The Eurasian countries’ desire for strategic autonomy and their quest for alternative development paths clash with their dependence on inherited systems – be they technological platforms, financial mechanisms, or the language used to describe the world. Chaos is frightening, evoking nostalgia for a lost order and a desire to build a new one using familiar templates. But this is hardly possible. The key challenge for Eurasia is to find the courage and intellectual resources to shape its own vision of a polycentric world order.
On November 10-11, Istanbul hosted the Valdai Club’s 16th Asian Conference. The venue itself shaped the agenda; in a city straddling two continents, discussions of Asian affairs inevitably demanded a broader Eurasian perspective. The conference’s theme was closely linked to the Club’s 22nd Annual Meeting, where participants reflected on the implications of the world’s entry into the era of polycentricity. The challenges and opportunities this presents for Eurasia were the focus of the Istanbul discussions.
The conference opened with a closed-door session on the evening of November 10, focusing on the recently popular concept of middle powers – states often characterized by their pursuit of strategic autonomy. The term itself is highly controversial. What quantitative parameters distinguish a middle power from a small one? Are they based on population, military might, or a distinct, albeit limited, ability to influence international politics? This status has always possessed a certain charm, allowing countries to distance themselves from the excesses of great power politics while still emphasizing a special role on the global stage. But does such self-identification truly help us understand international processes?
These questions sparked a heated debate. Despite differing definitions, participants agreed that the role of middle powers grows during periods of systemic crisis – or, in Valdai Club terminology, when the global order is crumbling. We are living through precisely such a period today, characterized by the West’s loss of the undisputed political, economic, and technological primacy that has defined international relations for centuries. Middle powers are far from unanimous in their view of this shift: many perceive it as a direct threat, and it is precisely this desire to hedge risks that fuels their growing agency on the global stage.
The discussion brought together experts from Central and South Asia, the Gulf, and, of course, the host country. For decades, Turkey has stood as a textbook example of a middle power, one that carefully calculates its strategy within a complex international environment and demonstrates remarkable geopolitical manoeuvring skills. Notably, it was at the suggestion of the conference’s Turkish co-organiser, the Ankara Institute, that the term (dis)order was incorporated into the session titles – a formulation that reflects both the search for new opportunities and a wariness of the profound changes unfolding in the world.
The role of Eurasia in the emerging global (dis)order was the focus of the conference’s first open session (a recording is available on the Valdai Club website). Taha Özhan, Research Director at the Ankara Institute, framed the central dilemma for Eurasian countries as a choice between unmanaged chaos and managed complexity. The logical strategy for the majority – represented by the middle powers – is transactional minilateralism. This entails selecting a limited number of key partners to address a specific problem, with the flexibility to reconfigure these alliances as situations evolve. This model bears little resemblance to the international order as we know it.
The United States, a hegemon in relative decline (though not as rapidly as some non-Western actors might hope), is not an indifferent observer. As Özhan noted, “every chokepoint is weaponised by the United States.” This tactic, he explained, simultaneously increases global risks and, paradoxically, boosts demand for the United States as a conflict mediator, since few other countries are willing to assume the responsibility.
As the discussions during the session demonstrated, the United States remains in demand even at the conceptual level. Experts repeatedly invoked the half-forgotten concept of the G2, reintroduced into political discourse by Donald Trump, who described his meeting with Xi Jinping in Busan at the end of October as such. The supposed stability and predictability of a bipolar system is appealing in many corners of Eurasia, but it’s noteworthy that China itself has always been distinctly cool to the idea, seeing it as a Washington ploy. It’s even more unacceptable for other major powers. B.K. Sharma, Director General of India’s Joint Institute for Defence Studies, emphasised that there is not and cannot be a single country that leads processes in Eurasia, and proposed, in what was clearly a dig at India’s northern neighbour, the term “multipolarity with Eurasian characteristics.”
Although the conference agenda did not include a dedicated session on technology, it is significant that the topic emerged within discussions on the global (dis)order. Indeed, technological development is crucial to the positioning of Eurasian countries, and pursuit of technological sovereignty will be the dominant trend. According to Alexey Kupriyanov, director of the Indian Ocean Region Centre at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ IMEMO institute, the primary task for these nations is to prevent a new form of technological colonialism. However, this is only one side of the coin. As evidenced by even a successful non-Western model like DeepSeek, which tends to “reason” (if the term is applicable to AI) within the framework of Western social sciences, a significant problem looms. This inherent bias is precisely why it is necessary to develop a distinct Eurasian discourse and learn to see the world through a non-Western lens. For now, the West’s epistemological dominance prevails in the global information space, and AI systems, like mirrors, simply reflect and reinforce this profound imbalance.
