The sudden disruption in global trade brought on by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has exposed a stark reality of contemporary global commons—the high seas no longer serve as secure superhighways linking international centres of economic activity. Those seas are now perceived with greater caution as the risks and uncertainty inherent to the maritime space increasingly come into focus for a number of powers. Prokhor Tebin, Director of the Center for Military-Economic Studies at HSE University, explores the maritime dimension of the war with Iran, pondering the consequences for American sea power and the logistics of global trade.
The reflections set out below offer a critical assessment of the policy pursued by the administration of Donald Trump in the context of the war with Iran as a whole, and of the situation surrounding the Strait of Hormuz in particular. It is therefore necessary to make a caveat before proceeding to the main body of the argument.
The military power of the United States—and, in particular, of the US Navy—is immense. Together with Israel, the United States is capable of inflicting enormous damage on Iran’s economy and its military potential. The threat to Iran, its future, and regional security is extremely grave. For Russia, China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, and Iran’s neighbours, the current situation represents a serious challenge and a threat to security. Iran’s military potential and its strategic resilience have come as an unpleasant surprise to the United States, yet they should not be exaggerated.
Nevertheless, it must be stated that for the United States the current war is already marked by failures—at least two. First, there is an obvious failure of planning. As far as can be judged, the US political and military leadership, when initiating the war with Iran, did not fundamentally consider the possibility of its protraction and the emergence of a real threat to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. And if such a possibility was considered, it was conveniently ignored. This can only be described as a gross miscalculation.
Second, for all its power, the United States has demonstrated glaring weakness at the narrative level. The penchant for “big, beautiful deals” has played a cruel trick on the current administration. Trump’s statements in other contexts can be seen as an eccentric yet shrewd, forceful, and overall fairly successful tactic. In the case of the situation around the Strait of Hormuz, however, Trump’s rapidly shifting, kaleidoscopic statements appear as signs of confusion and inconsistency. To sharpen the point polemically—Trump’s tweets regarding the Strait of Hormuz have inflicted significant damage on American sea power, even compared with the operational strain placed on the fleet over the past 15–20 years.
Forces and Assets
Only now has the United States begun to concentrate in the region a naval grouping that can be described as more or less suitable for military operations against an adversary such as Iran. As of 20 April, the US Navy has three carrier strike groups (CSGs) either near or en route to the Strait of Hormuz.
In the immediate vicinity of the Strait is the CSG led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72). The group includes two destroyers; additionally, seven more destroyers and one littoral combat ship (LCS) are present in the Arabian Sea, along with an amphibious ready group led by the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA-7). The CSG of the aircraft carrier USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77), including three destroyers, has entered the area of responsibility of US Central Command, rounding Madagascar and southern Africa. The CSG of the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), including two destroyers, has entered the Red Sea. A further two destroyers are in the eastern Mediterranean.
It is worth noting that the USS Tripoli joined the grouping only at the end of March. Movements of other ready amphibious groups towards the Middle East, despite earlier reports, have not been observed—yet. Accordingly, the likelihood of even a limited amphibious operation against Iran (for example, against Khark Island) appears low.
For comparison—in the 2001–2002 Afghanistan operation, the US Navy employed up to three CSGs simultaneously (and for several days in October 2001, there were as many as four). During the operation in Iraq in 2003, the US Navy concentrated five CSGs in the Persian Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean. In NATO’s operation against Yugoslavia, one American CSG participated, but this was offset by the active involvement of other NATO member states, the overwhelming imbalance of forces, and NATO’s geographical proximity to the theatre of operations.
As of 8 April, the United States reported 10,200 sorties and the destruction of more than 13,000 targets over 38 days of war with Iran. Israel, as of 10 April, reported 8,500 sorties and 10,800 targets struck.
To the US naval grouping engaged in the war with Iran, one must of course add Israeli forces and the US Air Force. Even so, the composition of the naval grouping reveals an initial desire by the United States to wage a “short victorious war” without any genuine Plan B.
