Sovereignty and territorial integrity—the sacred cows of a bygone era in international relations—are progressively losing their inviolable status. States now wield these principles with growing instrumentalism, and what was previously in a “grey zone” is being legitimized, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Anton Bespalov.
The recently concluded first quarter of the 21st century will go down in the history of international relations as a period when leading global actors began to interpret the norms of international law concerning the recognition of new states and the territorial integrity of existing ones—with unprecedented freedom and selectivity. While the second half of the twentieth century was also replete with territorial disputes resolved by force and the emergence of unrecognized or partially recognized entities exercising de facto control over territory, that earlier period was distinguished by several critical characteristics.
First, the Cold War era saw the emergence of several states whose external recognition was contingent upon their position in the bipolar confrontation. At various times, countries around the world were divided into fairly predictable associations depending on whether they recognized East or West Germany, North or South Korea, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or South Vietnam. It is noteworthy, however, that bloc discipline was less rigid in the West than in the East; for instance, most Western bloc countries established relations with the People’s Republic of China long before the United States took a similar step.
Second, the de facto states that emerged in the wake of separatist movements during or after decolonization were not recognized by the world’s major powers, although they may have enjoyed their tacit support. This applies primarily to Africa, where such entities emerged as the State of Katanga (1960-63), the Republic of Biafra (1967-70), the Republic of Cabinda (August-November 1975), and the most enduring and anomalous of them all, Rhodesia (1965-79). Of these, only Biafra received limited international recognition—from a few African states. In general, separatism in the Third World was perceived by both the Soviet Union and the United States as a threat to the existing order and was discouraged.
The declaration of independence of Bangladesh in 1971 was a notable exception. Although the United States and much of the Western bloc supported Pakistan, advocating for the preservation of the status quo, most countries recognized the new state shortly after the surrender of Pakistani troops. Interestingly, China became the most significant opponent of Bangladesh’s independence, being one of the last to recognize it—after Pakistan had already done so.
Third, the Cold War era witnessed several acts by formerly colonized states that met the definition of annexation, but received diametrically opposed assessments. India’s annexations of Goa in 1961 and Sikkim in 1975 were quickly recognized by the international community, despite criticism from a number of countries. In contrast, Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor and the partition of Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania in 1975 were widely condemned. The United States, although providing tacit support to Indonesia and Morocco and recognizing the de facto annexations, refrained from formal recognition.
During the final stages of the Cold War, Washington was cautious in recognizing the states that emerged from the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia. For example, the United States was slow to recognize Ukraine’s independence—this only occurred on December 25, 1991, the day the USSR officially dissolved—and was sceptical of Canada’s move to establish diplomatic relations with Ukraine the day after the December 1 independence referendum. And although Washington’s official policy was not to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR, throughout the Cold War this remained a mere formality, albeit an irritating one for Moscow. In 1991, the United States, unlike some of its NATO allies, refrained from recognizing the independence of the three republics until it became clear that Moscow was prepared to allow them to secede from the USSR.
In the first decades after the end of the Cold War, the territorial integrity of states remained a principle to which all global players declared their commitment. The political and military support provided to the unrecognized states that emerged during the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia did not translate into official recognition; they remained in a “grey zone.” The same applied to the de facto borders drawn unilaterally as a result of wars, primarily in the Middle East.
Despite widespread assertions that Kosovo could not be considered a precedent, its partial recognition since 2008 has become a crucial milestone in the history of the modern international system. Formally, the Kosovo case resembled that of Bangladesh: blatant injustices committed by the central government against a regional majority, followed by political and then armed struggle, and finally, the intervention of an external force. The significant difference was that the external force was a US-led military-political bloc, which was not in a situation of strategic rivalry with an opponent, did not face a counterweight from a comparable force, and used a local conflict to advance its vision of world order.
However, the generally accepted taboo was lifted—and in the same year, 2008, Russia removed Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the “grey zone.” Although the international scale of their recognition—as well as the recognition of subsequent territorial changes in the post-Soviet space—was much smaller than in the case of Kosovo, Moscow also made a bid to change the rules of the game. Essentially, its message to the world was: “In areas of our vital interests, we define our own borders, and beyond them, we adhere to generally accepted norms.” The absence of universalist claims, coupled with a clear understanding of the threat posed by the advance of “the most successful military alliance in history” toward its borders, rendered Moscow’s position acceptable to a significant portion of the world majority, even without formal approval. In fact, this very majority crystallized in 2022 thanks to its refusal to heed the West’s call to confront Russia at all levels for violating the rules of international community. By then, it was already clear that these rules were not absolute.
The United States under Donald Trump contributed significantly to their further erosion. In 2017, he decided to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the American embassy there. While this decision provoked widespread international condemnation for undermining the peace process, it did not definitively resolve the city’s status (that is, it did not formally deny Palestinian claims to its eastern part). Much more unequivocal was the 2019 decision to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, literally pitting the United States and Israel against the rest of the world, which considers this territory occupied.
In 2020, Trump made another important decision on territorial sovereignty, recognizing Western Sahara as part of Morocco. Rabat has long been Washington’s ally in North Africa, and the de facto annexation of the former Spanish Sahara had never impeded Moroccan-American relations, despite not being officially recognized. Under Trump, recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara became a “prize” for Rabat for normalizing relations with Israel. Israel itself recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in 2023.
One could say that on this issue, the US and Israel (now along with Morocco) have once again pitted themselves against the rest of the world, but there is an important nuance. While the list of countries recognizing Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara is limited to these three, the idea of a plan for regional autonomy within the kingdom has far more support. This was confirmed by the UN Security Council vote on October 31, 2025, on Resolution 2797, which states that “genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty could constitute a most feasible solution.” The resolution garnered support from eleven of the fifteen Security Council members, including three permanent members (with Russia and China abstaining), marking a significant diplomatic success for Morocco.
A further significant development in the realm of unrecognized states and territorial disputes occurred in December 2025, when Israel became the first UN member state to recognize the independence of Somaliland. Informal relations between Tel Aviv and Hargeisa have existed for much of the history of this self-proclaimed state, which considers itself the successor to the short-lived State of Somaliland—an entity that gained independence from Britain but existed for only five days in June 1960 before uniting with the former Italian Somalia. The formalization of Israeli-Somaliland relations unfolded against the backdrop of the formation of two informal coalitions in the Middle East that also encompass the Horn of Africa. The UAE and Ethiopia closely cooperate with Israel, while Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Somalia oppose them. The latter plays a key role in Turkey’s plans to gain a foothold in East Africa, so Tel Aviv’s decision has become yet another factor in exacerbating tensions with Ankara.
As for Washington, the likelihood of its recognition of Somaliland is quite high. This isn’t just because Hargeisa enjoys Tel Aviv’s support and is willing to join the Abraham Accords, while Trump harbours a personal dislike for Somalia as a country, likely driven by his antipathy of Representative Ilhan Omar. In February, Somaliland’s leadership offered Washington access to its natural resources and military bases on its territory—in the clear hope that this transactional language, understood by Trump, would pave the way for diplomatic recognition.
These recent developments collectively illustrate how sovereignty and territorial integrity—the sacred cows of a bygone era in international relations—are progressively losing their inviolable status. States now wield these principles with growing instrumentalism, and what was previously in a “grey zone” is being legitimized. The world’s political map has never been uniform—for example, India and Pakistan have drawn their borders in mutually exclusive ways for nearly eighty years, without regard for the situation on the ground. But today, such discrepancies are growing, and countries with distinct opinions on various territorial issues are increasingly unconcerned about universal recognition of those opinions.
