The Middle East is entering a new era, and its previous foundations, political and social, are already irrevocably gone. A crisis in Iran could set off a chain reaction that will lead to a revision of borders, changes in political regimes, and an intensification of the struggle for resources and influence, Murad Sadygzade writes.
The events of October 7, 2023 became a turning point that changed the dynamics of the Middle East. With each passing day, the scale of the transformations that are sweeping the region becomes increasingly clear. This turning point revealed many questions that have not yet been answered definitively. The failure of one of the world’s most authoritative intelligence agencies, the Israeli Mossad, to promptly detect and prevent a large-scale attack by Palestinian groups came as a surprise to many. This resounding defeat became something of a clarion call for a reassessment of global security strategies. However, behind this particular event there are far deeper processes that are undermining the stability of the region and laying the foundation for large-scale changes.
The mechanisms of influence that have long remained in the shadows are now becoming more obvious. These processes are not accidental, but are part of the structural transformation of countries that had previously tried to maintain independence and resist the penetration of external interests. A striking confirmation of this trend was the news of December 8, which shook the region and the world community: the Baath Party in Syria lost its power and Bashar al-Assad resigned, handing over control to the armed opposition.
These events were the culmination of many years of war that undermined the foundations of key players in the “axis of resistance.” With the weakening of the Palestinian movements and the near-destruction of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the attention of international and regional players has turned to Syria. The country, which for many years served as an outpost of Iranian policy in the Middle East, has now become yet another victim of external and internal pressure. The destruction of Syria’s stability indicates a deliberate effort to redraw the political map of the region.
The current situation is perceived as part of a larger plan aimed at redistributing influence and establishing a new order in the Middle East. The systematic weakening of the “axis of resistance,” from Gaza to Damascus, raises the logical question: who will be next in this dramatic series of changes? The nature of the events and the role of external forces in this process are still a subject of debate. However, one thing is clear: the Middle East is entering a new era, and its previous foundations, political and social, are already irrevocably gone.
How did it all happen?
On Wednesday, November 27, the situation in Syria sharply escalated: armed opposition groups violated the de-escalation regime and attacked the provinces of Aleppo and Idlib. Large-scale strikes on populated areas and military positions marked the beginning of their offensive operation, which began on November 29. A day later, on November 30, Aleppo, along with its strategically important facilities, including the international airport and the Kuweires military airfield, was taken over by the opposition. The success of their advance became obvious after the virtually unhindered capture of the key city of Homs that same night.
By December 7, the rebels had reached the outskirts of Damascus and the capital was surrounded. This was accompanied by chaos and the mass release of prisoners from prisons, including the famous Saydnaya. This moment became a symbol of the collapse of power, which until recently seemed unshakable.
December 7 was remembered in the capital for an outbreak of panic. The military, having thrown off their uniforms and changed into civilian clothes, hastily left the city, leaving it practically without protection. At night, the streets were empty: some residents rushed to leave their homes, others, fearing chaos, bought food. The outflow of people from the northern elite areas, where looting was feared, was especially noticeable. Meanwhile, in the southern part of the city, the rebels were greeted as liberators — people took to the streets with flags, held rallies, and the culmination was the demolition of the statue of Hafez al-Assad, the founder of the Syrian regime, and a symbol of the authoritarian era.
On the same day, Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali made an emergency address. According to Al Arabiya, he announced the government’s capitulation, expressing his willingness to cooperate with the new leadership to prevent chaos. Al-Jalali stressed that many ministers would remain in Damascus to maintain the functioning of key institutions during the transition period. He also announced that an agreement had been reached with the leader of the armed opposition, Ahmed Al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad al-Julani), which made it possible to avoid further destruction in the capital.
The words of Hadi al-Bahra, the head of the Syrian National Coalition, sounded like a hope for the country. “Syria has left the dark times behind. We are looking for a future without revenge and repression,” he said, reassuring the population and underscoring the peaceful intentions of the rebels. On December 9, as reported by Al Jazeera, the Syrian opposition appointed Mohammad al-Bashir as the head of a transitional government. The decision was agreed upon at a meeting of opposition leaders, including al-Sharaa, al-Bashir and former Prime Minister al-Jalali.
