As the Iran crisis drags on and the United States abandons all pretense of compliance with international norms and rules, it is becoming clear that Trump’s promise of putting an end to “forever wars” has not been kept. Now, hopes for restraint in US foreign policy are fading away—Oleg Barabanov, Valdai Club Programme Director, waves goodbye to Trump the peacemaker.
What has become one of the distinctive features of the current era in international politics is the United States’ exclusive focus on coercive methods of advancing its interests. Having begun his second presidential term in the role of a peacemaker who had stopped eight wars, Donald Trump shifted to an altogether different approach at the beginning of 2026. His operations in Venezuela and Iran are evidence enough of that. It is difficult to say what compelled Trump to alter his foreign-policy strategy so abruptly. Was it disappointment that he was never awarded the Nobel Prize? Or did his particular understanding of US national interests play its part? Or was it the desire to demonstrate to everyone that the much-discussed “global hegemon” remains unmatched in strength, and that writing it off would be premature? Or did Trump’s sheer unpredictability once again make itself felt here?
In any case, the year 2026 in American foreign policy differs markedly from 2025. A year ago, Donald Trump, of course, launched his campaign of tariff and customs pressure against most countries of the world. Yet all of this, while unexpected and sweeping, still remained within the familiar bounds of trade wars. As for the use of military force, Trump of 2025 stands in stark contrast to Trump of 2026. Last year, his central message was that wars hinder the development of trade beneficial to the United States, and therefore had to be stopped. Now, however, military power is becoming a key instrument of US foreign policy. Trump the peacemaker has given way to Trump the warrior. And last year’s hopes that a cynical businessman, who understands that wars are far too costly even for the US budget, would put an end to them across the world, have proved illusory. The hegemon remains the hegemon, and therefore does as it pleases.
At the same time, with his characteristic bluntness, Trump scarcely conceals his true aims in either conflict, and relies far less on the traditional human-rights rhetoric that characterised previous American administrations. For the objective is quite simple—it manifests itself very clearly in Venezuela and is by no means hidden in Iran either: US control over the oil market and over energy supplies from these countries.
The key importance of oil in the broader context of the conflict with Iran was also demonstrated by the recent statement from the United Arab Emirates announcing its intention to leave OPEC and OPEC+. Clearly, under present conditions, with the Iran conflict still unresolved, it is difficult to make any short-term forecasts as to how this will affect oil prices. Yet in the medium term, this could quite plausibly lower oil prices if the UAE decides to produce at its maximum technical capacity. And that fully corresponds to current US interests. Moreover, the linkage between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, sometimes regarded as the foundation of OPEC as a whole, is being broken.
The seemingly unshakeable tandem of these two countries has, in recent years, undergone considerable erosion.
Thus, even having encountered stiff resistance from Iran, Trump is already reaping medium-term gains from the conflict he initiated. He can therefore claim that his strategy is working in this case as well. And that he has indeed “already won”.
At the same time, it is clear that despite Trump’s repeated—and now increasingly routine—claims of victory over Iran, it is obvious to much of the global public that a lot, if not everything, in his conflict with Iran has gone contrary to plan. We have previously addressed this subject on the website of the Valdai Discussion Club. Yet it is also important to consider how other countries are reacting to the situation at hand.
Here, broadly speaking, there may be two opposing approaches. One consists of the view that a cornered hegemon, like a cornered lion, is twice as dangerous. Therefore, it is better not to engage with Trump at all at present. The other approach is entirely different. It proceeds from the assumption that the hegemon now has no time for anything else. Trump is bogged down in Iran, and therefore the ability of the United States to effectively control world events has sharply declined. Everyone else may do as they wish without fear of the hegemon. Recent global military-political history has, at times, offered examples of precisely such an approach.
From this perspective—if one were to choose the second approach—then, for example, assuming that China truly intends to retake Taiwan by force, and that this is not merely a baseless Western accusation, then it is precisely now, when Trump is entangled in Iran, that an almost unique opportunity has arisen to do so—one that is unlikely to recur in the medium term. It is precisely now that Washington’s military response to such a conflict would be at its weakest. Yet China is not doing this. Does this mean that the first approach is the more accurate one in this case, and that Trump still invokes fear? Or does China genuinely intend to resolve the Taiwan reunification issue relying exclusively on peaceful means?
In any event, the peacemaking illusions that characterised the first year of Trump’s current tenure in the White House have now dissipated. The United States is resorting to force, as before. And this makes the contemporary global geopolitical context far more acute and unpredictable.
