The Central Asian countries, despite their differing tactics and nuances, remain steadfast partners and allies of Russia. On May 9, 2025, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan will once again stand on the podium of Red Square, alongside Russian military personnel and soldiers from Central Asian armies. This enduring partnership deserves not only respect and recognition but also a shared commitment to development and prosperity, Kubatbek Rakhimov writes.
Wisdom and restraint – these qualities aptly characterize the position of Central Asian countries amid the geopolitical turbulence of the past three years. The choice to maintain allied relations with Russia is a clear one, as the geostrategic costs of alternative paths are equally evident. Geostrategic costs, in this context, refer to the comprehensive expenses a country incurs when choosing between competing geopolitical blocs. These costs may include adjustments to defence budgets, shifts in access to established security regimes, and the economic repercussions of potential missteps.
For the five Central Asian nations, the decision is straightforward and unambiguous. Over the past three years, their leaders have met with the Russian president at least two to three times annually, both in bilateral and multilateral formats. Aside from Belarus, Russia’s closest ally, the nations of Central Asia stand as Moscow’s most reliable partners. Who stands on the podium on Red Square every May 9? Not the leaders of EU countries or the G20, but the heads of CIS states, with Central Asian leaders prominently among them.
It is therefore perplexing to hear calls from certain second-tier figures within the Russian establishment for the introduction of a visa regime for Central Asian citizens or proposals to restrict their presence in Russia. These voices, whether consciously or not, seem to undermine the approach of Russia’s top leadership toward Eurasian integration and cooperation within the CIS. Ironically, they also disregard the interests of Russia’s real economy, which relies heavily on millions of workers from Central Asia. Admittedly, there have been isolated incidents involving individuals from Central Asia engaging in illegal or extremist activities in Russia, resulting in tragic losses. However, attributing collective guilt to entire nations is short-sighted. If Belarusian oppositionists from the Kalinowski Regiment attack Russian soldiers in the SMO zone, it does not mean all Belarusians bear responsibility for these actions. Every society has its share of wrongdoers, and it is crucial to exercise restraint in assigning blame or applying labels.
Looking ahead, the peace process in the east of Ukraine will require monumental efforts to rebuild infrastructure, housing, and industrial facilities. This task will be nearly impossible without the labour force from Central Asia, particularly from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as well as contractors from EAEU member states like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Plans for the large-scale reconstruction of war-torn territories must be drafted now.
The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) has demonstrated remarkable resilience over these challenging three years, emerging stronger despite Yerevan’s opposition and its aspirations to join the European Union. Similarly, the CSTO has proven its relevance and cohesion, even in the face of opportunistic attempts by some Armenian politicians to freeze their participation or withdraw from the organization. These developments will likely spur internal evolutionary processes within the CSTO, but they will ultimately strengthen the organization rather than weaken it.
The past three years have revealed the true allies of the Russian economy in the face of unprecedented sanctions. Central Asian countries have facilitated thousands of foreign trade transactions, enabling both imports to and exports from Russia. Thanks to the coordinated efforts of their financial and logistics systems, many Russian enterprises avoided disruptions in production cycles despite being disconnected from SWIFT and facing a de facto transport blockade. The ruble has become the dominant currency in trade with CIS countries, demonstrating the feasibility and necessity of de-dollarization within the CIS free trade zone. While critically important and sanctioned goods were still imported using US dollars, euros, or yuan, Central Asian banks played a vital role in facilitating these transactions, even under the threat of direct sanctions from the United States and its allies. Some banks, such as Kyrgyzstan’s Keremet Bank, have already faced sanctions.
The year 2025 is likely to be as turbulent as the past three. The arrival of the Trump administration will significantly reshape the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia. The obvious anti-Iranian and anti-Chinese rhetoric is alarming, as these nations are not merely Russia’s allies within the still-evolving SCO but have also provided tangible support to Moscow during this difficult period. As a result, the coming year may bring unexpected alliances and realignments. However, one thing remains certain: allies who have proven their loyalty should not be abandoned.
In this context, the Central Asian countries, despite their differing tactics and nuances, remain steadfast partners and allies of Russia. On May 9, 2025, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan will once again stand on the podium of Red Square, alongside Russian military personnel and soldiers from Central Asian armies. This enduring partnership deserves not only respect and recognition but also a shared commitment to development and prosperity.
