a growing number of Republicans—factors that could affect the outcome of the forthcoming US midterm congressional elections.
The military strategy of the US administration has reached an impasse. The chaotic alternation of military strikes and ceasefires has had no effect whatsoever on Iran’s firmly stated determination to pursue its objectives. The Hormuz trap, at least for the time being, provides the necessary conditions for it to do so.
