Inter-Korean Summit: Will the "Olympic Warming" Lead to Something More?

News of the "Olympic warming" is encouraging. Another round of high-level talks was held in preparation for the inter-Korean summit in northern Panmunjom (a border checkpoint in the demilitarized zone dividing the DPRK and the Republic of Korea), which was held on March 29, 2018. It was organized fairly quickly. Seoul formally extended an invitation to Pyongyang to hold talks on March 22, which was accepted on March 24. 

The South Korean delegation included Minister of Unification Cho Myoung-gyon, his deputy Chun Hae-sung and head of the press service of the presidential administration Yoon Young-chan (interestingly, a representative of the national intelligence service was initially named to this position instead of Chun Hae-sung). The North Korean side was represented by Chairman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland Ri Son Gwon, his deputy Chung Jong-soo and committee department head Kim Myung-Il. 

Setting the date for the inter-Korean summit was the main outcome of the talks. President of the Republic of Korea Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will meet at the Peace House in southern Panmunjom on April 27. The agenda of the summit, however, remains unknown. According to a representative of the presidential administration of the Republic of Korea, Korea presented three items to North Korea – denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, securing peace, and advancing inter-Korean relations – to which there were no objections. The representative hailed it as major progress, and said the failure of the parties to reach an agreement during the talks is due to the fact that the summit agenda is determined by the DPRK leader, not the participants in the talks. 

It was decided to hold the next round of contacts at the working level between representatives of the South and the North on April 4 to discuss protocol and security matters. A preliminary high-level meeting is scheduled for around April 18. 

In the opinion of this writer, the March 29 talks should be taken as a halfway point at most. Indeed, the latest round of high-level talks, which resulted in a concrete date for the inter-Korean summit, is important, but it’s just one in a series of steps. 

The first point at which intermediate results can be assessed will be either the inter-Korean summit or joint military exercises of the United States and the Republic of Korea, which will have to end before the summit. Of course, South Korea promised that the exercises would be held on a smaller scale and would not feature open shows of force or offensive elements. Yes, one can hope that there will be no mysterious incidents during the exercises similar to the sinking of the Cheonan corvette in 2010, of which North Korea was accused. Yes, North Korea promised this time to remain open-minded with respect to exercises, although this is reminiscent of the foundation on which Beijing and Seoul agreed on THAAD: yes, we understand that nothing depends on you in this matter, and we will, therefore, be content with the promise not to expand the project beyond what has already been done. 

However, the fact that exercises will occur around the same time as the summit introduces a significant element of uncertainty into the schedule, especially since 300,000 South Korean soldiers are involved and amphibious operations are one element, even if no US aircraft carriers or submarines will be involved. 

One can also note how the United States openly linked the outcome of purely bilateral talks on its possible withdrawal from the free trade agreement with South Korea to the outcome of the summit. For Washington, this is an even stronger source of leverage over Seoul than, say, China’s informal sanctions which it used to respond to the THAAD deployment. This means that Moon will have to raise subjects that are painful for the Northerners, demonstrating that the inter-Korean summit is not an opportunity for North Korea to attempt any insidious schemes to destroy the "indestructible friendship" between the United States and the Republic of Korea. 

Of course, the "general excitement in the room" when just the hypothetical possibility of a North Korean-Japanese summit was broached is reminiscent of the tumult that followed the inter-Korean summit of June 2000, when North Korea was visited, for first and last time, by the President of the Russian Federation followed by the US Secretary of State. Hence, the question: how long will such a positive dynamic last? From a tactical point of view, it is better than nothing. Last year ended on a very unpleasant note, and the writer’s danger meter put the probability of a conflict at 44 percent. It has fallen below 30 since, which is comforting. 

As to whether the "Olympic warming" will grow into something more, caution is warranted based on the lack of qualified specialists in the State Department in key positions related to the region and the return of old-school hawks to positions of power – not even military men but pure politicians, who in the absence of combat or even administrative experience, lightly take decisions with the potential to result in major casualties.

As I wrote in one of my previous articles, it's still too early to put the champagne on ice. Even though there has been progress in general, if either of the two summits fails, it may be a case of one step forward, two steps back.

 

Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.