India faces a unique challenge where its strategic partners are at war with one another in a region of existential importance to it. This war, whatever its outcome, will create a loss of confidence and distrust among the Gulf majors in particular and the region in general regarding Washington’s capacity to remain credibly invested in their security, writes former Indian ambassador to Jordan, Libya and Malta Anil Trigunayat.
India, like the rest of the world, has hoped and worked for continued security and stability in West Asia, despite a wide array of hotspots and consequent volatility attributed to legacy issues and geopolitical contestations. However, prolonged hostility and the prevailing MAD syndrome between Israel and Iran were bound to lead to disaster sooner or later. The Trump 2.0 administration blew the lid off the restraint that several American presidents had assiduously maintained to avoid a direct war between Israel and Iran—precisely because of the kind of disastrous outcome being witnessed today. Israel has been clear and consistent in its objective of decimating the Iranian state, its nuclear capabilities and ambitions, and its drone and missile capabilities, whatever the cost. It began dismantling, degrading, and decapitating Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, which have been powerful proxies of Iran and instruments of its power projection across the Shia-Sunni divide.
The killing of IRGC General Soleimani by the US, the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus by Israel (which killed several leaders), and finally the 12-day war in June 2025 conducted in concert with Washington — despite reasonably successful negotiations — created a playbook that was repeated yet again on February 28, when the US and Israel attacked Iran, this time killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and dozens of other military and political leaders. This time around, Trump was played by Netanyahu and several of his inexperienced and partisan advisers into entering an all-out war with no clear strategy, objectives, or consistent agenda, hoping for a quick victory lap despite the Islamic Republic agreeing to significant and unprecedented concessions in the nuclear domain during the second phase of negotiations. Now Trump is seriously looking for an off-ramp to take without losing face, and the Iranians are insisting on a dignified exit and sufficient security guarantees to avoid “Lebanon Syndrome.” Though Trump claims he has many cards, it appears that all tricks, except heaping more destruction on the region, have been exhausted.
Iran at this time is not looking at the day after and is more focused on its survival. Hence, its attacks on US bases and assets in the region, especially in GCC countries, continue. This will be the biggest challenge for Iran in reassuring its Islamic neighbours, as it is inflicting economic and reputational pain on them.
India considers the West Asia region its extended neighbourhood, and under PM Modi has transformed relationships with all regional majors from transactional to truly strategic under the rubric of its ‘Act West’ policy. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are among India’s top five trading and investment partners. India’s interest is also driven by the four Es: Energy and Food and Fertiliser security—most of which is sourced from the region and beyond; Economic engagement, which is robust and involves hundreds of billions of dollars; Ease of navigation, as 85% of trade comes from or passes through the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea; and finally, the Indian expatriates—nearly 10 million people who remit over $70 billion annually—whose security and welfare are of paramount importance.
At the start of the current conflict, India issued a statement urging respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, which implicitly called out US and Israeli aggression against Iran. Simultaneously, it also implied deep concern over Iran’s violation of the sovereignty of its Gulf neighbours, even if under the guise of attacks on US bases and assets. India was also concerned about the sinking of the Iranian ship IIS Dena in international waters off the coast of Sri Lanka by the US Navy, while it was returning after participating in the Milan exercises conducted by India. New Delhi has provided all assistance to the Iranians and even offered safe harbour to other ships.
Mindful of intra-regional rivalries and hotspots, New Delhi has followed a ‘four Ds’ policy: Dialogue, Diplomacy, De-hyphenation, and De-escalation. Indian PM Narendra Modi and Foreign Minister Dr. Jaishankar have been speaking to all regional and several world leaders, including Iranian President Pezeshkian, Israeli PM Netanyahu, and US President Trump, urging an end to the war and a return to the path of peace and dialogue. Dr. Jaishankar also attended the G7 Foreign Ministers’ meeting and discussed with other partners how to contain the devastating impact of the war. Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri also attended the 60-country meeting called by the UK and urged dialogue and diplomacy to end the war and keep the Strait of Hormuz open. India stands for freedom of navigation.
This quiet diplomacy has paid off, as Tehran has made exceptions for Indian ships and supplies and helped in the evacuation of Indians from Iran. As a result of the ongoing war, India has faced serious disruptions in supply chains and raised the issue with Washington as well. The USA waived sanctions on imports of Russian and Iranian oil, at least for a month. But if the war expands and escalates further, the impact and situation could become far more dangerous, with long-lasting regional and global consequences; hence, India is working to find pathways to a ceasefire and an end to the conflict.
This war has also raised another challenge for India as the current chair of BRICS. Three of the group’s members—Iran, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia—are directly involved in the conflict. Hence, reaching a consensus on a statement regarding the conflict has hit a dead end, since the trust deficit among the three has expanded manifold during the ongoing war. At the same time, in Indian public perception there is confusion as to why the two superpowers in BRICS—China and Russia—have not acted to contain the US-Israeli aggression against their ally Iran and have remained below the threshold.
Ironically, India faces a unique challenge where all its strategic partners are at war with one another in a region of existential importance to it. This war, whatever its outcome, will create a loss of confidence and distrust among the Gulf majors in particular and the region in general regarding Washington’s capacity to remain credibly invested in their security. This could, as an unintended consequence, provide an edge to China. It could even accelerate the race for nuclear weapons and capabilities in the region. This may be a concern for India, and it may have to adopt a more proactive mode with regard to economic, defence, and security cooperation with its strategic partners in the region, with or without the US. Hence, the primary objective remains an early end to hostilities and a return to the path of diplomacy.
