The south-eastern periphery of Europe represents the EU’s “final frontier” – a testing ground where the European project must reaffirm its appeal, both to sceptical citizens in core member states and to populations on the fringe. Brussels’ sustained political engagement in the region is thus all but guaranteed, Valdai Club Programme Director Anton Bespalov
writes.
The Cold War era in Europe was remarkable in many respects, not least for the unprecedented stability of national borders. For four decades, any territorial changes occurred exclusively through peaceful, negotiated agreements – typically involving minor land swaps between neighbouring states. Having endured two world wars that reshaped the continent’s political map, European nations – both East and West – were resolute in preventing future interstate conflicts over territory.
Indeed, no such conflicts emerged – with one notable exception. The 1983 declaration of independence by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) stands as the sole case of forceful border revision during this period, resulting in a partially recognised state. The historical irony is palpable: the process which led to TRNC’s formation unfolded against the backdrop of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which enshrined principles of non-violence, border inviolability, and territorial integrity. Yet these very principles were systematically violated between 1974 and 1983, from Turkey’s military intervention to Ankara’s unilateral recognition of the breakaway state.
For European powers, Northern Cyprus represented an isolated but persistent irritant. Unrecognised states inherently challenge international order – as Alexander Iskandaryan observes, they constitute “exceptions to international law that are best ignored, lest their irrational nature disrupt the established legal framework.”
However, the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia multiplied such challenges dramatically. While some breakaway entities proved ephemeral, others have endured for decades. Initially, major powers avoided formal recognition while selectively supporting client entities – until Kosovo’s 2008 transition to “partially recognised” status marked a turning point.
The international order inherently strives for “normality”, and in the case of unrecognised states, this is either international recognition or the reintegration of secessionist entities into recognised ones. Today, the only unrecognised state in Europe in the full sense of the word (not recognised by any UN member state) is Transnistria. As for partially recognised states, the situation varies significantly. Kosovo has been recognised by 108 UN member states, Abkhazia and South Ossetia by 5, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus by 1.
Post-1990, three scenarios have emerged for the restoration of state sovereignty over territories not controlled by central authorities:
The first is peaceful reintegration. This has only happened in full in Gagauzia, which in 1994 received autonomous status within Moldova. However, in a referendum in February 2014 (Declared illegal and without legal force by the Moldovan authorities), the residents of Gagauzia voted to declare independence in the event that Moldova loses its sovereignty. A case of partially peaceful reintegration is the 1998 restoration of Croatian control over Eastern Slavonia, the last fragment of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, destroyed three years earlier as a result of a Croatian offensive.
The second is forced reintegration under external influence, as in the case of Republika Srpska in 1995, or through that of the central government, as in the case of Chechnya in 1999-2000. NATO’s operation against the Bosnian Serbs brought closer peace talks that led to the creation of a completely new state consisting of two autonomous entities which was actually under external control. The long-term result of Russia’s military operation in Chechnya was the broad autonomy of the Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation, providing for the preservation of the local way of life, which became possible, among other things, thanks to the “Chechenisation” of the conflict, as some former enemies were converted into allies.
The third is the liquidation of secessionist entities by military means, leading to a complete redrawing of the ethnic maps of the corresponding territories: the case of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in 1995 and Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.
The last scenario is not applicable to the currently existing unrecognised and partially recognised states, since their patrons – the EU/NATO, Russia and Turkey – represent too impressive a force. What remains is peaceful reintegration, continued life in the “grey zone” – or international recognition.
The latter possibility could theoretically be assumed in the case of Kosovo, if Serbia were to recognise its independence, and Northern Cyprus, if the Republic of Cyprus were to accept the loss of the north of the island. But the fact is that maintaining the “partially recognised status” of these territories is not an insurmountable problem for any of the players involved.
