In the midst of persistent instability in several regions of the globe, particularly the Middle East, the international community has once again observed the contours of what can be described as the “Western style of negotiations”. This dynamic has been especially visible in the recent diplomatic engagements between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Western powers, primarily the United States, concerning Iran's nuclear programme. While the rhetoric of peace and diplomacy continues to dominate Western narratives, the actual conduct surrounding these negotiations frequently reveals a contrasting reality, marked by sudden escalations, parallel military actions, and the recurrent use of coercive instruments such as sanctions.
Since April 2025, five rounds of indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States have been conducted with Omani mediation in Muscat and Rome, with the stated aim of reviving a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear dossier. However, this dialogue has unfolded under complex geopolitical pressures. On June 13, Israel carried out attacks on Iranian military and nuclear facilities, assassinating several commanders and scientists. Iran’s response was a widespread missile offensive that escalated into a 12-day conflict. Just two days after the US bombed Iranian nuclear facilities, US President Donald Trump abruptly declared a ceasefire. The fact that the Israeli-US attacks occurred precisely when the sixth round of talks was scheduled highlights a recurring feature: Western negotiations are often accompanied with or undermined by parallel strategies of pressure, including military action. Such timing suggests that diplomatic engagement does not necessarily preclude confrontation, which undermines trust and contributes to perceptions of duplicity.
The pattern is not without precedent. In 2003, Iran, following an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution, entered into negotiations with European foreign ministers and agreed to suspend nuclear activities, granting full IAEA access. Despite Iran’s compliance, European negotiators demanded further concessions. The Iranian government, viewing these demands as overreaching and devoid of reciprocity, chose not to formalise the agreement. This led to accusations against Iran and the initiation of sanctions by the EU and the United Nations. Thus demonstrating again that the Western negotiation style can rapidly transition from diplomacy to punitive action if perceived conditions are not met. Here, the insistence on maximalist positions without tangible incentives created a precedent of strategic mistrust.
This historical mistrust was amplified following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the result of twelve years of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1. While the agreement imposed stringent oversight on Iran's nuclear activities, the US withdrawal in May 2018, led by President Trump citing American interests, signalled to Iran that negotiated commitments might lack durability. The subsequent “maximum pressure” campaign further reinforced the view that Western approaches can be transactional and subject to abrupt reversal; suggesting a negotiation style that prioritises unilateral leverage over mutual assurance.
Nevertheless, Iran adapted its politics regarding the sanctions and pressures and the potential of diplomacy remained. In April 2025, Iran and the US resumed indirect talks in Muscat, led by US envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Both sides articulated core interests: Iran emphasised the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and its opposition to weaponisation; the US prioritised non-proliferation. Although both acknowledged a path to compromise, the underlying mistrust lingered. The nature of this first round, measured, yet cautious, reflected a Western negotiation style marked by conditional engagement, where concessions are expected without equal assurances.
The second round, held in Rome on April 19, saw Iran propose the joint management of enrichment facilities, potentially offering a new framework distinct from the JCPOA. However, the US insisted on removing enriched uranium from Iran, proposing its transfer to third country. Iran resisted, invoking IAEA oversight and the need for mechanisms to prevent future US withdrawals. The episode illustrates a Western tendency to institutionalise asymmetric control mechanisms, rather than establish mutual security guarantees.
The third round, in Muscat on April 26, was overshadowed by external pressures and yielded little progress. Iran’s continued nuclear advancements and the coercive strategies of the US, including economic sanctions and military posturing, highlighted how each side wielded pressure to influence the talks. President Trump continued to project openness to diplomacy, but the instruments of coercion remained central. This duality, promoting talks while applying pressure, exemplifies a defining feature of the Western negotiation style: diplomacy is often conditional on compliance with pre-set frameworks, rather than shaped through equitable dialogue.