Guarantor of Maritime Trade—Or Its Saboteur?
In the context of the current events around the Strait of Hormuz, one is reminded of the 2007 US maritime strategy. At its core stood ideas of multilateralism and international cooperation. Preliminary research conducted during the development of the strategy noted that preserving the existing global system of international trade—based on maritime commerce—was a shared interest of all states, even of such potential US adversaries as North Korea and Iran.
Today, as is evident, the situation is entirely different. Iran’s actions are, in fact, quite logical—the Islamic Republic has found an asymmetric method of waging warfare under conditions of US superiority and Iran’s inability to pose a real threat to US territory or to forces operating beyond the range of Iranian weapons. Meanwhile, US actions have contributed to the destabilisation of maritime trade rather than its protection.
There are many foundations underpinning American power and, more broadly, the United States’ position in international politics, but among the most important are the network of US alliances and its status as the world’s leading naval power. Both of these pillars are now deteriorating—and the current administration is actively contributing to this process. Indeed, the war with Iran may be regarded as a self-inflicted wound, both in terms of alliances and in terms of the role of guarantor of the global trading system.
In this situation, the United States is transforming from a guarantor of globalisation and the development of the world economy into its disruptor. Regional security frameworks will also develop. This is already visible, for instance, in the case of Pakistan, which is seeking both to play a mediating role in the conflict and to develop security ties, including within the framework of a recent agreement with Saudi Arabia.
Another point that comes to mind is the once-popular American concept of Air-Sea Battle, aimed at countering so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems—including precisely the means that Iran is now actively employing. Indeed, a conflict with Iran was one of the two key potential scenarios, alongside a conflict with China, within the framework of Air-Sea Battle thinking. The fact that, a decade and a half later, the realisation of such a scenario appears to come as a surprise to the US military is somewhat striking.
Naval Mines—The Great Equaliser
Two additional points, seemingly unrelated at first glance, deserve mention—naval mines and the condition of US alliances. It is precisely naval mines that constitute the asymmetric weapon capable of playing a decisive role in scenarios involving the disruption of sea lines of communication in littoral zones and straits. What, then, can the US Navy offer in response?
In the field of mine countermeasures, the US Navy is experiencing an acute crisis. This is partly due to errors and problems in shipbuilding programmes dating back to the era of George W. Bush. It is also partly due to the US Navy’s focus on more “glamorous” and high-tech domains such as missile defence, air defence, carrier aviation, and the nuclear submarine fleet. A certain neglect of mine countermeasure issues, however, is characteristic of some other naval powers as well…
As noted above, the US naval grouping in the Arabian Sea currently includes only a single littoral combat ship—USS Canberra (LCS-30)—equipped with a mine countermeasures module. Two similar ships, usually based within the area of responsibility of the Fifth Fleet, are currently in Southeast Asia, where, according to US Navy statements, they are undergoing routine maintenance.
Four ageing Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships, previously assigned to the Fifth Fleet, were decommissioned in autumn 2025. At the beginning of April, reports emerged that the US Navy was redeploying two of the four Avenger-class ships based in Japan to the Central Command area of responsibility In recent days, they have departed Sri Lanka.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may claim that the United States has destroyed 95% of Iran’s naval mine arsenal during the operation, yet even the remaining 5% of mines are capable of causing considerable disruption to shipping. The mine threat will be perceived by civilian vessels as real so long as there remains any possibility of mines being present in the Strait. At the same time, reports indicate that Iran has conducted renewed minelaying operations and continues active measures to assert control over shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
Trump’s statements that demining operations are already under way—and that he has ordered the pace of work to be tripled—raise serious questions. Most likely, this merely reflects the arrival of two Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships from Japan to join USS Canberra. At the same time, press reports indicate that, during closed hearings in Congress, Pentagon representatives stated that it would take six months to clear the Strait of Hormuz of mines, and that the operation itself could begin only after the end of the conflict—presumably due to the threat posed to minesweepers and other forces operating near the Iranian coast.
