As assertive adversaries all across the globe compel the United States to disperse resources and step back from an active role in the Middle East, the region enters an era of “bargain diplomacy”—defined by short-term, uncertain deals, struck in an environment where personal ties reign supreme, Ruslan Mamedov writes.
Throughout 2025, the Middle East retained its position as one of the pivotal regions in global politics. It was in this part of the world that the main novelties of international affairs have been tested. Analysts increasingly spoke of a foreign policy transition from traditional diplomacy to a “transactional approach”. In turn, the very nature of interaction between states drove demand for even greater practicality. The author of this article therefore proposes that we avoid concealing those phenomena that became commonplace throughout international politics behind academic and diplomatic tone. Conditions in 2025 call for an open discussion around “bargain diplomacy”. It was the Arab world that among the first experienced the straightforward nature of contemporary international affairs, described using the term siyasat al-safaqa, or “bargain politics”.
The key research question is whether bargain diplomacy makes for more stable conditions in regional subsystems of international relations, or not—in other words, does this approach create the grounds for settling the hot button issues of contemporary global affairs, or does it merely numb crises that are destined to flare up with renewed intensity? Before providing an answer, the defining traits of bargain diplomacy should be discussed first.
What differentiates bargain diplomacy from classic diplomacy is the centrally positioned desire to reap benefits “right here, right now”, as opposed to the formulation of long-term strategies. Thus, the diplomatic bargains themselves are of short-term or medium-term nature. Such an approach implies, among other factors, the ability to predict crises and exit them, locking in immediate benefits and letting other actors (even those that used to be considered allies in the era of classic diplomacy) pick up illiquid assets. Secondly—the backing for diplomatic bargains is not provided by international norms and agreements, but rather derived from foreign policy resources—certain “basic settings” that include not just force (although it is of key importance), but also economic capabilities, allies, and “co-investors”. Third—within the framework of bargain diplomacy, it is implied that issues remain contained and solutions concrete. Seemingly, this may lead to multiple bargains being struck around issues that may have looked singular and complex in character within the framework of classic diplomacy. Fourth—shifts in external conditions prompt new bargains among parties already in agreement. It should be pointed out that bargains could be struck—and are being struck—by other players, which alters the surrounding environment itself and creates necessity for reaching new agreements, as well as updating or calling off previously concluded deals. And, of course, fifth—bargains in and of themselves imply the presence of parties. The very recognition of parties in bargains is something that emerged out of the last decade in global affairs.
None of the parameters listed above exist in isolation, but rather are mutually intertwined and exert influence on each other. The transition to bargain diplomacy more so symbolizes the waning of the unipolar world, when the sole superpower experiencing decline shifts priorities in an attempt to entrench its leading—although no longer dominant—position in a world order taking shape. For example: while in 2003 the Americans, generally, were not in need of allies to topple the Iraqi regime and occupy the country, in 2025 the logic of interaction with actors across the Middle East has changed.
Within the framework of the 2025 US National Security Strategy, the Middle East is relegated to the background—ranked fourth among regional priorities for American foreign policy. Yet the text of the Strategy itself gives this author the impression that Trump and his team are preparing to convince the reader still unsure that this position will be universally accepted. The Trump administration agrees that the security of Israel is important, just like investments originating from the region and stability in oil issues. Yet it keeps underlining that Washington must deal with other, more urgent matters. Here, another argument in favour of Washington choosing bargain diplomacy reveals itself before us—the preference stems from a plain need for leveraging resources elsewhere. The United States simply does not possess the appropriate resources required for a long-term strategy in an environment where it deals with encroachment from competitors in other regions.
An increasing amount of attention is dedicated to the personal qualities of participants in the deals of bargain diplomacy. Indeed, under President Donald Trump deals often revolve around his team personally, rather than institutions or multilateral cooperation. Tom Barrack, Steve Witkoff, Charles and Jared Kushner—they could hardly be referred to as career diplomats. In the new environment of 2025 professional diplomats are not as useful for leaders as trusted individuals (“the sovereign’s men) are. On the one hand, this helps overcome the bureaucratic nature of decision-making, on the other, it drives instability: if a leader or negotiating “sovereign’s man” is replaced, bargains can be altered and the trust serving as their foundation may crumble and disappear. Observes point out that contemporary diplomacy is undergoing transformation with shifts in structures of power, technology, mass media, and non-state actors—but the Trump model underscores the influence of personalities. Members of the current American administration have abandoned diplomatic tone and “democratic moralising”, and are telling it as it is, as many believe—throughout the Middle East such “honesty” has earned them recognition in certain circles.
Does “bargain diplomacy” drive stability, or rather instability, across the Middle East? The author is not prepared to give a definitive answer, as this article merely raises the question and makes an initial contribution to the discussion that began at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies within the framework of the 20th Conference of Arabists, “I.M. Smilyanskaya Readings”. Yet much remains in the hands of leaders, states, global and regional institutions. International relations are dynamic in nature—the positions and actions of players are unlikely to turn the clock back. But actors themselves may either fit in into the new era or influence trends using creative new solutions. Multilateralism and international norms retain a degree of importance in the Middle East, but regional leaders are prepared to accept bargain politics. To them, such a world is preferable to one based on rules camouflaged as “international law”.
