Seven lessons from the US-Israel campaign against Iran reveal that major powers can retreat, diplomacy still works, and nuclear deterrence is evolving—but exit strategies remain harder than entry, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Ivan Timofeev.
At the outset of the US and Israeli military campaign against Iran, we identified seven key lessons for the new conflict: sanctions tend to be followed by the use of military force; pressure on Iran will be prolonged; concessions to the attacker are ineffective; the leaders of the target country become prime strike targets; internal unrest encourages external intervention; support from friendly countries is important for the target nation but does not resolve its fundamental problems; and ultimately, the balance of power remains the primary means of resolving security issues. Responding to force with force is a crude but effective way to halt escalation. Now that the conflict has been paused—though most likely only temporarily—we can consider additional lessons.
Lesson 1: A Major Power Can Retreat
Strictly speaking, this is hardly a new lesson; rather, it is a case of history repeating itself. Recent history offers numerous examples: the US ended its long-standing military presence in Afghanistan; the Soviet Union wound down its Afghan campaign; and earlier, the United States was forced to withdraw from Vietnam. In the recent Gulf crisis, the United States and Israel inflicted serious damage on Iran but failed to crush the enemy, and further escalation through a ground operation was apparently deemed too risky. The result was a retreat from the goal of total victory and a shift toward diplomacy—which brings us to the second lesson.
Lesson 2: Diplomacy Works, and Compromises Are Possible
The 20th century shaped a painful legacy of wars ending in crushing defeats. World War I ended with the collapse of at least four empires. World War II resulted in the complete defeat of the Axis powers, whose sovereignty remains constrained to this day. The Cold War ended with a major political defeat and the collapse of the USSR. A number of local military operations led to disintegration or regime change in the attacked countries, including Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Cases in which conflicts are resolved through diplomatic compromise in the spirit of the 18th or 19th centuries have become quite rare. The confrontation with Iran, however, is bringing the old school of diplomacy back into the picture. Clearly, the underlying issues that gave rise to the conflict remain unresolved. Nevertheless, the parties have reached at least a temporary solution through negotiations and concrete concessions. They were forced to view each other as legitimate negotiators, willingly or not recognizing themselves as equals despite their vastly different capabilities.
Lesson 3: Tolerance to Losses Determines Outcomes
The level of losses and the willingness to absorb them are among the most important factors in a power struggle. Here again, the history of the 20th century demonstrates two extremes. On the one hand, there are world wars, whose losses were incalculable. On the other, there are local conflicts, where the very fact of losses became a significant factor in their termination—primarily exemplified by the American experience in Vietnam. After the Cold War, Western operations were characterized by relatively few casualties. Russian losses in the wars in the North Caucasus following the collapse of the USSR were significant and contributed to the peace pause after the First Chechen War; however, the lessons learned helped reduce losses in the Second Chechen War. The experience of the Gulf crisis reflects both models. The United States and Israel are unwilling to accept increased losses—such as those that would result from a ground operation—without sufficient confidence in success. Iran, by contrast, has demonstrated a firm determination to absorb losses. Neither civilian casualties nor the assassination of several dozen prominent political figures have shaken Iran's resolve to defend itself.
Lesson 4: Margin of Safety Matters
Consider the 20th century once more. The powers entered the First World War with a low margin of safety, not anticipating the hardships and costs ahead. The Second World War began between mobilized military camps, largely prepared for war and considering it inevitable. The Cold War was a story of accumulating a margin of safety, followed by the effect of falling through an open door: the Soviet economy was perfectly prepared for a world war, but under conditions of gradual détente, its strength turned out to be unneeded. After the Cold War, the military machines of former adversaries shrank significantly. Even in the United States—the largest military power to emerge victorious from the Cold War—it has not been possible to quickly revive previous production volumes of equipment, ammunition, and other materiel.
The Islamic Republic of Iran, however, has been preparing for open military confrontation throughout its history. The fact that Iran has survived the current conflict is due in no small part to the specific organization of its armed forces, security services, management, and economic structure. For “normal” peacetime needs, such a system may seem excessively costly, unbalanced, and cumbersome; but under extreme conditions, it proved functional. It should also be noted that Israel lives in a regime of constant military mobilization, having built its own model of a military economy—albeit on different principles. War-camp states are re-entering world politics. China is taking active steps to improve its resilience. Western countries are gradually moving in this direction as well. Russia and Ukraine have been forced to become war-camp states against the backdrop of their conflict; Ukraine, apparently, has already reached the peak of militarization, while Russia’s reserve for further growth remains considerable.
Lesson 5: Nuclear Weapons Decide—and Don't Solve
The fear of Iran becoming a nuclear power is one of the significant and long-standing reasons for its containment by the United States and Israel. If Iran already possessed nuclear weapons, as North Korea does, an attack on it would hardly have been possible in such a bold manner. As a strategic asset, Iran’s opponents can count on a delay in Tehran acquiring nuclear status. At the same time, neither the United States nor Israel has placed the use of nuclear weapons on the agenda as a tool for further escalation or as a means of defeating Iran—although both powers technically have the capacity for either a large-scale nuclear strike or targeted strikes with tactical charges. Beyond the obvious international condemnation, such a step is risky because it simply might not lead to victory.
Iran had every chance of maintaining stability and controllability even in the event of several nuclear strikes and the destruction of individual cities and infrastructure. Moreover, the determination to fight could reach a qualitatively new and unpredictable level. Nuclear weapons can theoretically be used, but even if they cause enormous damage, they will not necessarily lead to the defeat of the target country—especially if that country has spent decades preparing to repel an attack. This creates uncertainty. On the one hand, the political significance of nuclear arsenals is devalued in some (but not all) types of conflicts. On the other hand, the temptation to use them simply to inflict damage increases. The very design of nuclear deterrence may undergo changes against the backdrop of a revolution in military affairs.
Lesson 6: The Information Confrontation Is Large-Scale, but Its Results Are Limited
Modern information technologies provide enormous opportunities for propaganda and moral-psychological influence on the enemy. The conflict in the Persian Gulf was clearly asymmetrical—the United States possesses greater informational capabilities, given its control over global media and technological leadership. This may have helped undermine the situation in Iran on the eve of the war, but it still did not play a critical role. Numerous images of attacks on Iran failed to break the will to resist. Conversely, Iran’s informational impact on the enemy was also limited. We should also note the proliferation of AI-generated fakes; the quality of such “products” does not yet allow them to become a universal weapon. Nevertheless, the information component is becoming increasingly important in other conflicts, particularly the Ukrainian one.
Lesson 7: Exit Strategy Is More Complex Than Entry Strategy
A military campaign is easy to start; it is much more difficult to end—especially when initial goals remain unachieved. This is precisely the situation in which the United States found itself after its attempt to crush Iran with missile and bomb strikes failed. Retreat and compromise require a high price and are fraught with internal political risks. The very fact of negotiations may be received with hostility by the public and political opposition as a sign of weakness, not to mention actual concessions. The United States has shown that it can back down if the cost of escalation proves excessive—while recognizing that the final point has not been set, and that at an opportune moment, the guns may speak again. The strategy for exiting the conflict is becoming a formidable diplomatic and technical challenge. The United States and Israel did not crush Iran, but sought to withdraw in time. Iran, for its part, survived while managing to avoid a disastrous prolongation of the war. Time will tell how durable the results of such strategies will prove to be.
