Valdai Club

Even in a hypothetical scenario, when the Korean issue recedes into the shadows amid further escalation in Ukraine or when China tries to resolve the Taiwan issue in all possible ways, including “non-peaceful” ones, the likelihood that Pyongyang would decide to forcibly unify the peninsula for its own benefit is best categorised as fantastic, not an analytical assumption, writes Valdai Club expert Konstantin Asmolov.

The rapid collapse of the inter-Korean dialogue and the likely appearance of American missiles on Korean soil with the blessing of Moon Jae-in, has some chance of coming true, writes Valdai Club expert Konstantin Asmolov.

The most important demand made by the DPRK was that it ease sanctions, but the problem is that the United States perceives sanctions as the only effective lever of coercion, denying Kim the right to good will. As a result, judging by the final documents of the plenum, Pyongyang has decided that amid the current situation, there is no sense in hoping for the lifting of sanctions, and it is necessary to build a policy based on a worst-case scenario.

The aggravation of the troubled relationship between the United States and Iran has an impact on events on the Korean peninsula, which affect the South far more than the North.

Pyongyang has demonstrated new types of weapons, which in a possible conflict on the peninsula could be perceived as a “game changer”, but its response to joint military exercises can be called symmetrical and not promise-breaking.

Although the media praised it as a trilateral summit, in fact Moon Jae-in only played host to the summit meeting between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Therefore, there were two separate summit meetings.

Xi Jinping’s visit to Pyongyang demonstrates that China is actively involved in North Korean affairs, believes Konstantin Asmolov, Leading Research Fellow at the Korean Studies Center, at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute for Far Eastern Studies. On the one hand, China is interested in a continuation of the détente process, so Beijing doesn’t opt for a plan “B”. On the other hand, for North Koreans, that is serious support.

The latest result of the visit was another demonstration of the North Korean leader’s contractual capacity and his desire to pursue an active foreign policy, not limited to the American, Chinese or inter-Korean direction. Here Kim again demonstrated his charisma, and this author hopes that the next DPRK-Russia summit will be held earlier than after eight years.

Current rumours concerning the future visit of North Korea’s leader to Russia reflect speculation both regarding its prospects and about the current state of Russia-DPRK relations.

At a news conference in Pyongyang on March 15, 2019, North Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son-hui said the DPRK was considering suspending further talks on denuclearization with the US. According to Choe, the US is obsessed with its own political interests and is not sincerely interested in achieving results, and thus, missed its “golden” opportunity to reach an agreement at the summit in Hanoi.