On October 14-15, 2024, a joint conference was held in Moscow between the Valdai Discussion Club and East China Normal University. ECNU is one of the long-standing partners of the Valdai Club; our joint events have been held for many years. This year's conference was titled ”Stability and Potential: Russia and China on the 75th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations”. Its results are summarized by Oleg Barabanov, Programme Director of the Valdai Club.
The opening speeches were given by Andrey Bystritskiy, Chairman of the Board of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club, Feng Shaolei, Director of the Centre for Russian Studies at ECNU, and Zhang Hanhui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People’s Republic of China to the Russian Federation.
The first session of the conference was devoted to the topic of the global transformation of the world order and the strategic response of Russia and China. The conference participants emphasised the intention of both countries to create a fair and equal multipolar world, without claims to global hegemony by the United States or the West. The intention of Russia and China to cooperate closely for these purposes within the framework of the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries was noted. In this regard, the Chinese participants of the conference particularly emphasised that this partnership will withstand any tests, including the current pressure from the United States on Beijing to distance China from Russia. Our two countries regularly synchronise watches on the most important international issues at summits between the leaders of Russia and China. The decisions of the summits are then implemented in various political, economic and civil dialogue formats at all levels. The joint conference of the Valdai Club and the ECNU also became part of this dialogue of cooperation. Our relations are based on the values of mutual respect, harmonious coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation. Chinese speakers at the conference repeatedly emphasised that Russia and China should meet the challenges of the modern world together, “back to back”, and jointly promote their values and interests. Chinese colleagues have repeatedly emphasized that Russia and China should “back to back” together meet the challenges of the modern world and jointly promote their values and interests, while Russian colleagues, in turn, have noted that when it comes to establishing strategic relations, it is better to stand “face to face.”
The acute geopolitical struggle in the modern world has actually transformed the global political geography, it has become completely different. The world in which we have to live has completely changed. Moreover, the dynamics of changes in the world are so large-scale that sometimes our own understanding of the processes taking place cannot keep up with them. Our scientific and conceptual apparatus cannot keep up with this either; we are still trying to define the world in accordance with old categories and approaches (most often based on Western postulates), which no longer work. Therefore, part of the discussion at this session was devoted precisely to the development of a new categorical apparatus that would help Russia and China develop their own theoretical understanding of the dynamics of changes in the world, without being tied to old Western and Western-centric theories of international relations. Here we are only at the very beginning of the journey. In this regard, it was noted at the session that the potential for mutual recognition between Russia and China is still very high, and we will need time to seriously understand each other.
A number of conference participants compared Russian-Chinese relations with two recipes for family happiness. One of them is when spouses are very similar to each other, and the other is when spouses are very different in character and interests, but complement each other. Russia and China, despite the commonality of their values, interests and goals, are also very different. These differences are due to different histories, different civilisational identities, as well as the different positions of the two countries in modern geopolitics and economics. China was and remains much more integrated into the global manufacturing economy than Russia. China has not crossed the line of a complete rupture in relations with the West, unlike Russia, and, apparently, does not want to cross it on its own initiative at the moment, despite all the pressure from the West and its trade wars against China. This imposes serious limitations on China's position, and these limitations also affect the degree of China's support for Russia in the current conditions, especially on issues that could entail risks of secondary sanctions from the United States. At the same time, China is gradually crystallising the awareness that it "will be next" in any case, that it is a target for the West, just like Russia. This explains the political solidarity of our two countries.
In this regard, an interesting discussion unfolded at the session about whether China and Russia are one common pole in the modern world. This is how our countries are perceived by our common antagonists in the West. Russia and China are always listed together, separated by commas, as interconnected "revisionist powers" that have challenged the Western-centric world. Or China and Russia are different poles of the world, different not only culturally and historically, no one argues with this, but also different in their current political approaches. Here, the conference participants recalled the concept of perceiving modern Russia as the "third pole" of the world in clear contrast to China as the "second pole". The difference here is precisely in the qualitative difference between Russia, which has already "crossed the line" of a complete break with the West (and unites other countries of the same type that have "nothing to lose"), and a China which has not crossed this line.
The second session of the conference was devoted to stability, development and security in Greater Eurasia. The conference participants emphasised that the comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and China is an important constructive factor influencing all of Greater Eurasia, and is one of the key basic foundations determining the security of the continent. Russian-Chinese relations will largely determine the general framework of relations throughout Eurasia. Therefore, our two countries also bear a special responsibility for maintaining stability and security in Greater Eurasia. A number of speeches noted the expediency and potential for a kind of expansion of the values and approaches of the bilateral Russian-Chinese partnership to other countries of Greater Eurasia, for their involvement in this process. It was said that it is precisely on the basis of this core that a system of unified Eurasian security can gradually emerge. Naturally, this should be done taking into account the sovereignty and national interests of all countries that participate in this process.
