Valdai Club

2026

Polycentricity and Diversity

Anton Bespalov

Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Deputy Editor-in-Chief of valdaiclub.com

One of the main lessons of the first quarter of the 21st century is that universalist models of world order do not work. Despite economic and cultural globalisation, the world has not become uniform, and the widespread use of a limited number of technological platforms has not erased cultural and civilisational differences. The “unipolar moment” proved brief, and the “end of history” never arrived. The world has entered a stage of forming a new order, accompanied by the erosion of structures inherited from the past.

The bipolar confrontation of the second half of the 20th century lent a certain coherence and discipline to the international system; ideological fault lines made it easy to distinguish “friends” from “foes.” Today, as the old world order crumbles, nostalgia for that era is not uncommon, and the revival of global ideological confrontation may seem an attractive tool for mobilising allies.

However, the world refuses to return to the old framework. The evolution of the international system creates both new risks and opportunities. Traditional notions of alliances are eroding, and new, sometimes quite bizarre, configurations are emerging on the global stage. The struggle for global influence and economic opportunities is accompanied by the advancement of competing value systems. The programme’s goal is to study the nature, driving forces, and consequences of the emergence of a polycentric world order.

Opinions

Syria at the Crossroads of Conflicts and Foreign Interests

In 2025, the new government in Syria failed to demonstrate an ability to create stable institutions, ensure public security, or establish mechanisms for social consensus. Competition between armed groups has made the country vulnerable to localised outbreaks of violence, ethno-confessional conflicts, and new waves of destabilisation, writes Nikolay Sukhov.

RIC in 2026: What It Can and Cannot Do

The Russia–India–China (RIC) framework is neither obsolete nor transformative. Its value is limited but real: it keeps channels open and enables selective, low-cost coordination among three Eurasian powers in a fragmented order. With realistic expectations, RIC can function as a pragmatic stabiliser; burdened with grand ambitions, it will likely disappoint and expose the fractures it cannot resolve, Nong Hong writes.

Redrawing the Map: Geopolitical Thought Behind Trump’s Greenland Ambition

The US purchase of Alaska in 1867 established its status as an Arctic power. In the century that followed, Greenland emerged as a complementary strategic point for consolidating influence in the circumpolar region and controlling approaches to North America, Sellita writes.

Anti-Hegemonism and the Dynamics of Relations in the Russia-India-China Triangle

Russia—for which constructing a stable security order in Eurasia remains the overriding priority—is uniquely positioned to serve as a catalyst for understanding between Beijing and New Delhi, both in bilateral conversations and through multilateral platforms, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Anton Bespalov.

‘Whether They Like It or Not’: Trump’s Bid to Annex Greenland

While it’s doubtful that a conflict will arise if European troops are deployed to Greenland, it’s unlikely that Brussels will ever see NATO in the same light again. Like France under Charles de Gaulle, the EU should consider pursuing a “third way” between the US and Russia, writes Travis Jones.