However, behind the appearance of stability, there is concern for the future of the country. The profound political and social transformation leaves more questions than answers. A new stage has arrived for Syria, but whether it will bring long-awaited peace remains unclear.
What caused the fall of the Assad government?
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government and the opposition’s rise to power were the result of many years of internal and external contradictions that had intertwined into a complex knot, leading to devastating consequences for Syria. These events cannot be called sudden or unexpected. They were the logical outcome of deep-seated processes that had been tearing the country apart for years and gradually eroding the foundations of its political system. Bashar al-Assad, having taken office as president in 2000, inherited a state with enormous potential, but also with no less significant internal problems. The authoritarian model of governance built by his father, Hafez al-Assad, ensured stability, but did not allow the system to adapt to new challenges. Growing discontent among the population, caused by economic stagnation, inequality, corruption and a lack of social prospects, became the foundation for the gap between the government and society. Instead of reforms and compromise, the government chose the path of suppression and militarised the conflict, which further deepened the crisis. However, the internal problems were only aggravated by the influence of external forces. The Syrian crisis quickly turned into an arena of geopolitical struggle, with each side pursuing its own interests. Western countries and Arab monarchies openly supported the opposition, seeking to weaken the Assad government and undermine the influence of its allies, Russia and Iran. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel also saw Syria as an opportunity to strengthen their positions in the region, which was expressed in economic, military and political support for the opposition forces. At the same time, Russia and Iran, playing the role of key allies of Damascus, sought to maintain Assad’s power and stabilise the situation in the country, viewing Syria as an important element of their influence in the Middle East.
The events of October 7, 2023 had a significant impact on the situation in Syria, aggravating the crisis. Israeli strikes seriously damaged Iranian influence in the region and particularly weakened Hezbollah, which was a key military ally of Bashar al-Assad’s government. The loss of Hezbollah and the reduction of Iranian support deprived the Syrian government of important resources in the fight against the armed opposition. This allowed the opposition forces to become more active, which led to the loss of Aleppo, Homs and the encirclement of Damascus.
Syria also fell victim to the chaos brought about by terrorist groups that took advantage of the weakness of the central government. Militants acting without rules not only exacerbated the crisis, but also discredited the very idea of political dialogue. In such conditions, the Assad government was unable to cope with the challenges, and attempts to remain in power by force only accelerated the process of destabilisation. An important factor was the decline in trust in the regime on the part of those who had recently supported it. Economic difficulties, rising prices, shortages of basic goods and constant hostilities made life unbearable for the population. Years of sanctions and an economic blockade had deprived the leadership of room for manoeuvre, and the lack of reforms convinced many that change was necessary, even if it brought destruction.
Bashar al-Assad found himself in a difficult position as a political figure. His initial reluctance to become the country’s leader, his upbringing in a household dominated by his older brother Basil, and his lack of political ambitions left him vulnerable to challenges. After Basil’s death, Assad was forced to take over as heir, but his secular education in London and lack of experience in governing the country made him more of a symbol of the system than its real architect. Over the years, accumulated problems and personal tragedies, such as the illness of his wife Asma, sapped his energy and may have affected his willingness to change. Assad ultimately found himself trapped in a system that could no longer provide stability or prospects for development.
Winners and losers
The fall of Damascus was a turning point in Middle Eastern politics, marking not only the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, but also a radical redistribution of power in the region. One of the key consequences of this event was the strengthening of Turkey and Israel, which, taking advantage of the weakening of Syria and its allies, significantly expanded their influence.
Turkey, which had long sought to strengthen its position in Syria, perceived the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to increase its influence on the Syrian opposition and Kurdish territories. Ankara, which was already actively involved in the Syrian conflict through its support for armed groups, tried to present itself as a key player contributing to the success of the opposition. The Turkish leadership not only strengthened its position in northern Syria, but also increased pressure on the Kurdish forces, which Ankara traditionally views as a threat to its security. Taking advantage of the chaos caused by the fall of Damascus, Turkey continued to expand its military presence, strengthening its control over the border areas. Ankara also sought to legitimise its actions in the eyes of the international community, emphasising the need for “stabilisation” and the fight against Kurdish terrorism. However, its actions were controversial, as coordination with rebel forces and active participation in regime change raised questions about compliance with international law.
