The overthrow of Assad has made Turkey the main current external actor in Syria, but now it is facing growing competition from regional and extra-regional players. Although in economic matters, competition may benefit Ankara, in security matters, it is more obvious and risky for Turkey, writes Kamran Gasanov.
Since the first days of protests in Syria in 2011, the Turkish authorities have sided with the opposition which was ultimately able to remove President Bashar al-Assad. Due to their interference in the civil war and support for the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Turkey's relations with Russia temporarily deteriorated, as with the United States and even Arab countries. By supporting opposition groups and conducting military operations, the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan was able to project its power in a number of border areas in northern Syria, from Afrin to Ras al-Ayn.
However, due to the expanding zones controlled by Assad, the need to maintain partnerships with the United States, Russia and Iran, as well as in view of the beginning of the process of legitimisation of the Syrian president in the Arab League, in around 2022 Erdogan began attempts to normalise relations with Damascus (SCO summit in Samarkand). The Turkish and Syrian foreign and defence ministers held a series of meetings mediated by Moscow and Tehran, and a summit was already being prepared. However, the December 8, 2024 coup not only reset the process, but also turned the geopolitical map in Syria upside down.
The overthrow of Assad has made Turkey the main current external actor in Syria, although two months ago it was content with being the third or fourth power there, yielding first and second place to the tandem of Russia and Iran and being forced to take into account the opinion of the United States on the Kurdish issue. However, of all the external players, Turkey enjoyed the greatest influence on the forces that seized power in Damascus on December 8. It patronized the Syrian National Army (SNA), with which it conducted three military operations against ISIS (banned in Russia) and the Kurdish People's Defence Units (YPG), and through the National Liberation Front, Ankara had access to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, banned in Russia), which controlled Idlib. In addition, Idlib, from where the main offensive against the Syrian army began in November, was Ankara's area of responsibility within the framework of the Astana agreements.
Four days after the coup d'état in Damascus, the Turkish authorities decided to prove their superiority through political instruments - the head of the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) Ibrahim Kalin arrived in the Syrian capital as the first high-ranking foreign guest. On December 22, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Damascus. Contacts between Damascus and Ankara intensified. Turkey offered to help Syria form and restore state institutions, return refugees and fight internal and external threats like YPG and Israel respectively. The countries began to discuss signing an agreement on the delimitation of maritime borders following the Turkish-Libyan example, and Ankara ignored the interests of other coastal countries in this matter, such as Cyprus, Greece, Egypt and Israel. Turkey also acted “like a boss” towards Russia. Its media reported that the Russian military had asked for help from their Turkish colleagues to evacuate personnel from the SAR, and Fidan stated that the fate of the Russian military bases in Tartus and Latakia should be decided by the Syrians themselves.
Very soon after the visits of Kalin and Fidan, Turkey’s monopoly in Syria was put to the test. From late December until early January, Western and Arab diplomats and politicians began arriving in the Arab country one after another, including a representative of the US State Department, the foreign ministers of Germany and France, and their counterparts from Jordan and Qatar. On January 30, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani became the first foreign leader to visit Syria since Assad’s ouster, and the new Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa made his first official visit not to Ankara, but to Riyadh. The European Union began hinting at a possible lifting of economic sanctions, and the United States withdrew a $10 million reward for assistance in capturing the HTS leader. Turkey is unable to fight the influence of other forces and ignore the wishes of the new Damascus government on its own. Al-Sharaa has no desire to become completely dependent on Ankara, and he is therefore aiming to diversify ties by courting the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. He needs financial resources that crisis-stricken Turkey is unable to provide, but he can receive them from the GCC countries. The lifting of US and EU sanctions is necessary, so establishing contacts with Washington and Brussels is vital for Damascus.
Against this rather contentious backdrop, Ahmed al-Sharaa visited Ankara on February 4. Of course, after Riyadh, Ankara could no longer boast of being the first foreign stop for the Syrian leader, and Erdogan conceded the status of the first high-ranking guest to the Qatari emir. Nevertheless, Turkey still retains serious levers of influence on the neighbouring state. Ankara will probably try to turn external competition to its advantage, but more on that a little later.
In addition to the fact that Turkey was among the top three countries to receive al-Sharaa, the high level of relations is confirmed by the statements of the Syrian leader himself. He thanked Turkey for not leaving the Syrian people alone in difficult times (referring to the fact that Ankara remained the main sponsor of the armed opposition), and added that “Syrian and Turkish blood was mixed in the liberation struggle.” Al-Sharaa emphasized the “special fraternal relations” between the two countries, outlining the desire to transform them into “strategic cooperation,” primarily with respect to security issues.
Security cooperation includes issues of territorial integrity, the fight against separatism, and the Turkish military presence. In general, the positions of the parties coincide on all these issues. Al-Sharaa speaks of “the importance of international pressure for Israel’s withdrawal” from the buffer zone in southern Syria, and Erdogan supports him. Both the Syrian and Turkish leaders do not want to allow the creation of a Kurdish autonomous region, much less a statelet, in the northeast. The day after the talks, Fidan announced that the Syrian authorities currently do not intend to federalize the country or grant autonomy to the Kurds. At the same time, while al-Sharaa is trying to resolve the issue diplomatically (a Kurdish delegation has already visited Damascus), Erdogan believes that military measures are more effective. “We discussed the steps that need to be taken against the separatist terrorist organisation and its supporters occupying northeastern Syria,” the Turkish leader said. Earlier, Fidan made it clear that if Damascus cannot agree with the Kurds on the disarmament and evacuation of the YPG, Turkey is ready for military action against them. Immediately following the overthrow of Assad, the Turkish armed forces demonstrated their readiness by driving Kurdish formations out of Manbij and Tel Rifaat, and almost daily actions are carried out against the YPG in the “Spring of Peace” zone. At the meeting in Ankara, Erdogan, one might say, extended the unannounced deadline for resolving the Kurdish issue, but the solution depends not only on al-Sharaa, but also on the position of the United States, which has military bases in the Euphrates region.