The conference also emphasised that all previous world and regional orders were based, as a rule, on hierarchy, on the hegemonic dominance of the leading power. The fundamental difference of the emerging system of cooperation and security in Greater Eurasia is precisely that it does not provide for such a hierarchy and is based on the values of sovereignty and equality. It is clear that in practice it is more difficult to implement such an approach, but it will be much more harmonious and sustainable. The conference participants noted that the Eurasian security system is currently only at the very beginning of its development. Steps towards its implementation can be associated with the countries of Greater Eurasia gradually developing a common strategic culture. An approach whereby at the first stage, common agreements would concern small, private, technical issues on which the various states of the region would have fewer disagreements is also fruitful. For this purpose, existing mechanisms could be used, in particular. In this regard, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia was mentioned, and the intention was supported to make it a permanent organisation. It was also noted that the recent Russian initiative on common Eurasian security, in order to be better perceived in Beijing, could be more closely aligned, both in terms of terminological semantics and in essence, with Xi Jinping's proposals on global security, voiced at the last CPC congress, since Chinese politicians and experts do not go beyond their framework for obvious reasons. As a reflection of Xi Jinping’s concept, the speeches of the Chinese participants, in particular, put forward the idea of the inadmissibility of a nuclear war in modern international relations.
The aforementioned differences in the positions of Russia and China, in particular, determine that the most optimal format for interaction between the two countries in international structures is conjugation, which does not imply complete unity or a merger. This has already been tested in the practical conjugation of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which Russia does not fully participate in, and the same approach can be used for broader interaction between various international structures in Greater Eurasia.
However, in some speeches by Chinese speakers at the conference,arguments were made that Russia should nevertheless join the Belt and Road Initiative, which would open up additional opportunities for it, primarily for economic cooperation with China and the potential for access to Chinese financial mechanisms implemented within the framework of this Initiative. The Chinese side also proposed establishing a visa-free travel regime between China and Russia.
The third session of the conference focused on the topic of “China, Russia and the Construction of a New Type of Multilateralism.” The conference participants noted that our bilateral partnership is an important factor in the development of BRICS, the SCO and other international structures uniting the countries of the Global Non-West and the Global South. Russia's current BRICS presidency and China's upcoming SCO presidency provide a good opportunity for our countries to compare our positions in these structures, so that the agendas and priorities of both BRICS and the SCO complement each other in order to enhance the cumulative effectiveness of both structures.
The session emphasised that BRICS, the SCO and other non-Western international structures are a community of equals, without the hegemony of a single power, unlike Western-centric formats. This is precisely what attracts more and more countries from the Global South to BRICS, as demonstrated by both the decision to expand BRICS last year and new applications for membership submitted this year.
In this context, the conference participants discussed the possibility of various approaches to BRICS expansion, whereby the goals of general solidarity among non-Western countries would be met by attracting to BRICS as many new members as possible, but smaller formats would better suit the tasks of internal consolidation, homogeneity and, if you like, internal self-discipline of BRICS members and the effective implementation of decision-making. It was also noted that a point of view has emerged in the Western media and expert community that a maximally “loose” BRICS, incapable of reaching any serious agreement, would fully meet the goals of the United States and the West in maintaining their hegemony in the world. In this regard, the possible broadest expansion of BRICS would fully promote the interests of the West. It is clear, however, that the appearance of such articles is in itself part of a hybrid information war aimed at undermining BRICS from within. In this regard, approaches to linking old and new BRICS members within the BRICS+ or “Greater BRICS” formats were discussed. The session participants discussed in detail the issues of strengthening the role of national currencies between the BRICS countries – how to fulfil the task set at last year's BRICS summit. The importance of developing sovereign digital financial instruments in the BRICS countries for this purpose was noted. An interesting report was made on the experience of developing the digital yuan in China, including in the international dimension of Greater Eurasia and the Global South, in cooperation between the central banks of the region. Russia, which is only at the very beginning of the path in introducing a sovereign digital currency, could learn a lot from this Chinese experience.
Finally, the fourth session of the conference was devoted to the cooperation between Russia and China in the field of education, humanities and communications in the digital age. By decision of the leaders of our countries, the years 2024 and 2025 have been declared mutual Years of Culture of Russia and China. Much has already been achieved in this area, and this opens up new prospects for developing the potential for cooperation. One of the tasks here is for Russian and Chinese scientists to develop a kind of common epistemology for analysing global political and socio-economic processes in order to stop using the old Western-centric narratives. It is also important to abandon Western-centric scientometrics, which, until recently, with their formal scholastic mechanisms, almost completely determined the activities of universities and research centres in our countries, and still continue to exert influence.
Overall, the joint conference of the Valdai Club and the ECNU was held in an atmosphere of sincere, interested and trusting dialogue between experts from the two countries. It contributed much both to our mutual understanding of each other and to a synchronisation of watches between the political approaches of the two countries at the level of expert diplomacy. Close cooperation with Chinese colleagues will continue in the future.
