Pakistan’s elites contributed to the cessation of hostilities between the United States and Iran, although the fighting was suspended primarily because neither side proved capable of defeating the other. Islamabad’s efforts therefore acted more as a catalyst for the ceasefire—though the positive role played by the Pakistanis cannot be denied, writes Gleb Makarevich.
Islamabad to the rescue
Pakistan saves ‘a whole civilisation’—such was the headline of one newspaper that went viral on social media and became one of the clearest indicators of how Islamabad prefers to present its role in the current conflict in the Middle East.
The phrase alluded to one of Donald Trump’s promises to destroy an entire civilisation should Iran refuse to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. Whatever exactly the US president may have meant, it never came to pass: Trump nevertheless agreed to a ceasefire in order to hold negotiations with Tehran. Pakistani media drew attention to the fact that this decision was taken following the personal intervention of the country’s prime minister, Shehbaz Sharif. Moreover, the negotiations were supposed to take place not just anywhere, but in Islamabad itself.
Much has happened since then: senior American and Iranian delegations met and attempted to work out the broad contours of a future ceasefire agreement, but left the venue without any results; they intended to return to the negotiating table, yet ultimately refrained from making another attempt to reach an agreement without firm guarantees of achieving a satisfactory outcome. What the final outcome of this war will be for either side remains unknown, but politically speaking, its most obvious beneficiary for the time being is Pakistan’s military-political leadership. It should be noted that it was specifically the coordination between Pakistan’s military and civilian elites that enabled the country to establish effective engagement with both the United States and Iran. Field Marshal Asim Munir is believed to have played a particularly significant role in the negotiation process personally.
It should be emphasised that these are political achievements specifically, since shocks on global commodity markets have hardly had a beneficial impact on the South Asian country’s economy. Nevertheless, how did Islamabad manage to perform so successfully—at least at first glance—on the diplomatic front?
Walking a tightrope
In dialogue with the Americans, Pakistan’s military-political leadership was aided by two circumstances. First, relations between Washington and Islamabad span many decades, with particularly extensive cooperation in defence and security matters. Consequently, American and Pakistani counterparts already possessed a well-established foundation for discussing the Iranian issue.
Second, the personality of the current US president appears to have played its part. In May 2025, Donald Trump declared that another escalation in the conflict between India and Pakistan had ended precisely thanks to his own mediation efforts. The Indians did not appreciate the statement, whereas the Pakistanis enthusiastically embraced it. As a result, Prime Minister Sharif and Field Marshal Munir allegedly succeeded in winning the favour of the occupant of the White House and establishing personal relations of trust with him. One may assume that the combination of these two factors enabled Islamabad to emerge as a convenient intermediary for the American side.
The situation regarding relations with Iran appears even more delicate. One might assume that, based on the very idea of constructing a political regime around Islamic values, Pakistan ought to have unequivocally sided with a “brotherly people” and an Islamic republic. Indeed, this was initially the case: with the launch of the American-Israeli military operation on 28 February, official Islamabad firmly condemned the “unprovoked attacks” against its neighbour. However, the same statement also condemned Tehran’s attacks on the “brotherly countries of the Persian Gulf”. This nuance is particularly important in light of the fact that only recently—in September 2025—Islamabad and Riyadh signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, according to which aggression by any third party against one signatory would be regarded as an attack on both parties. Beyond high politics, the broader picture was further darkened by the humanitarian dimension: on the very first day of the war, a Pakistani citizen was killed in the UAE, while millions of other Pakistani labour migrants remained in a state of uncertainty for a long period because of the ongoing conflict.
Nevertheless, Pakistan’s military-political leadership managed to establish contact with both sides, conduct prolonged “shuttle diplomacy”, and even organise one round of direct negotiations. Did Pakistan manage to gain anything from these efforts?
All for naught?
If one sharpens the discussion somewhat, it may be said that Pakistan has not yet obtained any tangible benefits. Let us look directly at the negotiation process itself: its outcome remains unknown—the war could resume tomorrow, in a month, or in a year, since resolving the fundamental contradictions between the sides appears highly unlikely. This does not mean that Islamabad proved an ineffective mediator—in the current circumstances, scarcely anyone would have performed more effectively—but the absence of an obvious result does little to enhance the reputation of any mediator, which is why many are reluctant even to undertake such work.
One could say that Pakistan’s elites contributed to ending the hostilities, but that these were suspended primarily because neither side proved capable of inflicting defeat upon the other. Islamabad’s efforts therefore acted more as a catalyst for the ceasefire, though the positive role played by the Pakistanis in this matter cannot be denied.
If one attempts to look beyond the horizon and reflect on Pakistan’s foreign-policy prospects after the conflict ends, it is unlikely that anything will change dramatically. Foreign-policy and security problems are too subject to inertia, and therefore several months of intensive work by Pakistan’s military-civilian elites are unlikely to affect the dynamics of US-Pakistani or Iranian-Pakistani relations, or indeed other aspects of regional security. Moreover, it remains unclear how volatility in commodity prices and disruptions in supply chains will affect Pakistan’s economy in the medium and long term—any tactical advantages may ultimately be neutralised by an overall unfavourable economic environment.
Does all this mean that the efforts of Pakistan’s military-political leadership were in vain?
Blessed are the peacemakers…
Certainly not. First, the humanitarian dimension should not be discounted. Even the role of catalyst for a ceasefire is already of enormous value, since the suspension—or even reduction—of hostilities saves many lives, and that can only be welcomed.
Second, Pakistan’s military-civilian elites continue to capitalise on the image of victory that they themselves projected following the latest conflict with India. In May 2025, Pakistan managed to overcome the perception of being an economically less developed and politically unstable South Asian country by securing special favour from the United States and major regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. International prestige is an intangible asset that is difficult to acquire, and for the time being the crisis in the Middle East is giving Islamabad an opportunity to accumulate it.
The problem lies in the fact that Pakistan’s military-political leadership has historically shown a tendency to become excessively absorbed in matters of foreign policy and security—acquiring intangible resources amid a shortage of material ones does not always lead to an increase in the latter. All the more remarkable, then, is the fact that Islamabad currently appears to be extracting the maximum possible benefit from the circumstances presented to it without suffering any losses as a result of its own mistakes.