There is no more clarity regarding Turkey's military presence. According to Reuters, in addition to its 130 military and intelligence facilities, Turkey may create at least two military bases in central Syria - an airfield near Palmyra and the T4 airbase. In addition, according to the Mada Mas portal, Turkey is working on creating air defence systems and is trying to achieve the use of Syrian airspace for its own purposes. Al Jazeera also writes about the discussion of a certain "defence pact", and Bloomberg sources mention a "joint defence agreement" that would consolidate Turkey's military presence that began in 2016. Officially, Turkish Defence Minister Yasar Guler confirmed that there are plans to create air defence systems in central Syria, but it is too early to talk about a deal. In addition, according to Fidan, Ankara intends to create a mechanism to combat terrorism (meaning primarily the YPG) with the participation of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Jordan.
Two other issues of central interest in the Ankara talks are the economy and refugees. Turkey is ready to help rebuild the destroyed areas of Syria, and Erdogan confirmed this intention at the meeting with al-Sharaa. Turkish construction companies, whose shares have risen sharply since the overthrow of Assad, are already ready for this. However, Turkey, which is still suffering from inflation and the lira crisis, needs financing from outside, and this is why Erdogan called on the Arab and Muslim world to provide financial and moral support to Damascus. The Turkish authorities would like to return 3 million refugees home as soon as possible, as they have had a negative impact on the ratings of the ruling Justice and Development Party due to the burden on the budget and social conflicts. However, this cannot be done without building/restoring roads, homes, schools and hospitals.
As noted above, Turkey is facing growing competition from regional and extra-regional players. In economic matters, competition may benefit Ankara. Erdogan supported the EU’s initiative to suspend sanctions against Syria in the banking and energy sectors. A couple of days after al-Sharaa's visit, Erdogan had telephone conversations with French President Emmanuel Macron, in which the latter expressed a desire to strengthen dialogue with Turkey and establish military-technical cooperation. Until recently, Paris and Ankara were engaged in a fierce struggle over Libya and Syria, supporting different sides of the conflict, but now their interests are converging. Turkey needs money and for countries to lift their sanctions on Syria, while Macron wants to push, through Erdogan, for the creation of an “inclusive” Syrian government that respects all ethno-religious minorities.
In security matters, the competition is more obvious and risky for Turkey. The 2,000 American troops stationed in the northeast serve as a strong argument in the hands of the Kurds. Donald Trump, on the one hand, praises Erdogan as a “smart man,” but his team is quite tough on the Turkish leadership. In 2019, the United States and Turkey entered into a heated squabble over Operation Peace Spring, and Trump promised to destroy the Turkish economy by imposing high tariffs on steel and aluminium, but at the decisive moment of the Turkish operation, the US withdrew its troops. It is still unclear whether Trump and Erdogan are able to reach an agreement. If Damascus itself deals with the Kurds, then the contentious issue between the US and Ankara will be dissolved itself. A “deal” between the two NATO allies should not be ruled out either. On February 9, the Turkish newspaper Türkiye reported that, as part of an agreements with the United States, about 10,000 YPG militants agreed to leave for Iraq, taking their heavy weapons with them. In the event of a complete disarmament/evacuation of Kurdish militants and the Kurds’ renunciation of any political status, there will be no need for the presence of American troops in the region. In his previous term, Trump spoke of a desire to withdraw troops from Syria. On February 7, Murhaf Abu Qasra, the Minister of Defence of the Syrian transitional government, said that Damascus was discussing the future of US bases with Trump.
Thus, we can say that Turkey, while maintaining strong political, military and humanitarian instruments of influence in Syria, is aware of the growing competition of third forces in the near future, and it could be possible to agree with the US on the Kurds and with the EU on the political structure in Damascus. First, it is possible to allow a certain solidity between NATO partners consisting of the US, key EU countries and Turkey, without diminishing the role of their remaining disagreements on other issues, such as the Gaza Strip, Ukraine and Africa. NATO countries, understanding Turkey's geopolitical advantage in Syria, will seek to project their influence through the channels of their alliance partner.
A separate topic for reflection is the future of Russian-Turkish relations in light of the uncertainty of the Russian military bases present there. According to media reports, Tiyas base and the airfield in Palmyra, which may come under the control of Turkey, were previously used by Russia. Officially, there are no signs of confrontation between Ankara and Moscow over Syria. The foreign ministers are in constant contact, and during a telephone conversation on February 6, they agreed on coordinating the Syrian issue. The Syrian authorities are also not demonstrating any tough positions in demanding the withdrawal of Russian forces, which possibly indicates the absence of pressure from Ankara on Damascus. After a visit to Syria, Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation said that the parties are continuing consultations on the fate of Russia's military presence. The strengthening of coordination between Turkey and its fellow NATO countries in Syria, given their interdependence, could be a negative factor for Russia.
