The regional powers of the Middle East are poised to increase their roles there. This is not being driven by alternative centres of power, but by regional dynamics. In the most optimistic scenario, if they do their proverbial homework, the states of West Asia—primarily its middle powers—could give birth to unique new forms of internal development and organisation, writes Ruslan Mamedov. This material was prepared specifically for the 16th Asian Conference of the Valdai Discussion Club.
The situation in the Middle East is increasingly reminiscent of the events in the science fiction novel "Hard to be a God" by Soviet writers Arkady and Boris Strugatsky. External, technologically advanced forces are attempting to study and simultaneously adjust the course of events on an "alien" planet, with what they believe are the best of intentions. However, this often ends with the degradation of these external forces—they lose their identity, become susceptible to extenuating conditions, and themselves embody vengeance and brute force.
Over the past several decades, the United States has claimed the role of "arbiter of destinies" in the Middle East. The most recent high-profile initiative was US President Donald Trump's 2025 peace plan. The beautiful photographs of world leaders, led by Trump, against a banner bearing the words "Peace in the Middle East 2025" in Sharm el-Sheikh recalled another similar image. On May 1, 2003, US President George W. Bush, also a Republican, appeared against a banner reading "Mission Accomplished," declaring victory over Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime. But the Americans' greatest losses were yet to come: a guerrilla campaign, mixed with terrorism, against the US in Iraq had begun. Consequently, this was a failed attempt by the US to “play God”.
Trump's "peace in the Middle East" did not lead to the creation of a Palestinian state—and it didn't even necessarily stop the war between Israel and Hamas—but it was embraced by states in the region. The situation in Gaza has become too toxic for the Gulf states, and following Israel's strikes on Qatar, Arab monarchies have chosen to maximize their lobbying efforts to attract Trump's attention. The Arab states understand the unfinished nature of the conflict and are focused not only on maintaining Trump's involvement in the Gaza settlement but also on preventing the Netanyahu government from scuttling the deal or annexing the West Bank.
The Arab elites are ready to exist in a world with Trump's transactional approach to foreign policy. Israel's leadership appears even more prepared. However, Israel could work against them by establishing dominance in the region and implementing its “Greater Israel” project. While the Arabs previously feared the threat posed by Iran and its proxies, this fear has now faded, and concern about Israel's excessive strength is taking centre stage.
Israel enjoys the favour and extensive military assistance of the United States. Without this, its level of influence in the region would be impossible, especially given the prolonged war with Hamas. The US-promoted Abraham Accords, aimed at normalising relations between Israel and several Arab states while ignoring Palestinian interests, led to an escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip in 2023 and the destabilisation of the regional balance. This tactic of separate agreements is not new. As Yevgeny Primakov wrote, “...At the same time, it seems to me that the path to peace is lengthened and made problematic by its stability and the general nature of US tactics, which from the very beginning consisted of combinations designed to pull one Arab country after another, as well as the Palestinians, toward peace with Israel...” The inability of Arab governments to resolve the conflict has historically been one of the main reasons for the loss of legitimacy of rulers in the eyes of their societies. Arab rulers strive to retain power, but in the medium-term they may face the radicalisation of their societies.
According to SIPRI estimates, Israel may have approximately 90 nuclear warheads. Despite regional calls for sanctions against Israel for its non-adherence to the NPT and its crimes in Gaza, the Jewish state faces no consequences, thanks to US support. This makes Saudi Arabia's decision to rebalance the regional security architecture all the more interesting. The signing of the Mutual Defence Strategic Agreement (MDSA) between Riyadh and Islamabad on September 17, 2025, demonstrates that the Saudis do not trust the “old” US guarantees. Pakistan, the only nuclear power in the Muslim world, is becoming a player in the changing regional balance in West Asia, which once again raises the question of how to build a regional security system.
The escalation in Gaza triggered many regional processes, one of which was the considerable weakening of the pro-Iranian “Axis of Resistance”. The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 is widely considered a success for Turkey and Qatar. Ankara's rhetoric regarding the post-conflict period in Syria and the need to support reconstruction increasingly resembles that of Assad's allies in the late 2010s. However, in reality, the Syrian conflict has simply moved to the next stage. Thus, while a weak Syria under Bashar al-Assad had previously stood between Turkey and Israel, the post-Assad period has created a unique geopolitical vacuum, pitting pro-Turkish groups in Syria against Israel's harsh actions. Damascus currently considers it significant to restore the 1974 disengagement agreement between Israeli and Syrian forces, which Israel has effectively rejected by expanding its much-needed strategic depth into southern Syria. The new Syrian government's primary priorities in the initial phase were consolidating power, gaining international legitimacy, and lifting sanctions. However, Syria was divided into two zones, and in many areas, authority was nominal: individual factions, particularly those located in southern Syria, did not always obey the public orders of the new authorities in Damascus (Israel is currently actively working to bring Syria's Druze community into its political arena). The second zone included territories controlled by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (ААСВС), which was led by Kurdish armed organisations. Syria, meanwhile, will remain a field for external intervention for years to come, while speculation within the region is rife that the Americans will divide Syria into spheres of influence between their allies, Turkey and Israel. .Once again, “it's hard to be a God,” so Trump could delegate some functions to his allies, but judging by media reports, the Americans themselves will build bases in Syria to guarantee Israel's security.
Despite the apparent US dominance in the Middle East, this is not the “end of history”. The region itself may move toward an increasing role for regional powers. This is being facilitated not by alternative centres of power, but by its own regional dynamics. However, it is still worth noting the grand ideas of the Eurasian civilisation-states. Russia, India, and China are proposing new forms of the long term non-confrontational interaction on the continent. Russia and Belarus jointly proposed the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st Century. China is promoting the idea of a “Community of Shared Destiny for Humanity”, having already achieved diplomatic success in the region by guarantoring the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement and the Beijing Declaration of the Palestinian factions. India proposes a multi-directional, mutually beneficial development, Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (One Earth, One Family, One Future). Even under the most optimistic scenario, if they do their homework, the states of West Asia—primarily its middle powers—could give birth to unique new forms of internal development and organisation. This has previously been thwarted by the former European colonial powers and the United States, which undermined and constrained the development of Eurasia, including through attempts to exploit the Middle East for their own ends.
It is important to note that the new architecture of international relations is being formed around technological sovereignty or the ability to serve as a technological link between other centres (as the Gulf monarchies aspire to). The ability to balance competition and cooperation in areas such as AI (data centres), space, and nuclear energy is becoming the primary tool for ensuring technological sovereignty. Control over technology is control over discourse, infrastructure, and future norms of regional security. A number of regional powers are seeking to undergo a period of transformation and secure their position in the future regional order. However, this process will also be determined by global trends, as regional transformation itself is interdependent and reflects global processes in world politics. Recent years have demonstrated that West Asia needs a regional security system. This work must be carried out by key regional powers, including Iran and Israel, on an inclusive basis. In this sense, there is hope that the transactional nature of West Asian leaders is a temporary phenomenon and, ultimately, a path to strategic autonomy without shifting responsibility “to God”.
