The overall developments, military deployments, readiness levels, and defensive exercises indicate that if negotiations fail and diplomacy proves unsuccessful, Iran in a new round of conflict—unlike the 12-day war—intends to use the full extent of its defensive and military capabilities, writes Vali Kaleji.
While indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States are underway with Omani mediation, and both sides have allowed space for diplomacy, the prospect of another war in the Middle East continues to loom large—one that could prove more intense and expansive than the 12-day conflict of June 2025. The large-scale deployment of US forces and equipment to the region, including aircraft carriers, submarines, surface combatants, refueling aircraft, and air and missile defense systems, suggests that Washington’s objectives may extend beyond merely signaling or pressuring Iran to return to the negotiating table and accept US demands.
There is little doubt that, despite repeated statements by both Iranian and US officials emphasizing a preference for diplomacy, the current round of indirect negotiations remains highly fragile and fraught with challenges. If, however, a military conflict was to become unavoidable—one that would likely be more extensive and intense than the twelve-day war in June 2025—the question arises as to what options Iran would have at its disposal for response and what scenarios might plausibly be envisaged.
There is little doubt that Iran’s response could encompass a broad spectrum of targets, including strikes against Israel—even if Israel were not to participate directly in a US-led military campaign—as well as US military bases across the region and American assets and naval platforms deployed in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea.
Mark Rubio, the Secretary of State, has stated that the United States has 30,000 to 40,000 troops in 9 bases across the Middle East, all of which are vulnerable to Iranian drones and missiles. These forces and bases in Iraq, Syria Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, and Jordan are not only exposed to Iranian missiles and drones, but they could also simultaneously be attacked by proxy groups/the “Axis of Resistance” with missiles, rockets, drones, mortars, and, in some cases, suicide attacks. It is for this reason that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, recently warned that that “The US should know that if it starts a new war, this time it will be a regional war”.
Ballistic and Hypersonic Missiles
Iran has the largest stockpile of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, according to the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Iranian missiles have a self-imposed range of 2,000 km (1,240 miles), which officials in the past said was enough to protect the country since it covers the distance to Israel. The arsenal encompasses multiple long-range missiles that can reach Israel, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It says these include the Sejil, with a range of 2,000 km; Emad, 1,700 km; Ghadr, 2,000 km; Shahab-3, 1,300 km; Khorramshahr, 2,000 km; and Hoveyzeh 1,350 km. The unveiling of a new missile city in Iran—particularly the hypersonic Khorramshahr-4 missile on 6 February—carried out at the peak of tensions and amid the large-scale deployment of US forces and equipment to the Middle East, showcased a new level of Iran’s missile capabilities. The Khorramshahr-4 hypersonic missile can cover a distance of 2,000 kilometers in 12 minutes, posing a potential threat to Israel’s missile-defense shield known as the Iron Dome.
Therefore, from Israel’s perspective, unlike during the 12-day war in June, Iran’s missile capabilities—especially its ballistic missiles—constitute a more immediate threat to Israel as well as to the United States. After the 12-day war, many Iranian military officials stated that the country had not used all of its missile capabilities, especially the new generation of missiles. In this regard Iran’s Defense Minister, Brigadier General Aziz Nasirzadeh, stated that newly manufactured missiles with enhanced capabilities would be deployed in response to any new Israeli aggression.
In this context, Netanyahu is exerting significant pressure on Washington to ensure that any agreement with Iran should include reductions in Iran’s missile capabilities, including cutting missile ranges to below 500 kilometers; otherwise, if no deal is reached, the destruction of those missile capabilities should be placed high on the agenda as an immediate priority in any subsequent strike. Iranian officials are also strongly opposed to any reduction in missile ranges. In this regard, Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said that “reducing missile ranges to “below 500 kilometers” would effectively mean accepting coercion and surrender. “If you were in our position and negotiating, would you be willing to take away the country’s most important defensive weapon from us?” he asked, describing such a demand as tantamount to seriously weakening the country’s defensive capabilities.
Therefore, the first and most significant option available to Iran in responding to a potential US and Israeli military strike would be the employment of its ballistic and hypersonic missile capabilities. Unlike the twelve-day conflict in June—during which missiles were reportedly launched in relatively limited numbers but on a sustained, staggered basis over time—such capabilities could, in a future scenario, be deployed in a single, simultaneous, and large-scale salvo. In combination with missile attacks by proxy groups/ the “Axis of Resistance”, this approach could potentially overwhelm or penetrate Israel’s missile defense architecture, including the Iron Dome, as well as the air and missile defense systems protecting US military bases in the region, thereby inflicting significant and wide-ranging damage.
