Recent developments signal that relations between China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) are evolving beyond a purely transactional, trade-focused relationship into a more comprehensive and strategically aligned partnership. This shift, formalised in the 4th Joint Plan of Action for Cooperation (2025-2027), highlights a deepening of political, cultural, and security ties that is reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Western Hemisphere, writes Mateo Rojas Samper. The author is a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.
The relationship between China and CELAC is significantly influenced by the domestic political dynamics of individual countries, though ideological factors are not the sole driver. While there is a notable historical correlation between leftist governments coming to power and the expansion of China-CELAC cooperation, this is part of a more complex picture.
Initially, Beijing's diplomacy, which emphasises a “South-South” cooperation narrative and a policy of “respect for sovereignty” and “non-interference,” resonated with leaders of the “New Latin American Left” like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Lula da Silva in Brazil, who sought to counterbalance the influence of the United States. This ideological affinity served as a foundation for deepening ties in the early 2000s.
However, the relationship is now driven by a pragmatic mix of ideological, economic, and geopolitical interests. A strong correlation between leftist parties and expanded cooperation is not as clear-cut as it once was. While some Latin American countries align with the United States and Europe on “values” like human rights, they often align with China on “economic interests” such as trade and development. This suggests that economic pragmatism often takes precedence over political ideology. Furthermore, China's engagement strategy extends beyond ideological blocs, as demonstrated by the China-CELAC Political Parties' Forum, which includes representatives from a wide range of political parties across the region. For some, China's “non-interference” policy is seen as a way to provide “top cover” for leaders with authoritarian tendencies, regardless of their political leanings, allowing them to undermine democratic institutions without external criticism. Ultimately, the relationship is a product of individual countries leveraging the competition between global powers to secure their own national interests.
For over a decade, China's engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been defined by robust economic ties. The trade volume between China and LAC countries has doubled over the last ten years, reaching a new high of $518.4 billion in 2024. This growth is not just in volume but also in kind. While China continues to be a primary consumer of LAC’s raw materials, such as Brazilian iron ore and soybeans, and Chilean and Peruvian copper, the nature of its exports to the region is changing. During the first five months of 2025, Chinese exports of electric vehicles (EVs) to Brazil surged tenfold compared to the same period in 2024, signalling a new focus on high-tech and industrial goods.
Furthermore, Chinese investment in the region is recalibrating. While large-scale, state-backed loans for infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have slowed, private Chinese companies are now making strategic investments in new sectors like renewable energy and critical minerals. Chinese firms like BYD have begun EV production in Brazil, while others have deepened stakes in the “Lithium Triangle” of Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia. This new approach, which is driven more by market forces than by state-to-state lending, allows China to build on-the-ground industrial capacity and integrate itself more deeply into the regional economy.
The China-CELAC Forum, a decade-old platform, has emerged as the primary vehicle for this deepening relationship. The 4th Ministerial Meeting of the Forum, held in 2025, produced a new plan of action that is notably more ambitious than its predecessors. It moves beyond economic cooperation to include new areas such as anti-corruption, law enforcement, and judicial cooperation. This indicates a growing willingness to engage on sensitive political issues and demonstrates a shared vision for global governance that favours multilateralism and the increased representation of developing countries.
High-level diplomatic exchanges have become increasingly frequent. The presence of key regional leaders at the 2025 meeting, including the presidents of Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, underscores CELAC’s importance as a counterweight to other regional blocs. For China, CELAC is a crucial platform for promoting its foreign policy objectives, including its “one-China” principle and its broader vision of a “community with a shared future.” The document highlights a new focus on “inter-civilisational exchanges” and increased people-to-people links through scholarships, training programmes for journalists, and expanded Confucius Institutes, reflecting a long-term strategy to build soft power and cultural influence.
This strengthening relationship is occurring against a backdrop of intensified geopolitical competition, particularly with the United States. Given Washington’s more confrontational foreign policy, Latin American and Caribbean nations are increasingly finding themselves caught between two major powers. The US has often resorted to coercive measures, such as imposing tariffs and sanctions on its allies, to limit their dealings with China. This has, in many cases, proven counterproductive. The recent imposition of high tariffs on Brazilian exports by the US has triggered a backlash, pushing sectors that were once pro-Washington to support their government's strategy of diversifying partnerships away from US dependence.
This dynamic creates an opportunity for China, which presents itself as a more pragmatic partner offering investments and trade without political conditions. While some nations, like Panama, have exited the BRI under US pressure, others have continued to seek a non-aligned strategy. Brazil, for instance, is actively balancing its ties with both the US and China to preserve its autonomy. The Brookings Institution, among others, has noted that while the US focuses on immediate concerns like migration and security, China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive strategy that addresses the region’s core development needs.
The Opportunity Corridor Framework and Future Scenarios
Drawing from the "Opportunity Corridor framework" for strategic analysis, we can outline three potential scenarios for the China-CELAC relationship.
The first one, the current trend of deepening cooperation, persists – with more LAC countries joining the BRI and expanding their economic and political ties with China. The China-CELAC Forum becomes the dominant mechanism for regional dialogue, further sidelining traditional blocs.
The second is one where US pressure intensifies, forcing some LAC countries to make a definitive choice. This could lead to a fragmented regional landscape where some countries align with Washington, while others fully embrace Beijing, creating new trade and diplomatic divides.
The last is one where most LAC countries adopt a balanced approach, leveraging competition between the US and China to secure the best possible terms for trade, investment, and development. This scenario prioritises national interests and regional stability over ideological alignment.
The actionable recommendations stemming from this analysis are clear. For LAC nations, it is crucial to maximise the benefits of this strategic competition while minimising the risks of dependency. For the US, a shift from a coercive to a cooperative strategy that addresses long-term regional needs rather than short-term geopolitical rivalries would be the most effective way to maintain its influence. For China, the challenge will be to sustain its current momentum by proving it is a truly reliable and equitable partner, particularly as it expands its footprint from economics to broader security and political domains.