But what does this have to do with the network of US alliances? Traditionally, the US Navy has implemented a form of “division of labour” in its force development alongside its allies in Europe and Asia. This made it possible to concentrate on key competencies, relying on allied navies to cover certain niche tasks—including mine countermeasures. However, the strategic conduct of the United States in the war with Iran, and more broadly the behaviour of the Trump administration towards its NATO allies, has alienated many European countries, effectively depriving the US Navy—at least for now—of the ability to supplement its capabilities with the niche competencies of its European allies.
The Costs of Operation Epic Fury
The price of the war with Iran for the US Navy is significant. First, it entails considerable operational strain in a region that is not the highest priority in current US politico-military strategy (the priority being the Western Hemisphere and the Indo-Pacific). The first administration of Barack Obama also sought to pivot towards the Indo-Pacific, reducing its presence in the Middle East. In reality, however, the effort to wind down operations in Iraq and Afghanistan paradoxically required a substantial initial increase in engagement in the Middle East. A similar pattern is now unfolding.
The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) has already set a record for the length of a combat deployment since the Cold War (excluding the prolonged deployment of USS Nimitz (CVN-68) in 2020–2021 due to COVID-19 restrictions). Its deployment has now exceeded 300 days, compared with a planned duration of around 210 days for US carriers. Moreover, such levels of operational strain are not isolated. Even before the war with Iran, there were deployments related to operations against the Houthis and to maintaining a presence in the Euro-Atlantic. Such strain has a highly detrimental effect on personnel and materiel, leads to delays in scheduled repairs and maintenance, increases costs, and produces other negative consequences.
The current operational burden on amphibious forces is also extremely high. The United States has deployed three ready amphibious groups (in the Caribbean, near Guam, and in the Arabian Sea), representing a high level of strain—particularly in light of the loss of USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) in 2020.
Second, the war with Iran has led to a significant expenditure of costly missiles. The situation is compounded by the stated need to increase stockpiles in the context of competition with China, as well as by the requirement to supply allies—including in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Reports have already emerged of delays in the delivery of American weapons to European and Asian allies.
According to some estimates, the United States has already expended 27% of its stockpile of Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles, 23% of JASSM air-launched cruise missiles, 44% of PrSM operational-tactical missiles, 32% of SM-3 interceptors, more than half of its THAAD inventory, 16% of SM-6 surface-to-air missiles, and 45% of Patriot systems (based on the lower-bound estimate of missile expenditure).
In just the first two days, $5.6 billion worth of munitions were expended, and over 38 days of active operations total costs are unofficially estimated at $28–35 billion. Restoring pre-war stockpile levels—and further expanding them—will take years. In fairness, it should be noted that the United States possesses substantial reserves of other munitions, albeit often less advanced or with shorter effective ranges (JDAM, SDB, AMRAAM, and so forth).
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that another casualty for the US Navy in connection with the war in Iran may be Secretary of the Navy John Phelan, who was abruptly dismissed in recent days. The reasons for this decision remain unclear, yet the dismissal of another senior Pentagon official cannot but attract attention.
What Next?
At present, we are effectively observing two blockades coexisting in parallel. The first, American, aims to block Iranian ports. The second, Iranian, restricts vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz. Both sides are seeking to ensure the effectiveness of their own blockade while lifting or significantly reducing the effectiveness of their opponent’s.
The likelihood of a resumption of intense hostilities—and escalation risks more broadly—remains. Either side may choose to escalate. This is evidenced, among other things, by the continued build-up of the US naval grouping in the region. Nor should Iran’s threats be dismissed entirely—for example, its potential to disrupt maritime trade in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, or to affect undersea internet cables. There is little desire to speculate on the threats voiced by Trump in early April (which, fortunately, have thus far proved empty), yet neither should they be forgotten entirely.
In conclusion, one obvious point must be made—China is watching the developments in the Middle East very closely and drawing conclusions, both in the military and political spheres. American observers are already expressing concern that at the forthcoming summit between the two countries’ leaders, Donald Trump may find himself at a disadvantage.
