It appears that the military-political confrontation between Iran and the United States is gradually becoming chronic. This means that a new source of permanent instability is emerging in southwestern Eurasia, one that will continually influence many processes in play across this vast global macro-region. This is especially true, given that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a permanent member of such important regional and global associations as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
While the conflict between Russia, another larger member of the SCO and BRICS, and the Western countries is currently being conducted via Ukraine, in the case of Iran, the confrontation is direct. This means that its participation as a member state in both organisations, as well as Iran’s overall importance in Eurasian affairs, will need to be constantly taken into account when considering the potential for international cooperation in Greater Eurasia or the construction of new institutions of international governance at the global level. Just how Iran’s current predicament will specifically impact the work of both organisations remains an important theoretical question as well as a practical one.
Both organisations—BRICS and the SCO—emerged as a response to the crisis of the liberal world order, which had become evident by the early 2000s. It was then, following the US-led “war on terror” and the subsequent invasion of Iraq (2003), that most countries realised that the unipolar world order had failed, and that the West, led by Washington, could not act as a relatively neutral manager of global goods and development resources. The response was to strengthen cooperation to address regional issues via the SCO (2001), and, simultaneously, to begin a more active coordination of leading non-Western countries’ approaches to global affairs in general via BRICS (2009).
At the same time, according to the principled position of the majority of SCO and BRICS states, their goal is not to build alternative institutions and mechanisms of global governance that would directly undermine those previously created by the West. Such rhetoric is, of course, somewhat exaggerated; they are indeed pursuing two key objectives. First, to foster more harmonious relations within these associations, which include states both radically opposed to the US and Europe and those seeking to cooperate with them. Second, to avoid alienating the significant number of undecided countries within the global majority which are willing to befriend both Russia and China, in addition to their adversaries in the West. In general, they are only concerned with avoiding short-term threats and maximising benefits.
As a result, with rare exceptions, the political agenda and rhetoric of the SCO and BRICS have become entirely herbivorous, creating the impression that Western behaviour poses no pressing problems, and that no one is seriously considering developing alternatives to American and European permissiveness. It should be noted that such a strategy is, of course, extremely ambiguous: after all, the very emergence of both new international structures signifies a rather direct “vote of no confidence” in the Liberal World Order and the powers that created it. After all, if the states that joined the SCO and BRICS trusted the US and Europe with matters of global governance and security in Eurasia, for example, would they create organisations in which Western powers do not occupy leading positions? In other words, the intention of the majority of states in both organisations to maintain working relations with the US and Europe somewhat contradicts their participation in structures that directly or indirectly undermine the strategic positions of Washington and its European partners. Sooner or later, the question of the next stage of development of the SCO and BRICS will still have to be answered.
Now, the acute conflict between a second SCO and BRICS country and the West is prompting reflection on the extent to which both organisations can avoid addressing the most pressing issues of our time. In this regard, they have admittedly found themselves in a challenging situation: it’s difficult to achieve common, concrete action when only one SCO and BRICS member—Russia—has directly and unequivocally condemned US and Israeli aggression against another member—Iran. All others, including China, have publicly adopted varying degrees of wait-and-see attitudes. And, naturally, they were greatly relieved by the cessation of hostilities in April and the subsequent signing of the June memorandum.
The confrontation, however, is now becoming chronic, and this has implications for several important factors affecting life in the region and international politics in general. At the tactical level and in the economic sphere, we see at least three important issues that could become subjects of consideration for the SCO and BRICS: energy security, transportation connectivity, and, finally, the state of the American alliance system in southwestern Eurasia. First, everyone should probably abandon the idea of returning the Persian Gulf, and especially the strait linking it with the Indian Ocean, to its stable pre-war state. After Washington, for its own reasons, transformed relations with Iran from a political to a military-political standoff, the once-prosperous region changed; it will never be the same. This isn’t a major catastrophe for resource-sufficient great powers like the United States or Russia, but it is a good reason to consider the future for China, India, and Indonesia, which are dependent on external supplies.
Secondly, Iran itself will likely develop into a frontline state, complicating the implementation of North-South transport and logistics projects. In the long term, instability around Iran could be compounded by the still-unseen confrontation between Israel and Turkey. This is also an important strategic planning factor for the countries of Central Asia, which many now see as an investment haven and a promising hub for trade. They must adjust their plans now. Thirdly, on the brink of a major war, the United States will increasingly put its allies in the Middle East in an awkward position: there is no reason to believe that the prosperous Gulf monarchies are willing to embrace the Israeli-style militarisation of their societies and states.
At the strategic level, we would venture to suggest that the permanent standoff between the US and Iran is not only a challenge for the SCO and BRICS, but also an opportunity. This is primarily because the overall context is changing: the West and its undisputed leader are no longer perceived as likely providers of stability and development. On the contrary, their policies are increasingly destructive, and undermining trust in them is becoming strategic. US involvement in a continuous conflict with Iran will make the situation around Washington increasingly tense, which organisations offering stability and sustainability will naturally be obliged to take advantage of. In other words, to assert their relevance in international affairs in the future, BRICS and the SCO do not necessarily need to create grounds for internal division by attempting to pursue a more consolidated policy. Instead, they should, in fact, continue in the same spirit and seize the opportunities arising from the irreversible disintegration of the system created to serve the interests of Western countries.