In turn, Israel also took advantage of the weakening of Syria to realise its strategic goals. The fall of Damascus allowed the Israeli army to significantly expand its occupation of Syrian territory, particularly in the buffer zone of the Golan Heights. Israel strengthened its presence in this region, which not only strengthened its strategic position, but also significantly limited the ability of Syria and Iran to counter it. Moreover, Israel’s air force and navy carried out numerous strikes on Syrian bases, ports and infrastructure facilities, which practically eliminated Syria’s military potential. Bases with equipment, weapons depots and even ships in key ports such as Latakia and Tartus were destroyed. These actions dealt a crushing blow to the remnants of the Syrian army, completely undermining its ability to conduct any large-scale military operations.
For Israel, this was a strategic success, since the weakening of Syria and Iran allowed it to strengthen its security and expand its control over the region. The strikes on bases and ports also sent a clear signal to other countries in the region that Israel was ready to actively defend its interests and would not allow the restoration of Syria’s military potential.
The United States and its allies initially advocated ousting the Bashar al-Assad regime, seeing this as a step toward weakening the influence of Iran and Russia in the Middle East. The Western strategy included economic pressure in the form of sanctions, the diplomatic isolation of Damascus, and support for the Syrian opposition. In addition, Washington and its allies actively coordinated the actions of armed groups, providing them with military and financial assistance. Although these efforts were officially presented as fighting terrorism and promoting democracy, in reality they contributed to the destabilisation of Syria and the undermining of its state apparatus.
Under the guise of fighting the Assad government, the United States has increased its military presence in eastern Syria, focusing on areas with oil fields, such as Deir ez-Zor. Under the pretext of fighting the remnants of terrorist groups, American troops have established control over these strategically important territories, depriving the Syrian government of access to one of its main sources of income. This move not only weakened the Syrian economy, but also allowed the United States to strengthen its position in the region.
Western countries also played an important role in the information war, shaping international public opinion. The media actively supported the narrative of the need for a change of power in Syria, focusing on the human rights violations of the Assad regime. Interviews with rebel leaders, such as the head of the armed opposition Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was the head of the terrorist group HTS (banned in Russia by court order) for a long time, on Western channels, including CNN, clearly demonstrated the West’s willingness to use such forces as a tool in the struggle for influence in the region, despite their terrorist status.
The fall of Damascus was a turning point for Middle Eastern politics, symbolizing not only the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, but also a significant weakening of Iranian influence, which had determined the strategic architecture of the region for many years. For Tehran, Syria was not just an ally, but a key element of the “axis of resistance” to Israel, which also includes Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestinian groups. Syria played the role of a logistical hub for supplying Hezbollah with weapons as well as political and economic support. However, the fall of the capital and the chaos in the country destroyed these routes, leaving Iran without a significant part of its regional infrastructure. Taking advantage of the situation, Israel strengthened its position by expanding its occupation in the buffer zone of the Golan Heights, which further limited Iran’s influence in the region.
The losses of Hezbollah were a particularly painful blow for Tehran. The Lebanese organisation, which had long been considered Iran’s main tool in the confrontation with Israel, found itself isolated. The destruction of logistical chains and the loss of arms supplies called its combat effectiveness into question. For Tehran, this is not only a weakening of its influence in Lebanon, but also a serious test for its entire Middle East strategy. In the context of the loss of Syria, Iran was forced to reshape its foreign policy plans, which only exacerbates internal contradictions in the Islamic Republic.
Disappointment in Damascus was also reflected in official Iranian rhetoric. Pars Today accused Assad of being unable to maintain control over the situation, emphasising that his weakness and lack of ideological firmness were the cause of the collapse. These words reflect the deep frustration of the Iranian leadership, which is aware of the scale of the losses.
The role and interests of Russia
On September 30, 2015, Russia, at the official request of President Bashar al-Assad, came to the defence of Syria by sending its Aerospace Forces and a limited contingent to fight terrorist groups. Moscow’s main goal was to restore stability and peace in the country, which would allow Syria to return to normal life. Russia’s participation became a turning point in the Syrian conflict, demonstrating the Kremlin’s desire not only to provide military support, but also to initiate a political dialogue that would help resolve the crisis.
