Given the persistent mutual hostility, distrust, and unwillingness to compromise on both sides, the prospects for a durable political and diplomatic settlement of the conflict between Iran and the United States remain uncertain, although temporary tactical agreements on specific issues cannot be ruled out, writes Alexander Maryasov.
Iranian–American relations deteriorated sharply following the Islamic Revolution and the hostage-taking of staff at the United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979. From being a reliable regional ally, Iran turned into an irreconcilable political and ideological adversary of Washington. Every US president pursued a hard-line anti-Iran policy, imposed sanctions, and threatened the use of force. However, Donald Trump went further than any of them—he withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear programme, and twice, together with Israel, initiated war against Iran.
Given the persistent mutual hostility, distrust, and unwillingness to compromise on both sides, the prospects for a durable political and diplomatic settlement of the conflict between Iran and the United States remain uncertain, although temporary tactical agreements on specific issues cannot be ruled out.
The Iranian Revolution and the hostage-taking of American diplomats dealt a severe blow to the pride and prestige of the United States. To this day, it has not been able to rid itself of the sense of humiliation and helplessness experienced in 1979. This continues to shape the hostile course pursued by any American administration towards Iran.
Despite the fact that anti-Americanism constitutes one of the core elements of the Islamic Republic’s political ideology, proponents of normalising relations with the United States always existed within the Iranian establishment—figures prepared to pursue compromise arrangements with Washington that would not threaten Iran’s security or infringe upon its national interests.
In 1995, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani lobbied for the conclusion of a multi-billion-dollar contract with the American oil company Conoco for the development of the major Iranian oil field Sirri. However, the administration of President Bill Clinton not only blocked the deal, but also imposed an embargo on American investment in Iran’s energy sector and banned the development of economic relations with Tehran.
In 2003, when it became known that Iran was developing a nuclear programme, President Mohammad Khatami was prepared to agree to substantial limitations on nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and the establishment of trade and economic cooperation with the United States. Washington rejected the Iranian proposals.
The most successful attempt to resolve the most acute issue in Iranian–American relations was the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear problem in 2015 under President Hassan Rouhani. The implementation of this compromise document significantly restricted Iran’s enrichment activities, blocked Tehran’s path to developing nuclear weapons, provided for the lifting of anti-Iranian sanctions, and created the conditions for developing trade and economic cooperation between Iran and the United States.
However, in 2018, the United States withdrew from the agreements reached, and Iran ceased to comply with its obligations to limit nuclear activities. Under the Biden administration, Tehran and Washington made attempts to reconfigure and revive the nuclear deal. However, Donald Trump’s return to the White House interrupted these efforts.
Trump attempted to resolve the Iranian impasse by military means. Together with Israel, the United States launched massive missile and air strikes against Iran’s military, industrial, and civilian infrastructure. The primary objective of this unprovoked aggression was regime change and the installation in Tehran of an opposition force loyal to Washington. However, Iran demonstrated resilience and a readiness to go to the end in repelling what it perceived as an existential threat to its existence as a sovereign state. It also became clear that Iran lacks a strong, well-organised opposition capable of challenging the theocratic regime.
The regime itself proved resilient thanks to the extensive and deeply layered system of state authority and governance established by its founder, Ayatollah Khomeini, as well as the deeply rooted Shiite tradition of spiritual mobilisation, self-sacrifice, and acceptance of martyrdom in the struggle for faith and a just cause. The near-total destruction of much of the military infrastructure, the killing of numerous military and political leaders—including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—and the increasing intensity of bombardments targeting energy, oil and gas, and other facilities did not bring Washington any closer to victory over Iran, but instead strengthened the resolve of more radical figures who came to power, reinforcing their commitment to a harsh and uncompromising policy towards the United States.
Iranian–American negotiations in Islamabad, organised by Pakistan, although lasting more than twenty hours, did not result in concrete agreements. At the same time, during the talks, the Iranian side demonstrated a degree of flexibility and proposed a temporary, five-year freeze on enrichment activities, as well as significant dilution of its highly enriched uranium, which would render it unusable for the production of nuclear weapons. In return, the Iranians sought the lifting of sanctions and the unfreezing of their foreign currency assets held abroad.
The American side insisted on a twenty-year ban on enrichment activities, the removal of highly enriched uranium from the country, and the lifting of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Thus, no agreement was reached in Islamabad. However, as they left the capital of Pakistan, both delegations did not rule out the possibility of continuing negotiations within the framework of the declared ceasefire.
Dissatisfied with the outcome of the Islamabad talks, Trump decided to increase pressure on Iran by imposing a naval blockade. This step may limit Iran’s oil export capabilities, but could further exacerbate oil and gas problems for many countries.
Despite the ongoing concentration of United States naval forces around Iran, Trump, it appears, is unlikely to dare to launch a full-scale ground operation, as its implementation—even according to American military assessments—would lead to serious casualties among service personnel, which would be perceived painfully at home. However, limited military special operations cannot be ruled out. If the United States resumes hostilities, the Iranians will continue to resist fiercely and deliver painful strikes against American military bases and other targets in the Persian Gulf countries, while intensifying the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. It would be difficult for Trump to present this as a “decisive victory” over Iran.
If hostilities cease without a peace agreement, but with arrangements reached on certain issues, Iran will actively restore its military infrastructure and develop its missile programme in order to be prepared for new military provocations by the United States and Israel. To rebuild the country and compensate for the damage inflicted, Iran will seek to monetise its control over the Strait of Hormuz and will attempt to secure the unfreezing of its foreign assets.
Under conditions of continued mutual hostility and distrust, and an unwillingness to reach mutually acceptable solutions on such acute issues as the future of Iran’s missile programme, relations with proxy forces, and guarantees of non-aggression by the United States and Israel, the achievement of a sustainable peace agreement between Tehran and Washington does not appear possible.
