To be like a stalk and to be like steel
in a world where we can do so little
– Marina Tsvetaeva
Thanks to the multilayered power structure, the Iranian political system maintains flexibility and the ability to self-regulate. It is precisely the internal competition between conservatives, pragmatists, and individual centres of power that contributes to the preservation of the political system, preventing any one player from undermining the balance of the entire structure, writes Mehrubon Ashurov. The author is a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.
Israel’s attack on Iran in June 2025 – which aimed, in part, to overthrow or at least significantly weaken the Iranian government – failed to achieve its objectives. This outcome cannot be attributed solely to Iran’s strategic depth, successful defence, or the rallying “around the flag” effect. A critical factor in the resilience of the Iranian political system is its inherent institutional flexibility.
Despite serious challenges associated with socioeconomic deterioration and increasing external pressure, Iran’s political system has once again (as throughout the 46 years of the current political system’s existence) demonstrated its resilience and adaptability.
The intertwining and multidimensionality of democratic and theocratic norms, initially laid out as the foundation of the system after the 1979 revolution, have created a unique self-regulation mechanism, forcing political players to act within the established “rules of the game”. This model of institutional order, with functioning feedback channels, presidential and parliamentary elections, is capable not only of preventing the system from collapsing but also of mitigating crises by absorbing protest potential. However, the effectiveness of this model has gradually declined in recent years.
The decline in Iranian society’s trust in legal feedback channels is evidenced by the turnout rates in the 2021 presidential elections (where only 48% of the population participated) and in 2024 (39.9% and 49% in the first and second rounds, respectively) being the lowest in the Islamic Republic’s history. This, in turn, was offset by chronic protests. However, it would be incorrect to interpret these solely as an institutional weakness of the political regime, as widespread protesting is normal in many countries with stable governments (the United States, France, Lebanon, and Algeria).
On the contrary, the factor of popular mobilisation, deeply embedded in the foundations of the government’s identity, is an informal form of political participation and bargaining. Through this unique mechanism of pressure on the authorities, society communicates its demands, resulting in the government being pushed toward certain responses (budget adjustments, personnel changes, revision of austerity measures) and the expansion of acceptable socio-political behaviour (relaxing sanctions for women not wearing hijabs), even if the official response is forceful. Thanks to this, the authorities, while maintaining overall control over the process, adjust individual policy areas. This unique “dialogue through crisis” has become an element of the system’s resilience, especially after the 2009 events (when a significant portion of the population, dissatisfied with the results of the presidential elections, took to the streets in protest).
It turns out that the “rules of the game” in Iranian politics are constantly being formed on the fly, and protests are an organic element of this “improvisational” social order. Elites are forced to respond to challenges ad hoc, and societal demands articulated through protests result in a wide variety of decisions, depending on which forces – reformers, centrists, or conservatives – are in power and dominant at a given moment.
The ongoing rivalry between “hawks” and “doves” among Iranian elites is another factor in the stability and institutionalisation of the political regime. Despite all the rhetorical polarisation, no single centre of power, not even the supreme leader, possesses the potential for monopolistic control over the system. This polycentricity prevents the formation of a personalistic dictatorship and transforms political governance into a process of constant negotiations, balancing, and mutual restrictions.
This is precisely why parallels (post-war conditions, sanctions, the complex domestic political and economic situation) with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, despite the desire of experts to find similarities in Middle Eastern regimes, are misleading.
Thanks to the multilayered power structure, the Iranian political system maintains flexibility and the ability to self-regulate. Competing elite groups are forced to operate within the framework of common institutional rules established by the Supreme Leader; he acts as an arbitrator and his authority is enshrined in law. Paradoxically, it is precisely this internal competition between conservatives, pragmatists, and individual centres of power that contributes to the preservation of the political system, preventing any one player from undermining the balance of the entire structure.
Furthermore, in the decades since the 1979 revolution, the country has developed a relatively stable bureaucratic apparatus, party-political infrastructure, religious foundations, and other institutions that participate in the distribution of rents and the maintenance of social stability. These structures form the basis for the vertical integration of power.
However, with the weakening of electoral feedback channels since the conservatives came to power in 2021, the effectiveness of this “bargaining” has noticeably diminished. This is due not only to a changing social structure, where the younger generation, raised under sanctions, focuses primarily on socioeconomic guarantees (rather than ideological slogans), but also to the fact that conservatives are proposing a different vision for the country’s development, emphasising ideological mobilisation and the securitisation of domestic policy. As a result, the distance between elites and society is increasing, and the “bargaining” mechanism is losing its former adaptability.
