The formation of a political alliance along the Moscow–Minsk–Pyongyang axis appears far more realistic than a Moscow–Pyongyang–Beijing alliance, as China adheres to a fairly firm position of not entering blocs that could in any way constrain its sovereignty—including any obligation to become entangled in conflicts on behalf of third parties, writes Konstantin Asmolov.
If Russia is regarded as a Eurasian power, then Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to North Korea marks the first visit by a European head of state to the country after a very long hiatus.
For this reason, the ceremonial component of the visit was notably elaborate, and in part replicated the established protocol used to welcome leaders of more influential states. Kim Jong Un, together with a significant portion of the country’s top leadership, greeted the distinguished guest in the city centre, on Kim Il Sung Square, where an honour guard inspection, the performance of the national anthem, and a gun salute took place. A special concert was held at an indoor ice rink, where songs in Belarusian were combined with figure skating performances. Moreover, a sign of successful negotiations can be seen in the fact that, at the conclusion of the visit, Kim Jong Un personally travelled to the airport to see the guest off. That said, this piece will focus less on the details of the visit itself, and more on its outcomes and political context.
Background: from renewed engagement to the visit
Diplomatic relations between the two countries have existed since 1992, and a joint trade and economic committee has been in place since 1995. However, following the United Nations Security Council sanctions of 2017 and the coronavirus pandemic, trade between the two countries declined sharply, and diplomatic contacts were reduced to a minimum: Belarus currently has no embassy in Pyongyang, while in 2024 bilateral trade amounted to just 0.01 per cent of their total foreign trade.
In the summer of 2024, Belarusian Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhenkov visited the DPRK, where discussions focused on prospects for expanding trade, including supplies of Belarusian pharmaceuticals and food products, as well as imports of Korean cosmetics.
From 28 to 30 October 2025, DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui travelled to Minsk to participate in the Third Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security, where she delivered a speech and declared the DPRK’s readiness to contribute to the construction of a multipolar world. In addition, Choe and Ryzhenkov confirmed their willingness to continue extending mutual support on international platforms in order to shape a fair multipolar world order, and agreed on concrete steps to strengthen cooperation between their foreign ministries so as to elevate relations to a new level, after which the trade and economic committee was effectively “rebooted”.
The official invitation to visit North Korea was conveyed by Kim Jong Un to Alexander Lukashenko during ceremonial events in Beijing in early September 2025, when the North Korean and Belarusian leaders attended commemorations marking the end of the Second World War, demonstrating the unity of countries unwilling to bend to the historical narrative of the collective West.
An American connection?
At times, the visit has been linked to the fact that it was preceded by a visit from a representative of US President John Cole, following which the United States lifted sanctions on the Belarusian Ministry of Finance and key Belarusian assets in exchange for the release of political prisoners. This has led to speculation that the Belarusian leader might have brought a secret message from Donald Trump. However, we should avoid the common logical fallacy whereby “after” is taken to mean “because of”.
Although at the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and at the subsequent session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong Un signalled to Washington that the door to dialogue is closed, but not locked—and that Pyongyang would be willing to talk if Washington changed its approach—this is largely a demonstrative gesture.
First, because the situation surrounding Iran illustrates the extent to which the Trump administration can be trusted in negotiations: too often, they have served as cover for the use of force. Second, North Korea today finds itself in a far stronger negotiating position, and the United States has few meaningful levers of influence left—the proverbial “stick” has worn thin, as under the conditions of a strategic partnership agreement between Russia and the DPRK, any military solution would imply a third world war, while further pressure backed by sanctions would be blocked by both Russia and China. As for the “carrot”, even at a minor level the question arises: what could Trump offer Kim Jong Un that he could not obtain from Vladimir Putin or President Xi? If we are speaking of genuinely significant incentives—such as lifting sanctions or elements of diplomatic recognition, including abandoning the paradigm of DPRK denuclearisation—such measures would be unacceptable to American society and a large segment of officials and experts, including Trump’s own electorate, which would openly sabotage such steps, much as John Bolton’s unscheduled intervention effectively derailed the preliminary agreements reached at the Hanoi summit. Therefore, it is more appropriate to focus on relations between Pyongyang and Minsk, while keeping Moscow in mind.