Asymmetric Warfare: A Combination of Unmanned Aerial Systems and Fast Attack Crafts
During the twelve-day war, the United States launched an attack from the northern Indian Ocean with the assistance of an Ohio-class submarine, firing 30 Tomahawk missiles at the nuclear facilities in Isfahan and Natanz. This strike effectively complemented the bombing of those same nuclear sites by B-52 bombers. Nevertheless, the scope of the confrontation between Iran and the United States did not extend into a naval war, and Iran’s response was an attack on the US military base at Al Udeid in Qatar.
According to Ahmad Vahidi, deputy commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in response to the question “Why did the Quds Force or the IRGC Navy not enter the war?”, “It is not the case that in a war all of our forces are deployed at once. We commit portions of our capabilities in proportion to the requirements. Have we deployed all of our missile capabilities? We used only the portion that was necessary. We do not intend to bring all of our power into the field from the outset.”
Accordingly, in contrast to the twelve-day conflict—during which Iran’s naval forces were not directly engaged—the large-scale deployment of US equipment, warships, and aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea has rendered maritime confrontation—should a war occur—largely unavoidable. Under such conditions, in addition to the naval fleets of the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operating in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, a combination of unmanned aerial systems and fast attack craft could generate a form of asymmetric warfare across the region which could be particularly significant in the narrow width of the Strait of Hormuz and the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf.
Proxy Groups / the “Axis of Resistance”
During the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2025, the proxy groups that Iran refers to as the “Axis of Resistance” did not play an active role. Some Iranian officials even stated that there had been requests from these groups to participate, but Iran chose not to use their capabilities at that time. But now, it seems that the situation has changed. The open support of leaders of proxy groups in the Middle East for Iran, particularly the Supreme Leader who is facing direct threats from the United States, is a significant development.
Various Shiite groups in Iraq declared their support for Iran, even expressing readiness for jihadist and martyrdom operations. For instance, Kataib Hezbollah announced it was prepared for “total war” if the US attacked Iran. Abu Hussein al‑Hamidawi, the Iraqi group’s leader, said the “enemies” of the Islamic Republic will face “the bitterest forms of death”. In Lebanon, Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem on January 26 warned that “a war on Iran this time will ignite the region. In Addition, Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi group threatened new attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, as a US aircraft carrier moved toward the region amid rising tensions over Iran. The Houthis released a short video showing images of a burning ship with the caption “Soon,” without giving details.
Therefore, unlike the twelve-day war, simultaneous missile and rocket attacks by proxy groups—the so-called Axis of Resistance—alongside Iran’s hypersonic and ballistic missile launches as well as drone operations, could expose US military bases in the region and Israel’s missile-defense system, known as the Iron Dome, to greater threat and vulnerability than was seen during the twelve-day conflict.
Closure of the Strait of Hormuz
This option can be regarded as the final scenario in the chain of Iran’s potential responses to a US and Israeli attack. In recent years, some Iranian officials and analysts have threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, yet this threat has never been carried out. According to one scenario, this is carried out by laying naval mines on the sea surface and then using anti-ship cruise missiles and small submarines to disrupt mine-clearing operations.
However, if a large-scale and intense war were to occur, Iran might implement such a measure. As Seyed Jalal Dehghani Firouzabadi, secretary of Iran’s Foreign Relations Council, recently noted, “If a war breaks out in the region, energy security will be endangered and the Strait of Hormuz will be closed.” The naval forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have also launched a large-scale exercise titled “Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz” starting Monday, 16 February. The rapid, decisive, and comprehensive response of IRGC operational forces to anti-security plots in the maritime domain is at the core of the intelligence and operational exercises of the units participating in the drill.
There is little doubt that closing the Strait of Hormuz would have extremely wide-ranging geopolitical and geo-economic consequences. If such a scenario were to materialise, roughly one-quarter of the world’s oil supply and about one-fifth of global natural gas supplies would be disrupted. Prices could rise above $100 per barrel. This assessment suggests that Iran’s geopolitical weight in global energy markets extends beyond its actual share in oil and gas production and exports, which have for years been constrained by extensive economic sanctions.
Conclusion
The overall developments, military deployments, readiness levels, and defensive exercises indicate that if negotiations fail and diplomacy proves unsuccessful, Iran in a new round of conflict—unlike the 12-day war—intends to use the full extent of its defensive and military capabilities. This would create a complex combination of conventional military formations and asymmetric warfare. The geography of the conflict, in addition to Iran and Israel, would also encompass countries in the region that host US military bases, as well as a vast maritime area including the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea. The overall outcome would be a broad regional war with dimensions and consequences that could prove uncontrollable.
