In addition to utilising all the military and defensive options that were deployed during the twelve-day war in June 2025 and the recent forty-day conflict, Iran could also employ new measures tailored to the scale, intensity, scope, and duration of the war, Vali Kaleji writes.
In my previous article, titled “Iran’s Options in Response to US and Israeli Military Attacks in the Event of Diplomatic Failure,” published on February 17, 2026—nine days before the outbreak of war between Israel, the United States, and Iran—I identified four potential options: “ballistic and hypersonic missiles”, “asymmetric warfare combining drone systems and fast attack craft”, “proxy groups / the Axis of Resistance”, and “closure of the Strait of Hormuz”. All four predictions were realized, and during the recent forty-day war—from February 28 to April 7—Iran employed all of these capabilities.
However, under the current circumstances, following a brief period of relative calm, US attacks on Iran’s southern coastline and islands have resumed, accompanied by Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone strikes against US military bases in Arab countries. Unlike the twelve-day war of June 2025 or the recent forty-day conflict (February 28–April 7), the element of strategic surprise has now been reduced to its lowest level. This raises an important question: if the current conflict between Iran and Israel escalates into a broader war involving direct US intervention, what new and likely options would be available to Tehran?
It appears that, in addition to utilising all the military and defensive options that were deployed during the twelve-day war in June 2025 and the recent forty-day conflict (February 28 to April 7) to counter the United States and Israel, Iran could also employ new measures tailored to the scale, intensity, scope, and duration of the war. Some of the most significant of these potential options are discussed below.
Simultaneous Closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait
During the twelve-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025, the forces that the West refers to as “proxies” and Iran refers to as the “Axis of Resistance” did not play an active role. Some Iranian officials even noted that these groups had requested to participate, but Iran chose not to deploy their capabilities at that time. However, in the recent forty-day war—from February 28 to April 7— these forces conducted extensive attacks against US military bases in Iraq, Jordan, and Kuwait, while Hezbollah in Lebanon carried out missile, rocket, and drone strikes against Israel.
Nevertheless, Ansar Allah in Yemen, commonly referred to as the Houthis, joined this effort only after a significant delay, during the final days of the war. Some Iranian experts and officials explained that this delay was due to the need to “appropriately employ” the “strategic capacity” of Ansar Allah at the “right moment”. Although Ansar Allah launched several missile and drone attacks against Israel in the closing days of the conflict, they did not attempt to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (“Gate of Tears” in Arabic), nor did they carry out attacks on shipping or disrupt navigation in this strait and the Red Sea.
In the event of a new war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, it is possible that Ansar Allah in Yemen could, similar to the resistance groups in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon, fully engage in the conflict. One of the most significant consequences of such participation would be the closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, or at the very least severe disruption and restrictions on maritime navigation in this strait and the Red Sea. Coupled with Iran’s potential control and closure of the Strait of Hormuz, this could deliver a substantial and unprecedented shock to global trade and energy flows.
Although Ansar Allah lacks a conventional navy and remains highly vulnerable to airstrikes—a key weakness for the group—they possess anti-ship cruise missiles, fast attack boats, offensive drones, unmanned explosive-laden vessels, and naval mines, giving them the ability to strike ships and disrupt transit via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait or close it entirely. They demonstrated this capability in 2024, when their threats to the strait extended maritime transit times by more than ten days, increased fuel consumption by approximately 40%, and multiplied shipping costs between East Asia and Europe several-fold.
While the United States conducted extensive strikes against the Houthis in March and May 2025, inflicting significant damage, the Houthis still imposed at least $1 billion in costs on the US military, including the downing of several American drones and two multi-million-dollar fighter jets, notably an F/A-18 Super Hornet that fell off the deck of an aircraft carrier.
Therefore, in the event of a renewed war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, the Houthis in Yemen could leverage this capacity to simultaneously close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait while Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. This dual-strategy option would enable Iran to exert additional pressure on the United States, Israel, and the Arab countries hosting US military bases.
Tactical and Targeted Expansion of Mine Warfare in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf
Iran possesses dozens of types of naval mines, explosive traps, and remote-controlled mines that can be rapidly deployed along critical maritime routes, including moored mines, drifting mines, and limpet mines equipped with magnets. During the recent forty-day war—from February 28 to April 7—Iran made limited use of mine warfare to block, control, and reroute vessels within areas under the control of Iranian armed forces.
The Strait of Hormuz, at its narrowest point, is approximately 33 kilometres wide, and water depths along primary shipping lanes generally range from 30 to 60 meters. This depth is highly suitable for naval mines, as they can be deployed relatively easily while remaining difficult and time-consuming to detect and clear. However, Iran did not exploit the full potential of its mine-laying capabilities, and deployment was limited to the Strait of Hormuz, without extending into the wider Persian Gulf. Midway through the conflict, the spokesperson for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters— the highest coordinating body for military operations in Iran—stated that “due to sufficient control and power, there is no need to deploy mines in the Persian Gulf, and all available means will be utilised as necessary to ensure security.
