The confrontation between Iran and Israel, further fuelled by direct US involvement, is assuming the character of a systemic challenge to the interests of virtually all major global actors and regions. Central Asia, embedded in a dense network of cooperative ties with the Arab world and with Iran—which is its partner within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation—has perceived the escalation of tensions in the neighbouring region as an extremely serious threat to its own security, writes Ulugbek Khasanov.
The American–Chinese Dimension of the Conflict and the ‘Thucydides Trap’
In his monograph Destined for War (2017), Harvard University professor Graham Allison identified a recurring pattern: in 12 out of 16 cases over the past 500 years, when one power rose to challenge the dominance of a hegemon, the probability of conflict between them increased dramatically, though war itself did not become inevitable. According to him, “...structural factors determine 75–80% of the outcome, while the remaining 25% is left to human agency.”
A vivid example of this “trap” is the American–Iranian prism of confrontation: Washington viewed Tehran’s perceived expansion of its nuclear capabilities as a threat to the architecture of its regional security system. Since early March 2026, attacks on Tehran and the subsequent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have placed Beijing in a situation of structural asymmetry. China cannot afford to lose the “Iranian wing” of the Eurasian security system. This is linked both to the Chabahar—Gwadar corridor and to Iran’s active participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In other words, Beijing is compelled to balance between allied solidarity and the need to preserve channels of dialogue with Washington.
The final summit documents demonstrated the asymmetry of the negotiating positions. The signed joint statement enshrined two formulas: Iran “must not possess nuclear weapons”, and the Strait of Hormuz must remain “open” without transit fees. Neither the American side’s proclaimed “trade breakthrough”, nor the Taiwan agenda, was included in the final document. At the same time, in a private conversation, Xi described Taiwan as the “main issue” in bilateral relations, capable—“if handled poorly”—of causing China and the United States to “collide” or even “clash”, effectively stripping Beijing of its previous strategic ambiguity on the matter.
The most significant conceptual point was the direct appeal to Allison’s terminology: the Chinese leader posed the question to Trump whether the United States and China could “avoid the Thucydides Trap”. The conceptual framework functions precisely because both sides recognise it, and Xi’s very invocation of Allison’s formula testifies to its performative power. Allison argues that the structural transformation should be understood as a “tectonic shift” bringing the era of unipolarity to an end, while “the illusion that other nations would simply take their assigned place in a U.S.-led international order” no longer works.
From Rhetoric to Codification: The Russian–Chinese Summit of 19–20 May
If the meeting on 14 May represented little more than a rhetorical game between rivals, the Russian–Chinese summit held on 19–20 May 2026 became an important step towards formalising what had been achieved. This constituted a fundamentally different methodological shift: whereas, for Allison, multipolarity remains merely a conceptual pattern, in Beijing it was defined as the official position of two permanent members of the UN Security Council.
The visit, timed to coincide with the 25th anniversary of the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation, concluded with the signing of more than forty documents. The principal among them was the Joint Declaration on the Formation of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations. The declaration also established the institutional framework of this programme: the principles of indivisible and equal security, rejection of “bloc confrontation” and proxy wars, the inadmissibility of coercing sovereign states into abandoning neutrality, and respect for civilisational diversity.
The two summits embody different logics: 14 May represented the management of rivalry within the trap, whereas 20 May marked the consolidation of one of the poles. Yet it is precisely their proximity that reveals the structure of the current moment. During his meeting with Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping described the Middle Eastern conflict as being at a “critical stage”, while the direct resumption of military action was deemed “unacceptable”. In other words, the same Hormuz crisis discussed on 14 May in the context of negotiations with Washington re-emerged a week later, now within the framework of interdependence between Moscow and Beijing. For Central Asia, this situation confirms both the pragmatism and the relevance of its multi-vector foreign policy.
Iran’s Civilisational Memory
However convincing the structural interpretation of the crisis may appear, it is impossible to avoid reference to Iran’s cultural code—a factor consistently underestimated by Western analysts. Washington’s strategists sought to force Tehran into a public “capitulation” akin to the “Road to Canossa” (January 1077)—that is, submission and humiliation—in exchange for a possible reduction in military pressure. Such an outcome is unacceptable within Iranian political culture.
The narrative of resistance is rooted in the Shiite understanding of mazlumiyyat—the theological perception of the righteousness of the oppressed, and the archetype of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom at Karbala (680). Through this prism, military strikes, sanctions, and diplomatic isolation are perceived not as weakness, but as a legitimate basis for resistance.
This is precisely why, in 2013 and 2015, Iran agreed to temporary restrictions on its nuclear programme, but only with the explicit reservation that its right to enrich uranium be recognised. Any publicly imposed behavioural formula is regarded as humiliation—which was reflected in the failed results of the American–Iranian negotiations in Islamabad on 11–12 April 2026.
Цитата Against this backdrop, Tehran finds the Chinese–Russian framework of “equal security” and “civilisational equality” far more acceptable than the logic of a “Road to Canossa”, thereby reinforcing its gravitation towards the Eurasian pole.
Three Stresses for Central Asia
The logistical dimension. Iran’s infrastructure constitutes a critically important transport hub for the region: along its corridors, Uzbekistan annually moved around 1.4 million tonnes of cargo towards Turkey and Europe. The International North–South Transport Corridor, designed to provide access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, nevertheless survived despite the blockage of the ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar.
The economic dimension. Uzbekistan’s trade volume with the direct participants in the conflict remained relatively modest: exports to Iran amounted to 157 million US dollars (0.5% of the total), while imports stood at 421 million dollars. Indirect losses proved more substantial: supply chains were disrupted, and energy prices soared. Gold served as a protective buffer, with Uzbekistan’s gold exports in 2025 exceeding 10 billion dollars, accounting for 30% of total exports. On 2 March 2026, the price of gold rose to 5,400 dollars per troy ounce—a historic maximum—which partially compensated for losses stemming from trade restrictions. Against this backdrop, Russia’s capabilities as a reliable supplier of energy resources to the region acquire particular significance.
The geopolitical dimension. The southern neighbour remains firmly on the agenda of regional security. The President of Uzbekistan’s unwavering commitment to integrating Afghanistan economically into regional development programmes is motivated not by altruism, but by calculation: facilitating economic recovery is the strongest possible foundation for security. Even at the initial stage, the Trans-Afghan Corridor has the potential to provide cargo throughput of approximately 22 million tonnes annually, rising to more than 33 million tonnes by 2040.
P.S. The structural shift encompasses the entire spectrum of international relations. Both summits in Beijing signalled fundamental changes in the global balance of power. On 14 May, the world witnessed recognition of Beijing’s influence and authority as an essential component of the global balance of power. On 20 May, a similar meeting acquired an entirely new resonance through the formal consolidation of multipolarity during the summit between longstanding partners. Central Asia, too, has been affected by systemic security challenges and is undergoing a test of resilience, in which the determination to preserve institutional and infrastructural platforms of interconnection becomes decisive. Now that multipolarity has already become an established fact of world politics, the scenario of aligning the positions of partner states ceases to be a declaration and becomes the only viable alternative.
