The US sanctions regime against Syria remains in full force. The decrees will most likely be cancelled only if Washington is confident in a large-scale and irreversible change in Syria’s political course towards the expectations and interests of the US, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Ivan Timofeev.
The change of power in Syria raises the question of possible changes to the US sanctions regime against the country. Over the past two decades, Syria has been among the countries against which Washington has applied the most severe regime of restrictive measures. These included blocking financial sanctions, large-scale export controls, import bans, transport and visa restrictions. Political transition creates the preconditions for reducing the sanctions pressure. The head of the Foreign Ministry of the transitional government of Syria appealed to the US with a call to lift the sanctions.
We are very likely to see a softening of the restrictive measures. However, the process will be slow, and the legal mechanisms of unilateral US sanctions against Syria may remain in force for years and decades, despite political changes.
A consolidated list of US claims against Syria was formulated back in 2003 in the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty Restoration Act (SAA). It includes support for organisations that the United States considers terrorist, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and others (back in 1979, the US State Department added Syria to the list of state sponsors of terrorism); undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon (Syrian troops withdrew from the country in 2005); development of medium- and shorter-range missiles, chemical and bacteriological weapons; assistance to adversaries of the United States. In pursuance of the SAA, US President George W. Bush invoked his powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and, by Executive Order 13338 of May 11, 2004, imposed a number of restrictive measures against Syria. The export of military and dual-use goods was prohibited; access of Syrian civil aviation to the United States was restricted; a mechanism of blocking financial sanctions was created against Syrian individuals associated with the Syrian government and contributing to the country’s policy in the above-mentioned problem areas. In 2005, Syria was added to the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which was renamed as the Iran-North Korea-Syria Nonproliferation Act. It implied sanctions for violating export controls on dual-use goods, including those suitable for use in the production of missile systems and weapons of mass destruction.
Subsequently, the sanctions regime introduced by George Bush was supplemented by new orders. In 2006, blocking financial sanctions were expanded in connection with the death of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri (Executive Order 13399). In 2008, a new basis for blocking sanctions against Syrian individuals was involvement in corruption (Executive Order 13460). In 2011 – human rights and suppression of the opposition (Executive Orders 13572, 13573).
Along with blocking sanctions against Syrian officials and institutions associated with them, US investments in Syria were prohibited, a ban on the export and re-export to Syria of any services, import and any transactions with oil and petroleum products of Syrian origin was prohibited (Executive Order 13582). In 2012, the use of digital systems to spy on the opposition and human rights violations were added to the blocking sanctions (Executive Order 13606). A legal mechanism for blocking financial sanctions against third-country individuals who facilitate the evasion of sanctions against Iran and Syria was created (Executive Order 13608). Finally, in 2019, Congress passed the Caesar Syrian Nationals Protection Act (or Caesar Act). The law imposed restrictions on transactions with the Central Bank of Syria and created a new legal mechanism for sanctions against third-country individuals (including Russia) for cooperating with the Syrian authorities..
The United States also imposed sanctions on its allies on the Syrian issue. For example, in 2019, President Trump declared a state of emergency and created a legal mechanism for sanctions against Turkish and other individuals conducting operations “to undermine the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Syria” (Executive Order 13894). Ultimately, Syria became a jurisdiction against which the United States used one of the toughest sanctions regimes. In addition to export and import controls, almost all systemically important companies and enterprises of Syria in the fields of energy, transport, finance, industry and technology were under blocking sanctions.
The EU, the UK, Canada, and other Western countries introduced their own sanctions regimes against Syria.
From a formal point of view, the US sanctions regime against Syria remains in full force. It is highly likely that the US authorities will use the temporary license mechanism in the near future, while maintaining legal mechanisms in the form of federal laws and executive orders. The decrees will most likely be cancelled only if Washington is confident in a large-scale and irreversible change in Syria’s political course towards the expectations and interests of the US. Due to the difficulty of changing them, federal laws may survive for a long time even in the event of a radical change in Syria’s foreign and domestic policies, although the president has the authority to suspend them.
Along with the introduction of general licenses, the US may use as a “carrot” the exclusion of individual government structures or enterprises of Syria from the lists of blocked persons. But this process will be slow. The conditions for lifting blocking sanctions may include, for example, the presence of American observers in the management system of these organisations, their accountability to the US authorities, and other control mechanisms.
Some relaxations in the area of export control should also be expected, especially with regard to goods and services that do not have dual use. In any case, the process of lifting sanctions seems to be cautious. It will be linked to the fulfilment of US political demands with the possibility of a quick return of sanctions in the event of failure to meet Washington’s interests. Sanctions will remain a noticeable instrument of influence on the political course of the new Syrian authorities.