Following these rounds, France threatened to trigger the JCPOA's snapback mechanism, while the US imposed new sanctions on Chinese firms linked to Iran. Further sanctions targeting Iran’s petrochemical trade followed. While the fourth round was postponed due to “logistical reasons”, the timing of these sanctions suggested the strategic use of pressure to gain leverage. Even when progress was cautiously acknowledged, such as in the fifth round in Rome on May 23, subsequent US sanctions on Iranian research entities undermined the atmosphere of trust. This repetition of conditional concessions, sanctions lifted only to be reinstated days later, demonstrates how pressure mechanisms are integrated into Western diplomatic engagements as both deterrent and negotiation tool.
The sixth round, scheduled for June 15, was pre-empted by the Israeli attacks on Iranian facilities starting June 13, culminating in the US bombings on June 21. During the course of these hostilities, President Trump threatened regime change and directly addressed Iran’s leadership with aggressive rhetoric. Despite this, European foreign ministers and the EU foreign policy chief entered into talks with Iran, asserting their involvement even against US preferences. Europe’s alignment with Israel during the conflict suggests a convergence of interests that may override moral or strategic independence. This raises a question about the coherence and ethics of the Western style of negotiation; whether engagement is genuinely aimed at peaceful resolution or instrumentalised to assert broader geopolitical objectives.
European intervention at this stage, while intended to preserve diplomatic presence, has also reflected strategic manoeuvring. By aligning with Israel during hostilities and asserting their role in Iran-US talks, European powers have sought to maintain relevance, especially if the US aimed to sideline them. This manoeuvring suggests that Western approach, rather than being a unified peace-seeking initiative, is often fragmented and opportunistic, driven by shifting alliances and self-interest.
The 12-day conflict not only inflicted substantial material damage on Iran but also significantly weakened the already fragile diplomatic processes running parallel to the hostilities. The attacks on non-military infrastructure, including medical centres and “Evin” Prison, and the deaths of civilians sparked widespread public outrage within Iran, galvanising national unity and reinforcing the collective determination to maintain its nuclear programme. Notably, while the use of military pressure was ostensibly intended to coerce Iran into concessions, it achieved the opposite: the nuclear programme remains intact, Iran demonstrated its defence capabilities, and the anticipated internal collapse did not materialise; instead, the societal bond between the public and the state appeared more resilient than at any time in recent years.
Perhaps most critically, the hallmark of the Western negotiation style, pressure coupled with diplomacy, has not only eroded trust between Iran and Western actors, especially the United States, but also discredited international institutions meant to mediate such conflicts. Iran’s suspension of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in protest of what it views as Director General Rafael Grossi’s biased reporting, underscores this broader distrust, which now extends to entities like the UN Security Council and the United Nations at large. In this context, the sustainability of the current ceasefire remains deeply uncertain, especially as the US proceeds with new arms sales to Israel and President Trump continues his aggressive rhetoric.
Cumulatively, the Western style of negotiations with Iran reveals several characteristics: a persistent coupling of diplomacy with pressure; the use of sanctions not only as punishment but as leverage during talks; the absence of durable commitment mechanisms; and the willingness to introduce or tolerate military actions even amidst negotiations. This pattern undermines the possibility of building sustained trust and reinforces a perception that negotiation, in the Western context, often operates on asymmetric expectations.
Recent commentary has described the prevailing condition of negotiations as “conditional diplomacy”; where engagement is contingent upon compliance with unilaterally determined terms, leaving little room for equitable bargaining. The situation can be characterised as one where the “trigger mechanism” for sanctions is always present, effectively placing negotiations under constant threat. These conditions reduce diplomatic engagement to a controlled and constrained process, where genuine consensus is elusive, and the negotiation table becomes another theatre for projecting power.
These developments raise a pressing question for the international community: if Iran’s experience with Western negotiations results in entrenched scepticism and institutional disillusionment, how can other nations, particularly those currently engaged in talks with the US and its allies, trust the durability or fairness of any agreement in the absence of credible guarantees?