In the event of a new war, particularly under high-risk scenarios such as a potential US ground operation to seize islands like Kharg—the largest Iranian oil export terminal—Qeshm, Greater and Lesser Tunbs, and Abu Musa, it is highly likely that we will witness tactical and targeted expansion of mine-laying operations in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf. Such operations would increase casualties, operational risk, and force warships to alter their routes.
Tactical and targeted mine-laying, when combined with anti-ship cruise and shore-to-sea missiles, drones, fast attack craft, surface vessels, and submarines—including the recently unveiled light-class “Persian Gulf Dolphins” submarines—could significantly enhance the operational capabilities of the IRGC Navy (covering the western Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (covering the eastern Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman). This integrated approach would enable a robust defence against potential US attacks on the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian islands within the strait and the Persian Gulf.
Disruption or Destruction of Submarine Fibre Optic Cables in the Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz, and Persian Gulf
A submarine cable consists of multiple strands of fibre optics encased in protective layers of steel and polyethylene. According to authoritative TeleGeography maps and the Submarine Networks database, at least five to seven major cable systems pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Based on global routing data (BGP), approximately 60 to 70 percent of Iran’s internet traffic is routed through terrestrial pathways to the north and west (Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan), while only 30 to 40 percent enters via southern submarine cables.
For the Arab countries along the southern Persian Gulf coast, however, the situation is markedly different. These states are heavily dependent—over 90 percent—on maritime cable routes through the Strait of Hormuz due to limited and insecure terrestrial alternatives. If, for any reason—natural disasters, ship anchoring, maritime accidents, or deliberate actions—several major cables in the Strait of Hormuz were simultaneously severed, this would constitute a digital catastrophe for the Arab states. Their internet infrastructure would experience severe outages or widespread disruptions, leading to cascading consequences, including stock market and financial trading disruptions, e-commerce interruptions, banking transaction failures, and other critical impacts.
Based on this pronounced vulnerability, in recent weeks some Iranian officials and media outlets, within the framework of the new legal set-up governing the Strait of Hormuz and the collection of transit fees, have called for the imposition of initial and annual renewal fees on foreign companies, the requirement for technology giants (Meta, Amazon, Microsoft) to operate under Iranian law, and the exclusive maintenance and repair of submarine cables by Iranian companies.
Although this proposal has not yet been formally approved, it clearly indicates a significant shift in strategic thinking: the collection of fees from the Strait of Hormuz should no longer be limited to shipping and energy, but also extend to other sectors, such as submarine fibre optic cables. Accordingly, in the event of a large-scale and intense war, particularly if Iranian energy and technological infrastructure is attacked, it is plausible that the Iranian armed forces could target submarine fibre optic cables in the Gulf of Oman, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf. Such actions would aim to increase pressure on Arab states hosting US military bases and inflict economic and operational damage on major American banks and corporations in the region.
Counterattacks on Energy Infrastructure, Power Plants, and Desalination Facilities
In the event that US President Donald Trump’s previous threats regarding the widespread destruction of all Iranian power plants and bridges—and his characterization of Iran as being in a “Stone Age”—are realized, Iranian political and military officials have repeatedly stated that retaliatory strikes against energy infrastructure, power plants, and desalination facilities in Israel and the Arab states hosting US military bases would be executed.
Beyond the extreme vulnerability of oil and gas fields and refineries in the Arab states and Israel, the heavy dependence on desalination facilities constitutes a critical strategic vulnerability. While Iran relies on desalination for approximately 3 percent of its water supply, Israel obtains 80 percent of its drinking water from just five desalination plants. Similarly, Bahrain relies on four desalination facilities for 60 percent of its drinking water, and the UAE depends on five major desalination plants, including the Jebel Ali facility.
Iran’s electricity generation and distribution network, by contrast, is dispersed and relatively diversified, with roughly 100 power plants nationwide. The energy supply is not concentrated in a few facilities; the largest power plant in Iran, with a capacity of approximately 75,000 MW, accounts for only about 3 percent of the total national electricity output. In such a network, any localised damage or disruption can be mitigated by transferring electricity from other plants and through load management, allowing at least partial control over potential fluctuations or outages.
In contrast, Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf have more centralised and dense power networks, meaning that an attack on a single power plant could eliminate up to 20 percent of electricity production. Accordingly, should prior threats from Donald Trump against energy infrastructure and power plants materialise, particularly on a large scale, the Iranian armed forces are likely to conduct extensive counterattacks targeting energy infrastructure, power plants, and desalination facilities in Israel and Arab states hosting US military bases.
