The South Caucasus has entered a phase of de facto peace, but not yet one of settled security. The Armenia-Azerbaijan breakthrough and new connectivity plans offer a historic opportunity, while incomplete legal normalisation, unresolved border and humanitarian questions, corridor rivalries, Georgia's enduring conflicts, and spillover from surrounding wars keep the regional order fragile. Pakistan’s strategic partnership with Azerbaijan, newly established relations with Armenia, and growing engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union have given Islamabad a genuine stake in the outcome. Its interest lies in sovereignty-based connectivity, inclusive regionalism, and peace that produces shared economic benefits.
The strategic map of the South Caucasus has changed fundamentally. Azerbaijan's restoration of control over Karabakh in 2023 ended one phase of the region's long conflict cycle. The Washington Joint Declaration of August 8, 2025, followed by the initialling of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations, opened another: the difficult transition from military outcome to political normalisation. The leaders of both states now describe peace as a reality. Yet the declaration itself acknowledges that further steps are required for the agreement's formal signature and ratification. The region therefore inhabits an unusual condition, de facto peace without a fully institutionalised peaceful order.
This distinction matters. A durable settlement cannot rest indefinitely on converging intentions at the leadership level. It requires legal commitments, diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, continued border delimitation and demarcation, reliable communication mechanisms, and public acceptance in both societies. Humanitarian questions concerning detainees, missing persons, landmines, displaced communities and cultural heritage can keep grievances alive even when interstate hostilities have stopped. If these issues are instrumentalised in domestic politics or accompanied by renewed military signalling, the current calm could prove more vulnerable than official optimism suggests.
The second risk lies in the geopolitics of connectivity. The opening of communications could convert the South Caucasus from a fractured borderland into a junction between Europe, the Caspian, Central Asia, Russia, Türkiye, Iran and the wider Asian economy. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is intended to connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenia and strengthen the Trans-Caspian route. Importantly, its implementation framework affirms Armenian sovereignty, jurisdiction and territorial integrity, while promising reciprocal economic benefits.
However, infrastructure does not automatically produce peace. A corridor perceived as extraterritorial, strategically exclusive, or designed to bypass neighbouring states can generate insecurity instead of interdependence. Russia, Iran, Türkiye, the United States and the European Union each views regional routes through a different strategic lens. The answer is not to prevent new links, but to make them complementary. TRIPP, Armenia's Crossroads of Peace concept, the Middle Corridor, the International North-South Transport Corridor and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) networks should be treated as parts of a comprehensive connectivity system rather than mutually exclusive geopolitical projects. Sovereignty and reciprocity must remain operational rules, not merely diplomatic language.
There is a third threat: external competition may move faster than regional institution-building. Russia retains extensive economic, security and societal ties across the South Caucasus. Türkiye is Azerbaijan's closest ally and an indispensable participant in Armenia's wider normalisation. Iran regards developments along its northern frontier as a direct security concern. Washington and Brussels have expanded their diplomatic and economic roles. A polycentric region can accommodate these relationships, but only if external involvement supports local agency rather than bloc discipline.
The region is also increasingly exposed to conflicts beyond its borders. The Ukraine conflict has altered the strategic calculations and resources of every major actor in the northern Black Sea-Caucasus space. The 2026 escalation involving Iran demonstrated how quickly missiles, drones, disrupted airspace and threats to energy infrastructure can reach neighbouring states. These pressures can interrupt trade, generate displacement and force small states to make choices they would prefer to avoid addressing. Regional security consequently requires the protection of critical infrastructure, crisis hotlines and explicit assurances that territory and transport facilities will not be used for attacks against neighbours. Connectivity is valuable only when the surrounding security environment makes it dependable.
The 3+3 Regional Cooperation Platform offers one possible mechanism for dialogue among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and their three large neighbours, namely Russia, Türkiye and Iran. Its limitation is equally clear: Georgia has remained outside it. The unresolved conflicts involving Abkhazia and South Ossetia have also demonstrated that stability in the South Caucasus cannot be reduced to Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. A regional order that excludes Georgian security concerns, or leaves Tbilisi permanently detached from regional formats, will remain incomplete. Flexible participation may therefore be more realistic than attempting to impose a single architecture.
Pakistan may appear geographically distant from these fault lines, but it is not strategically detached. Its relationship with Azerbaijan has developed into a strategic partnership grounded in political solidarity and expanding defence, investment, energy and transport cooperation. At the Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Pakistan summit in Lachin in May 2025, the three countries agreed to deepen cooperation across these sectors and to connect Pakistan more closely with Eurasian transport initiatives. Islamabad's consistent support for Azerbaijan's sovereignty and territorial integrity has generated exceptional trust. That trust now gives Pakistan not only influence, but a responsibility to encourage the conversion of military success into stable regional peace.
At the same time, Pakistan's establishment of diplomatic relations with Armenia on August 31, 2025 was a strategically important adjustment. The joint communiqué opened avenues in trade, education, culture and tourism while affirming the principles of the United Nations Charter. This step should not be seen as undermining Pakistan's partnership with Azerbaijan. It reflects recognition that a post-conflict South Caucasus requires engagement with all its sovereign states. Direct communication with Yerevan also gives Islamabad a more credible basis for assessing the region and reduces the danger that South Asian and Caucasian rivalries will be mechanically superimposed on one another.
The EAEU adds a practical economic dimension. Armenia is an EAEU member, while Russia has explicitly welcomed Pakistan-Armenia relations as conducive to stronger Pakistan-EAEU ties. In April 2026, Pakistan and the Eurasian Economic Commission agreed to create a joint research group on the feasibility of a free trade agreement; in May, the EEC Council formally approved its formation. This process gives Pakistan a direct interest in the stability of the commercial and transport space connecting the EAEU, the Caspian and South Asia. Even if it does not become Pakistan’s main route to Eurasia, the South Caucasus can provide a valuable additional corridor, expanding Pakistan’s connectivity options and reducing dependence on any single route.
Pakistan's most useful contribution would therefore be steady rather than theatrical. Islamabad should support the formalisation and implementation of Armenia-Azerbaijan peace, including border mechanisms and communications based on consent and sovereign jurisdiction. It should deepen economic and diplomatic engagement with Armenia while continuing its trusted partnership with Azerbaijan and trilateral cooperation with Türkiye. It should connect the prospective EAEU trade dialogue with serious work on customs procedures, multimodal logistics and private-sector links. Finally, it should favour inclusive regional consultation, without presenting itself as a mediator where the parties have developed their own negotiating capacity.
From Pakistan's perspective, the central choice facing the South Caucasus is no longer simply between war and ceasefire. It is between rival connectivity and shared connectivity; between externally managed balances and regional ownership; and between a peace declared by leaders and one institutionalised through law, commerce and societal contact. Pakistan benefits from the latter set of outcomes. Its emerging diplomatic geometry, strategic trust with Azerbaijan, an open channel to Armenia, close relations with Türkiye, growing cooperation with Russia and engagement with the EAEU, equips it to support a South Caucasus that functions as a bridge within Greater Eurasia rather than another fault line across it.