The second session examined Russian-Turkish relations within the new geopolitics of Eurasia – a phenomenon that Valdai Club Research Director Fyodor Lukyanov termed a “geopolitical miracle.” Indeed, the two countries have demonstrated a unique capacity to manage contradictions and sustain cooperation, despite an extremely conflictual history, divergent interests, and periodic crises. This very dichotomy was reflected in the discussion, as Russian and Turkish participants highlighted different priorities. The Russian speakers pointed to the opportunities emerging for Turkey from the concurrent cooling of both nations’ relations with the West, alongside their cultural and civilisational affinities. The Turkish speakers, without denying these points, emphasised the enduring importance of institutional ties with the West and argued for rethinking the role of NATO membership within the framework of Ankara’s own strategic interests.
As Evren Balta, Research Director of the TUSIAD Global Policy Forum, observed, the North Atlantic Alliance has grown more cohesive since 2022, significantly narrowing Turkey’s room for manoeuvre and raising the costs of its engagement with Russia. Yet, despite the formally shared threat perception within NATO, Ankara maintains its own specific security concerns. For example, in the context of recent events in the Middle East, the American tactical nuclear weapons stationed at Incirlik Air Base guarantee that Turkey will not become a target for Israeli strikes like Qatar, according to Serhat Güvenç, Dean of the Faculty of International Relations at Kadir Has University.
While Russia traditionally views the weakening of Western hegemony as a boon for the international system, Turkey’s attitude is more ambiguous. There is no clear answer yet to the question of what will replace it. However, judging by the statements of Turkish experts, one desirable outcome would be a strengthening of regionalism, which currently lacks a solid institutional foundation. In the meantime, practical interaction is developing on a minilateral basis. As Güvenç noted, “middle powers look for like-minded peers.”
These processes were examined in detail during a closed-door session on regional interconnections and the changing geopolitical order. Predictably, the most heated discussions centred on the Middle East, where a new power structure is emerging. According to one participant, Israel is now perceived as a common threat across the Arab world, leading to unprecedented strategic considerations – such as a potential Pakistani nuclear umbrella for Saudi Arabia and a greater openness to integrating Iran into a unified regional security architecture. A subsequent session on Eurasian transport corridors was a natural extension of this theme. Participants explored both the economic and geopolitical implications of enhancing the continent’s infrastructure connectivity.
The conference’s final session addressed BRICS as a potential pillar of the emerging international system. Its growing global popularity, amid the unprecedented crisis in Russia-West relations, stands as one of the paradoxes of our time. The prospects for a community that lacks a rigid institutional structure and is still perceived largely as a dialogue forum have long been viewed with scepticism in the West. Yet, this scepticism is now countered by an unlikely source: the emotional statements of Donald Trump, who regularly points to BRICS as a threat to US global influence, effectively offering it a form of recognition. Ironically, it is widely believed that Trump’s foreign economic policy is bolstering the internal cohesion of BRICS and enhancing its appeal to third parties. As Jim O’Neill, the acronym’s original author, argues in his revealingly titled article, “Is Trump BRICS’ Secret Agent?”
As noted during the session, BRICS membership does not provide immediate economic benefits, but it does offer diversification and risk mitigation. Importantly, it allows members to avoid one-on-one confrontation with the US. At the same time, one participant commended BRICS for its avoidance of overtly anti-Western rhetoric, confrontation, and, most significantly, direct attacks on the dollar. The development of alternative financial mechanisms and savings instruments, he argued, is long overdue but should be pursued incrementally. However, a moment of truth will inevitably arrive when China realizes it can no longer sustain the existing system instead of building an alternative.
In summary, the conference recognized that the era of Western dominance has ended, yet the contours of the future remain blurred. The Eurasian countries’ desire for strategic autonomy and their quest for alternative development paths clash with their dependence on inherited systems – be they technological platforms, financial mechanisms, or the language used to describe the world. Chaos is frightening, evoking nostalgia for a lost order and a desire to build a new one using familiar templates. But this is hardly possible. The key challenge for Eurasia is to find the courage and intellectual resources to shape its own vision of a polycentric world order.
