In spite of pessimistic forecasts of certain doom for Iran if Tehran ever found itself in a direct confrontation with Washington, the Islamic Republic withstood the overwhelming US-Israeli blow launched against it after decades of mounting tensions. With Iran emerging from the conflict as the first state in fifty years to survive a war with America, the outcome of the Middle East clash may now send ripples throughout an international system already fraught with uncertainty. Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, examines the consequences of the Iran War for the macroregion of Greater Eurasia.
It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that, in recent years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been regarded by many observers as, if not the “weak link” in that part of humanity striving for a fairer world order, then, at the very least, the member of the revisionist camp most likely to become the target of a direct and successful attack by the forces of the collective West. The first of these expectations did indeed come to pass. On 28 February, the combined forces of the United States and Israel, with the direct and indirect support of other American satellites, launched an unprovoked attack on Iran. This was followed by more than a month of virtually uninterrupted aerial bombardment of both military and civilian targets across the Islamic Republic, characterised by its sheer ruthlessness. The entire world witnessed horrifying images of the consequences of US and Israeli air strikes on Iranian schools and energy infrastructure, the destruction of bridges, and the creation of conditions conducive to technological disasters. However, the second expectation—that a Western attack on a BRICS and SCO state will achieve success—did not materialise. Contrary to what many observers, both in the West and elsewhere, had portrayed as inevitable, Iran neither collapsed, nor capitulated militarily, nor even experienced state collapse under the pressure of an enemy that descended upon the republic with all the fury of a weakening hegemon. Even according to US military estimates, more than 1,000 cruise missiles alone were launched against Iran. Let us recall that this was precisely the objective pursued by the United States and Israel, one that their politicians, in truth, made little effort to conceal.
For more than a month, the Iranian armed forces, the Iranian people, and the country’s political leadership demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of aggressors possessing overwhelming military superiority. From the very outset of the conflict, Iran responded confidently by striking military infrastructure belonging to the United States and its regional partners, while also carrying out large-scale attacks against Israeli territory. The Iranian authorities also decided to close the Strait of Hormuz—one of the most important commercial arteries of the modern global economy—which ultimately became a significant factor in Tehran’s political success. Moreover, the world saw that the calculations of the IRI’s opponents—that mass popular unrest would erupt within the country, plunging it into the abyss of civil conflict—proved entirely unfounded. On the contrary, the Iranian people rallied around their patriotic values and became a pillar of support for their armed forces in the struggle they waged against vastly more powerful military adversaries. At the same time, the results of the strategy of cooperation with the countries of Eurasia and BRICS, which Iranian diplomacy had so prudently developed in recent years, became readily apparent, as did the West’s underestimation of the depth of trust in Iran’s relations with the leading powers of the World Majority. As a result of Iran’s resilience, its effective retaliatory strikes, and the mounting economic consequences of the crisis, it became clear within just a couple of weeks that the original calculations had been mistaken, and that American policymakers would have to seek a way out of a situation of their own making.
The negotiations that began in mid-April have thus far resulted in Iran and the United States reaching agreement on a fairly broad range of mutual concessions, the legal formalisation of which could form the basis of a more stable long-term settlement. The parties have given themselves sixty days for this process, although no one knows how long the negotiations may actually continue. In reality, however, this is not the most fundamental issue. Far more important is the fact that the failure of the US and Israeli aggression against Iran has become one of the defining events in both international and regional affairs. In essence, it has created a substantial part of the reality of the multipolar world order whose emergence we are currently witnessing. This is so for several reasons, each of which is equally important for understanding how the changing world will affect Greater Eurasia, and what new opportunities—as well as constraints—the success of Iran’s resistance to its formidable adversaries creates for cooperation among the states of the region.
First, at the systemic level, the actions of the United States demonstrated the limitations of even the most militarily powerful states in the contemporary world. This is of great importance because, now that all the meaningless discussions about the decisive role of a state’s economic power or its influence over international institutions have dissolved into nothingness, many have come to regard military power as the factor that will provide the solid foundation for future international stability. Yet what we have seen is that the United States’ interests in the war against Iran were neither sufficiently extensive nor sufficiently vital for Washington to commit all its available resources once it became clear that victory could not be achieved with the resources at its disposal. Moreover, given that Iran’s success in resisting the assault may itself become an important factor in the long-term stability of America’s close ally Israel, as well as in the confidence of the Arab states, the unwillingness of the United States to pursue the struggle against an openly hostile government to its ultimate conclusion says a great deal about the future of any alliance commitments it may undertake. The governments of the former Soviet Baltic republics, which are now seeking to host US military facilities, as well as certain neighbours of China, may therefore wish to reflect on just how sound such a strategy truly is.
Second, the failure of the aggression against Iran provides an excellent opportunity to reflect upon the very purpose of war itself. During the post-Cold War era, we have grown somewhat accustomed to the military campaigns conducted by the Western powers being broadly successful. At the very least, in the medium term, they typically achieved the destruction of political regimes that had fallen out of favour with the United States, Europe, and their allies, while depriving the targeted states of the ability to influence their regional environment.
Finally, Iran’s success is also of considerable importance for international politics in Greater Eurasia. We have traditionally associated the internal stability of this vast region with the fact that none of its most powerful states—India, China, or Russia—can or intends to claim regional hegemony. To this ideal formula for international cooperation is now added the factor of Iran—a medium-sized state, yet one that possesses self-confidence and, most importantly, has demonstrated that confidence in practice. It is therefore essential to understand what contribution Iran will make to the architecture of international security and cooperation in Greater Eurasia during the next stage in the development of international politics.