Russia was the main initiator of the Astana format of negotiations, offering its resources and a platform for constructive intra-Syrian negotiations. Moscow played an important role in normalising relations between Syria and other Arab countries, supporting Syria’s return to the Arab League. Moreover, Russian diplomacy tried to establish a dialogue between Damascus and Ankara, but Bashar al-Assad did not show the necessary consistency and flexibility in finding compromises, which made it difficult to implement these initiatives.
For Russia, stabilising the situation in Syria was of strategic importance. Syria was seen as a key platform for strengthening Russia’s position in the Middle East, which became the basis for the creation and expansion of military bases in Tartus and Latakia. These bases not only ensured Russia’s military presence in the region, but also symbolised its determination to remain an important player in Middle Eastern politics.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s May 4, 2016 statement underscored the nature of Russia’s policy. “Assad is not our ally, by the way. Yes, we support him in the fight against terrorism and in preserving the Syrian state. But he is not an ally in the sense that Turkey is an ally of the United States,” he noted, indicating that Russia seeks to preserve Syria’s state institutions, but not Assad personally. This was confirmed by the position of the Russian Foreign Ministry, which on March 27, 2016, stated that Assad’s departure could result in a complete collapse of power, comparable to the Libyan scenario.
The situation changed in late 2024, when Assad announced his decision to step down as president following negotiations with the parties to the armed conflict. On December 8, 2024, the Russian Foreign Ministry emphasised that Moscow had not participated in these negotiations, but called on all parties to avoid violence and seek a political solution to the conflict. In support of an inclusive political process, Russia continued to interact with all ethno-confessional groups in Syria, following UN Security Council Resolution 2254.
Assad’s departure and the formation of a new government have opened a new chapter in Syrian history. Representatives of the new government have emphasised that they seek to build relations with Russia based on common interests. Member of the Political Committee of the National Coalition of Revolutionary Forces Anas al-Abda said that cooperation with Moscow could become the basis for restoring the economy, education and healthcare in the country.
It is highly likely that Russian military bases will remain in Syria, although their status may be revised taking into account the new conditions. Moscow retains an important role not only in the Syrian settlement, but also in the regional politics of the Middle East, which confirms its ability to remain a key player in resolving the most complex international issues.
On the threshold of a “Persian autumn”
It is premature to talk about the end of the crisis in Syria, because the example of Libya clearly demonstrates that the overthrow of a regime does not always bring long-awaited stability. Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya has failed to find peace, becoming an arena of incessant wars, internecine strife and the shattered hopes of millions of citizens. The country has been fragmented between numerous groups, each pursuing its own interests, and the population has found itself in conditions of endless chaos, a loss of security and destroyed infrastructure. A similar fate could befall Syria, where the apparent success of the opposition and its Western patrons hides a real threat of protracted conflicts. They could lead to even greater disunity in the country, exacerbate its exhaustion and make the restoration of peace a distant and almost unattainable goal.
After the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the conflict potential in the region will inevitably increase. Syria, which has long served as an arena for confrontation between global and regional players, will become a source of instability that could spill over to neighbouring states. The political vacuum created by Assad’s loss of control will inevitably provoke new conflicts between various ethnic and religious groups, as well as the increased activity of extremist organisations.
The next point of crisis may be Iran, which will find itself under pressure from both internal and external factors. On the one hand, growing popular discontent, economic difficulties, and tensions between various political and social strata are already visible within the country. On the other hand, external pressure, including sanctions and possible provocations from neighbouring states, may aggravate the situation, pushing Iran into a new stage of crisis.
The region that experienced the “Arab Spring” risks finding itself on the threshold of a “Persian Autumn.” This metaphor symbolises possible profound changes in the geopolitical and social structure of the Middle East, where Iran may become the epicentre of transformation processes. It is difficult to predict what consequences these changes may have, but one thing is clear: the region is expecting serious upheavals that will affect the global balance of power.
These developments will inevitably transform the Middle East, making it even more fragmented, unpredictable, and difficult for international regulation. A crisis in Iran could set off a chain reaction that will lead to a revision of borders, changes in political regimes, and an intensification of the struggle for resources and influence.