Recognition of Kosovo is not a condition for Serbia’s accession to the EU (five of whose states do not recognise Kosovo), although Serbian politicians admit that it could be set – and in that case rejected. But reintegration of the region is also impossible, although the “Kosovo is Serbia” ideology is an important part of Serbian policy. Therefore, the most likely scenario is the continuation of the normalisation of relations without recognition, which is underway despite periodic breakdowns. Life in the “grey zone” creates situations that may seem counterintuitive, based on the logic of irreconcilable confrontation between the parties, but they indicate that in everyday life people always find creative solutions. For example, during the period when Serbia had already received a visa-free regime with the EU, but Kosovo had not, many Kosovo Albanians acquired Serbian passports and registered at fictitious addresses in Serbia. The importance of free entry to the EU for residents of the European periphery is emphasised by the fact that about a third of all Kosovo Albanians live outside Kosovo, and the share of remittances from the diaspora in Kosovo’s GDP stood at 17.5% of GDP in 2023.
As for Cyprus, an attempt at peaceful reunification failed on the eve of its accession to the EU in 2004 due to the position of the Greek Cypriots, who have since demonstrated an increasing willingness to accept the idea of two states. However, the official position of the EU, which de jure controls Northern Cyprus, is that reunification is the only possible solution. In 2021, Ursula von der Leyen said that the European Union would “never, ever” accept a two-state deal on Cyprus. In May 2025, Brussels appointed a special envoy for Cyprus, which the Greek community perceived as an increase in Brussels’ involvement in Cypriot affairs.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia will remain partially recognised states for the foreseeable future (it is possible that Syria will withdraw its recognition of their independence, although Syrian-Abkhaz contacts have continued after the regime change in Syria). Attempts at forceful reintegration by Tbilisi can be ruled out, but the two republics are as unlikely to join Russia. Firstly, this requires the will of their population (it is clearly expressed only in South Ossetia), and secondly, Russia’s preservation of the status quo helps strengthen those forces in Georgia that advocate a balanced foreign policy.
In the absence of a common border, Russia has fewer opportunities to influence the situation in Transnistria, which, according to Dmitry Ofitserov-Belsky, has developed a “symbiotic form of coexistence” with Moldova over three decades. Chisinau’s current course toward European integration creates a potentially acute dilemma for both constituent parts of the former Soviet Moldavia. Objectively, it is advantageous for Moldova to join the EU without Transnistria, although politically it is extremely difficult to admit this, and Transnistria has found itself in a situation of choice: either a hypothetical chance to end up in the European Union, or continued life in the “grey zone”.
Moldova’s accession to the European Union can create a situation similar to Northern Cyprus, with an EU member state not controlling part of its officially recognised territory. There is no doubt that the EU will make efforts to reintegrate Transnistria, employing “carrots” (the possibility of free movement around Europe, education and business if not “sticks”. The majority of Transnistrians have Moldovan citizenship (along with Russian), and this factor will certainly be used in working with it.
In recent decades, the European Union has become an inescapable factor for all unrecognised and partially recognised states on Europe’s south-eastern periphery, though its influence varies considerably. In Kosovo, it looms dominant; in Northern Cyprus, significant; and in Moldova – and by extension, Transnistria – increasingly palpable. For Abkhazia and South Ossetia, EU involvement has so far been confined to sporadic condemnations of their political trajectories, though the concept of “engagement without recognition” (particularly regarding Abkhazia ) has circulated in Brussels for years. Against the backdrop of Russo-European tensions, the EU is likely to pursue a more assertive policy toward these territories, especially if pro-European factions come to dominate the political life of Moldova and Georgia – countries Brussels views as strategic battlegrounds in its contest with Moscow.
The EU’s enlargement agenda now confronts a paradox: the remaining candidate countries rank among Europe’s poorest, offering limited economic benefits to current members. Their accession will prove protracted and arduous, with mass labour migration (and, in Moldova’s case, Romanian passport acquisition) serving as a de facto substitute for full integration. Yet this south-eastern periphery represents the EU’s “final frontier” – a testing ground where the European project must reaffirm its appeal, both to sceptical citizens in core member states and to populations on the fringe. Brussels’ sustained political engagement in the region is thus all but guaranteed.