The emergence of a Moscow–Minsk–Pyongyang triangle?
The Union State of Russia and Belarus is, of course, a rather unique construct, yet it is telling that when Lukashenko laid a wreath at the Liberation Monument in honour of Soviet soldiers who liberated Korea, a bouquet on behalf of the President of Russia was placed alongside it. Moreover, at Vladimir Putin’s request, Lukashenko paid tribute to North Korean fighters who lost their lives in the course of the conflict in Ukraine. In this context, the formation of a political alignment along the Moscow–Minsk–Pyongyang axis appears far more plausible than a Moscow–Pyongyang–Beijing alliance, as China maintains a firm stance against joining blocs that might in any way limit its sovereignty, including obligations to engage in conflicts on behalf of third parties.
Outcomes of the visit: three main areas
During the visit, both sides agreed that their relations had entered a new stage. In terms of concrete outcomes, the main result is a cooperation agreement, along with around ten additional agreements across a wide range of fields. The extent to which these will be implemented remains to be seen, but three principal areas are already clearly identifiable.
The first is political and diplomatic support. Instructions have been issued to establish a Belarusian embassy in Pyongyang, as well as to prepare for visa-free travel. It is also quite likely that further mutual references will appear in the diplomatic rhetoric of both countries—indeed, such elements were already evident in the ceremonial speeches exchanged by the leaders: emphasis on sovereignty, the role of tradition as a pillar of authority, and anti-Western rhetoric.
There is also a bureaucratic dimension: the agreements reached provide a legal and administrative framework—interagency channels, regular exchanges, and projects. The key question, however, is whether stable mechanisms for implementation will emerge.
The second area is cooperation in education and healthcare. By analogy with the agreements concluded alongside the comprehensive strategic partnership treaty between Pyongyang and Moscow, these spheres can generally be developed without risking accusations of violating United Nations Security Council sanctions. This may include assistance to Pyongyang in the form of medical equipment, as well as expanded educational exchanges. One might hope to see Belarusian students specialising in Korean studies at Kim Il Sung University, as well as North Korean students in Belarusian technical universities.
The third area is agriculture. North Korea may be interested both in Belarusian food standards—more precisely, in the ability to maintain older Soviet norms over an extended period—and in the experience of agro-towns, through which Belarus is believed to have actively developed its agricultural sector and expanded its exports. At the same time, it should be noted that opportunities for certain Belarusian exports to the North remain limited: potatoes have traditionally been regarded in North Korea as food for the poorest strata of society, and although since the mid-1990s the North Korean leadership has actively encouraged potato cultivation, unprocessed potatoes are rarely consumed, being used primarily in the form of potato noodles or potato flour.
Prospects for cooperation in other areas remain limited: logistics, sanctions constraints, weak financial infrastructure, and the high toxicity of many transactions involving the DPRK significantly restrict the pace at which real cooperation can grow.
In lieu of a conclusion
In sum, the very fact of the visit is significant, as yet another visit by a head of state demonstrates North Korea’s gradual emergence from international isolation: even if the West continues to portray Pyongyang as a pariah, the diplomacy on the ground has already become more complex than that image suggests.
What can be expected in the medium term? The most likely scenario is a moderate one: a series of interagency contacts, agreements on specific issues, cautious growth in humanitarian and educational cooperation, and limited projects in “safe” sectors. In the context of heightened turbulence, an accelerated scenario is also possible, in which political expediency temporarily outweighs economic costs. An inertial scenario cannot be ruled out either, involving slow implementation and the bureaucratic “settling” of signed documents.
Thus, Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to the DPRK in March 2026 represents an important step towards institutionalising an already existing political rapprochement against the backdrop of the special military operation and the crisis of the previous architecture of international relations. Its real significance will depend on whether the agreements signed are transformed into functioning channels for the exchange of resources, personnel, and technologies.
