Donald Trump’s moves on the international stage are increasingly defined by a reckless, snowballing habit of asserting American power by means of unrestrained military force—with Iran being the current target. Oleg Barabanov, Valdai Club Programme Director, ponders the nature of the strategic calculations behind Trump’s assault on Iran, describing the president’s approach as “I want it, therefore I can do it”.
The actions of US President Donald Trump have shown that the approach of the “global hegemon” has now come to rely exclusively on force. Moreover, the desire to use force is restrained by neither legal nor moral norms. Even possible self-imposed limits associated with the calculable uncertainty of the consequences of one’s own actions no longer function. A similar approach can, if one wishes, also be observed in a number of other cases. As a result, the principle of “I want to, therefore I do” is increasingly becoming one of the defining principles of modern world politics. It is a simple and unsophisticated principle, and one cannot even say that it is new. This was the case before, and indeed, throughout history, it has perhaps always been so.
In the past, however, this principle generally still included another element: “I can”—“I want to, I can, and I do”. Now, that element of “I can” is often dropped from the formula altogether and no longer taken into account. Firstly, because calculating one’s actions under conditions of conflict-related uncertainty is difficult and does not necessarily lead to the results originally intended. Secondly, because the force of desire—the element of “I want”—becomes psychologically dominant and all-consuming for the decision-maker. The psychological profile of Trump himself may well fit this pattern. As a result, an equals sign is immediately placed between the elements of “I want” and “I can” in such decision-making processes. Here, “I want” a priori implies “I can”. Or rather: “I will probably manage somehow, and then things will somehow sort themselves out.” All of this resembles, to some extent, the well-known general psychological principle of “keep your eyes on the goal, believe in yourself, and ignore the obstacles”. Here, however, this general motivational mindset is elevated to the basis of foreign policy and military decision-making.
At times, it must be admitted, such an approach works. One example is Trump’s operation in Venezuela. But there are also occasions when it does not work—surprising though that may seem. This applies to the current conflict in Iran, as well as in a number of other instances. It sometimes happens that everything that was planned in advance and in great detail cannot, in practice, be implemented in the course of military-political struggle. And this is precisely what, once again, happened to Trump in Iran. Naturally, in public he said that everything was proceeding according to plan, and he will say so even more insistently if efforts to settle this conflict ultimately lead to a more or less stable ceasefire. But that does not change the essence of the matter.
Iran’s resistance to Trump could probably have been predicted. In Iran’s case, moreover, we are speaking not metaphorically, but quite specifically, of collective political will. Since the death first of Ali Khamenei and then that of Ali Larijani, and, if rumours are to be believed, the severe injury or even coma of Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran has been left without a single supreme leader. Iran’s collective political will managed not to succumb to Trump’s “Venezuelan temptation”, in which it is enough to remove but one person and everyone else proceeds to rapidly adjust to new conditions. I have already written that it is difficult to blame the Venezuelan leaders for this, given the obvious inequality of forces and the simple human instinct for self-preservation, which at a critical moment suppresses, in very many people, the desire to continue fighting for their ideals. Moreover, they did not yet have before them the example of Iranian resistance. The external imbalance of power between the US and Iran, although not as overwhelming as that between the US and Venezuela, also appeared entirely obvious. Yet Iran’s collective political will chose to resist.
This raises the question of whether the US was capable of calculating the possible forms of Iranian resistance. In my view, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, although it clearly came as a surprise to the United States, was entirely foreseeable. Ever since last year’s 12-day war, only the lazy had failed to write about it. Another matter is that the Trump administration and the Pentagon—if they calculated war scenarios at all—may well have concluded that if Iran had not closed the strait during the 12-day war, then it never would. That Iran’s notorious red lines amounted to nothing more than threatening rhetoric. Recent global military-political history may have seemed to provide Americans with examples confirming this view. As a result, they may have fallen under the sway of the self-suggestion that Iran would behave in the same way. Taken together with what they saw as the irresistible pull of the Venezuelan temptation—abandoning resistance and caving in—they likely did not seriously consider the possibility of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz.
It was more difficult, however, to calculate another element of Iran’s resistance strategy. Namely, that in response to strikes by the US and Israel, Iran would strike not only Israel, as it did during the 12-day war. For the Americans, this may have been viewed as inevitable, but not particularly significant in strategic terms—a form of collateral damage within the military campaign. Iran chose differently. The idea that the Arab Gulf states would be made to pay the price for the actions of the US and Israel was genuinely difficult to predict.
This kind of asymmetric warfare strategy on Iran’s part truly came as a surprise to almost everyone. It is doubtful that any preliminary scenario for this war extended beyond one or two symbolic strikes on American bases in those countries—with prior warnings and notifications—as had been the case during the 12-day war. Iran, however, chose a strategy involving not only numerous strikes on American bases in the Arab Gulf states, but also attacks on infrastructure targets—airports, oil refineries, and others—and even civilian targets in those countries, including hotels. As a result, the image of the much-vaunted “Dubai paradise” was shattered, and, far more importantly, it became clear that the Americans are incapable of protecting their partners, who have no direct connection to their confrontation with Iran. Moreover, this is perhaps the first case in which countries hosting American military bases became legitimate military targets for the side opposing the US—even though they themselves have no direct involvement in the conflict.
