As American military assets continue flooding US bases throughout the Middle East, Alexander Maryasov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia to Iran (2001-2005), explores the nature of a potential confrontation between Washington and Tehran, the domestic resilience of the Islamic Republic and its political system, and the retaliatory actions America and its allies may face should they choose war.
Experts worldwide continue to speculate as to whether the United States will bomb Iran or not. Opinions diverge. Arguments are advanced both in favour and against the inevitability of military action, and each is presented with considerable conviction. Yet, ultimately, no one is capable of predicting how the unpredictable American president will act.
The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli lobby in the United States, hawkish advisers to Donald Trump, and hardliners in the US Congress are urging the president to hasten strikes before Iran further strengthens its missile capabilities and before the momentum of recent protests within Iran dissipates. They contend that the defeat of Hamas, Israel’s substantial blows against Hezbollah, the fall of the Assad regime, and last year’s joint US–Israeli strikes against Iran have significantly weakened the Islamic Republic’s regional standing. In their assessment, the mass protests within Iran itself have prepared the ground for regime change.
Conversely, more sober voices within Trump’s circle and the broader American establishment caution him regarding the dangerous consequences of Tehran’s retaliatory missile attacks. Such strikes could result in American military casualties, with more than 40,000 US personnel stationed at bases in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain alone. This, in turn, could significantly weaken the Republican Party’s position in the forthcoming autumn congressional elections.
Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and other Arab countries are seeking to dissuade the American president from military action against Iran, fearing their own entanglement in a broader conflict. The Saudis recall how Iranian missiles reportedly penetrated American air defence systems and struck Saudi energy facilities in 2009. Qatar likewise has not forgotten Iran’s missile strike on a US base on its territory in June 2025, carried out in response to American aggression.
For the time being, Trump maintains a posture of strategic ambiguity, alternating between threats of attack—which are backed by the deployment to the region of a substantial naval armada led by the USS Abraham Lincoln, with a second carrier strike group set to reinforce it—and declarations of his desire to conclude a “good deal” with Tehran on the nuclear issue.
Fully aware of the gravity of the threat hanging over it, Iran has agreed to renewed negotiations with the US in the hope of gaining time and securing an outcome acceptable to itself. At the same time, Iranian officials repeatedly remind audiences of Washington’s “treachery” in attacking Iran during previous talks held in Oman earlier in the summer of 2025—talks that had been progressing quite constructively. The Omani mediators had stated that Tehran was prepared to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment, subsequently reduce enrichment levels, and consider participation in the possible establishment of an international uranium enrichment consortium in exchange for sanctions relief.
Now, the American side reportedly commenced talks with a firm demand for the complete cessation of enrichment activities, as well as the dismantling or removal from the country of stocks of highly enriched uranium. However, it has not, at least thus far, raised issues relating to Iran’s ballistic missile programme or its support for pro-Iranian entities throughout the region—matters on which Israel continues to insist.
Iran is unwilling to halt uranium enrichment entirely but appears prepared to discuss possibilities for reducing enrichment levels and possibly exporting highly enriched uranium in exchange for the lifting or easing of sanctions.
Trump is reportedly considering various options for striking Iran, since refraining from military action could be construed as weakness and would deal a blow to his cultivated image as a politician who will always find a way and a decisive problem-solver.
The negotiations themselves serve as a diversion, as neither side appears prepared to make fundamental concessions. Washington is unlikely to abandon its demands that Iran permanently cease enrichment, curtail its missile programme, and end support for regional proxies. For Tehran, these demands are fundamentally unacceptable.
A more dangerous scenario would entail large-scale attacks targeting the religious-political leadership, military installations, nuclear sites, and other critical infrastructure, in an attempt to decapitate the regime and minimise its capacity for severe retaliation against American and Israeli targets.
Tehran declares itself prepared for any eventuality, including the most perilous. Iranian officials suggest that lessons have been learned from last year’s US–Israeli attack, and that measures have been undertaken to deploy additional air defence systems, enhance and expand ballistic missile capabilities, disperse and better conceal launch systems, and reinforce nuclear facilities.
Iranian law enforcement authorities have also acted to identify and arrest members of Israeli intelligence networks who provided information on the whereabouts of senior Iranian military officials and nuclear scientists, as well as on the location of missile launch sites and military installations.
While warning Israel against joining any US military action against the Islamic Republic, Iranian officials assert that they now possess enhanced capabilities to penetrate Israeli air defence systems— that includes the Iron Dome—and to inflict substantial damage on Israel’s military and industrial infrastructure.
Iran has further cautioned that, should American and Israeli strikes intensify the conflict “could become regional”. Recent contacts between Iranian representatives and the leadership of Hezbollah and the Yemeni Houthis suggest preparations to involve these actors in strikes against Israel and the United States in the event of aggression against Iran. Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, has stated that if the United States were to attack the religious leadership of the Islamic Republic with Ayatollah Khamenei at its helm, Hezbollah and other Shiite armed groups would open a front of jihad—sacred struggle—against the aggressors. In the event of a sharp escalation, Iran could attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz, thereby disrupting regional oil exports and causing a sharp rise in global prices.
Although recent protests in Iran were significant in scale and accompanied by anti-government slogans, they did not, contrary to expectations in the West, lead to acute internal destabilisation, let alone the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Law enforcement agencies moved relatively swiftly to stabilise the situation and to identify and detain individuals instigating unrest and rioting.
The country possesses a relatively robust, deeply layered system of governance across all branches of power, capable of containing crises. The regime’s resilience is underpinned by the powerful security apparatus of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—closely aligned with the country’s religious-political leadership—and its subordinate Basij militia.
The regime’s durability is also significantly reinforced by the religious factor. Through an extensive network of theological centres, mosques, Friday prayer imams, and personal representatives of the Supreme Leader across all provinces, the religious-political leadership shapes behavioural norms and ideological perspectives. The majority of the population remains committed to Shia Islam and does not support the dissenting sentiments expressed by segments of youth, business circles, and Iranian liberals who advocate the abandonment of Islamic norms and rapprochement with Western states.
Rapidly destabilising such an ideologically charged state system—whether through economic and military pressure or through large-scale political protests, as some in the West assume—would be quite hard.