This was evidenced by the longest protests in the history of the Islamic Republic, which erupted in 2022. The formal pretext for them was the death of Mahsa Amini, who was accused of violating the hijab law. However, within a short time, the protesters put forward deeper and more systemic demands regarding the need for political and social reforms. The protests were suppressed, and their demands were never met. As a result, the authorities, under external pressure, resource shortages, and systemic economic difficulties, have proven increasingly incapable of converting public discontent and protest impulses into real concessions – as occurred, for example, during the 2009 protests.
In the current post-war period, the Islamic Republic faces the task not only of enhancing its defence capability and addressing systemic problems in the economy, electricity, water supply, etc., but also of implementing socio-political reforms and strengthening its national identity. Although post-war society largely consolidated around the authorities, and anti-Israeli sentiment spread to the previously neutral urban middle class, the “rally-around-the-flag” effect is short-lived, making the need to renew the social contract quite obvious.
As part of its effort toward national consolidation, the authorities – recognising the declining appeal of an Islamic identity for the post-revolutionary generation – began to actively promote ethnonational narratives rooted in pre-Islamic history. This involved a revival of heroes from Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh epic. At the height of the war with Israel, a billboard appeared in central Tehran depicting Arash the Archer, a legendary defender of Iran, launching Iranian missiles instead of arrows. Two months later, in Tehran’s Enghelab (Revolution) Square, another billboard featured the epic hero Rostam battling a dragon painted in the colours of the American flag. In Shiraz, a poster styled as an ancient relief showed a kneeling Netanyahu depicted as the Roman Emperor Valerian before the Sasanian Emperor Shapur. This theme culminated on November 8, 2025, with the unveiling of a statue in Enghelab Square portraying the same humiliating scene of Roman submission. While such iconography existed before the conflict, its proliferation has increased markedly since the war with Israel began. This also coincides with global and regional trends toward increasing nationalism (for example, in Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, etc.). This shift in discourse reflects the regime’s desire to adapt its ideological base to new societal demands.
Another, more practical step was the easing of state social controls, particularly regarding the hijab and internet access. However, the degree of liberalisation of the socio-political space will depend on the position of the influential conservative part of the establishment. Its conflict of interests with the (post-revolutionary) urban middle class citizens, the main champions of reformist expectations, will remain the main indicator of socio-political disintegration.
Socio-political reforms, the need for which is increasingly being discussed by both external analysts and Iranian officials, could develop along two main paths. However, their dynamics will inevitably depend on the external environment – the risk of a new war with Israel, the nature of relations with the US, and possible sanctions. If we abstract from external factors and focus on the domestic political situation, two basic scenarios can be identified. They broadly reflect the differences in visions of the future between the conservative and reformist wings of the Iranian elite.
The first is a certain inertia in the current domestic political dynamics, based on maintaining managed stability in the face of external pressure and structural economic problems. This scenario, which the Islamic Republic has been pursuing in recent years, assumes that the authorities will try to minimise public mobilisation, preserving the system in a securitised governance mode. This strategy may ensure short-term stability, but is fraught with the accumulation of internal contradictions, which, if the system’s ability to respond to social demands weakens, will inevitably erupt into protests. In such a case, the system will be forced, in one way or another, to “accommodate” the potential street protesters.
The second, somewhat risky, but more effective (for the system’s continued stability) approach is systemic reform. This involves a partial renewal of the social contract, entailing greater representation for reformers and an increased role for them (and, correspondingly, a diminished role for conservatives), a reduction in foreign policy activity, and a more attentive ear to public demand. However, it would also have to reflect a rethinking of the system's ideological core–the concept of Velayat-e faqih.
Despite the apparent unlikelihood of this, such a version of updating the system may be quite viable within the framework of the Shiite tradition, in which the doors of ijtihad , while in the Shiite tradition they are open: every highly qualified scholar – marja at-taqlid – has the right to do legal opinions) are quite open to innovation. Thus, the political regime, in search of renewed legitimacy, could transform the Velayat-e faqih, relying on alternative formats proposed within Shia political thought: Naeini’s constitutionalism, Montazeri’s “limited guardianship”, Shirazi’s collective rule, and others.
At the same time, the second scenario, which entails the strengthening of the reformist wing and a revision of the state ideology, poses a threat to the existing political system and the country as a whole. These risks are greatly exacerbated by Iran’s complex relations with the United States and Israel, with whom the Iranians (based on their own experience) doubt the sustainability of their agreements.
In any case, today, given its limited resources, the Iranian leadership faces a key strategic challenge: finding a balance between risks and benefits. Iran’s future development – whether preserving the current model or gradually transforming it – will depend on how effectively the authorities can maintain this balance.
