Eurasia’s Future
Panic Without the Panic Room: Reflections on Fractured Transatlantic Relations After Three Years of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict
© Reuters
Europe is struggling to adapt to a new multipolar world, but to be able to turn around, it has to radically change its self-perception and modus operandi, stepping out of the West-dominated path of arrogant and obsolete order planning. With the rise of the Global South, the arrival of the AI revolution, and especially the return of Trump, the inner workings of Europe’s understanding of the world order actually reveal fears of different outcomes for the future evolution of that order, Wang Yiwei and Tan Yannan write.
Transatlantic relations: From “Together In” to “Together Out”
At first glance, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict appeared to breathe new life into the transatlantic relationship, a bond of which the United States and Europe had long been proud. Strategic coordination and resource integration between the two reached unprecedented levels. Yet, after three years of smoke and mirrors, as highlighted in the recent Munich Security Report, Europe finds itself at the epicenter of a “perfect storm.” This storm is marked by waning European influence and security, alongside spiraling fears and anxieties. Europe’s autonomy has been steadily eroded through its alignment with US ambitions, even as it clings to the special relationship with the US in pursuit of a false sense of security and shared prosperity.
The outcome is stark: Europe, having poured vast sums of money, resources, technology, and military assets into the conflict, now risks being sidelined. The Trump administration’s approach to resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has left Europe voiceless and excluded from the negotiating table altogether.
Rewind to early 2022, before the Ukrainian crisis erupted. At that time, Europe, as reflected in the Munich Conference, was grappling with a sense of “collective helplessness.” Europeans felt paralyzed by a declining global order, intensifying geopolitical rivalries, emerging social system crises, and the perceived “absence of the West.” Back then, Europe’s proposed remedy was unity: Western democracies, rather than remaining defensive, should continue to cooperate based on shared “values.” Initiatives like the Franco-German Alliance for Multilateralism, the US-led “Summit for Democracy,” the revitalization of NATO, and the promotion of “European Sovereignty” were seen as pathways to renew the Western world.
Three years later, however, the Munich Security Conference – a cornerstone of post-World War II US-Europe security cooperation and Western order – has witnessed the most profound and staggering shifts in transatlantic relations since the Cold War. The United States, once a steadfast ally in the post-war order, appears to be gradually “unbundling” itself from Europe. US Vice President JD Vance has accused Europe of retreating, while the erosion of shared values has emerged as a core point of contention and a major threat to the transatlantic relationship. Secretary of State Marco Rubio hinted that the US is reconsidering its role, debating whether to remain at the forefront of European security or to step back and serve as a mere “backstop.” Even more bluntly, the US National Security Advisor and Secretary of Defense have stated that, regarding the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, “in terms of security and safety, the Europeans will take full responsibility.”
Transatlantic relations: From “Together In” to “Together Out”
At first glance, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict appeared to breathe new life into the transatlantic relationship, a bond of which the United States and Europe had long been proud. Strategic coordination and resource integration between the two reached unprecedented levels. Yet, after three years of smoke and mirrors, as highlighted in the recent Munich Security Report, Europe finds itself at the epicenter of a “perfect storm.” This storm is marked by waning European influence and security, alongside spiraling fears and anxieties. Europe’s autonomy has been steadily eroded through its alignment with US ambitions, even as it clings to the special relationship with the US in pursuit of a false sense of security and shared prosperity.
The outcome is stark: Europe, having poured vast sums of money, resources, technology, and military assets into the conflict, now risks being sidelined. The Trump administration’s approach to resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has left Europe voiceless and excluded from the negotiating table altogether.
Rewind to early 2022, before the Ukrainian crisis erupted. At that time, Europe, as reflected in the Munich Conference, was grappling with a sense of “collective helplessness.” Europeans felt paralyzed by a declining global order, intensifying geopolitical rivalries, emerging social system crises, and the perceived “absence of the West.” Back then, Europe’s proposed remedy was unity: Western democracies, rather than remaining defensive, should continue to cooperate based on shared “values.” Initiatives like the Franco-German Alliance for Multilateralism, the US-led “Summit for Democracy,” the revitalization of NATO, and the promotion of “European Sovereignty” were seen as pathways to renew the Western world.
Three years later, however, the Munich Security Conference – a cornerstone of post-World War II US-Europe security cooperation and Western order – has witnessed the most profound and staggering shifts in transatlantic relations since the Cold War. The United States, once a steadfast ally in the post-war order, appears to be gradually “unbundling” itself from Europe. US Vice President JD Vance has accused Europe of retreating, while the erosion of shared values has emerged as a core point of contention and a major threat to the transatlantic relationship. Secretary of State Marco Rubio hinted that the US is reconsidering its role, debating whether to remain at the forefront of European security or to step back and serve as a mere “backstop.” Even more bluntly, the US National Security Advisor and Secretary of Defense have stated that, regarding the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, “in terms of security and safety, the Europeans will take full responsibility.”
Europeans now realize, belatedly, that the very prescriptions they once championed have become the root of their current political, economic, and security woes.
With the return of the Trump administration – a government willing to “abandon” its regional allies – Europe has been forced out of the safe house built by the United States. Unprepared for this new external environment, Europe panics like a deer caught in headlights. A report by the European Defence Agency reveals that the combined military spending of the EU27 amounts to only one-third of the US budget, with equipment standardization at less than 15 percent. Should the US further reduce its military presence in Europe, the region could face a security vacuum in the short term.
Despite countless high-level speeches and discussions within the European Union since the breakdown of US-European relations, few voices have critically examined the transatlantic relationship from within Europe or called for profound changes. Having lost the firm US commitment to its security guarantees, Europe appears adrift in a rapidly shifting international landscape.
The Munich Security Report suggests that Europe is attempting to leverage its fading influence to promote a Westernized vision of “multipolarity,” hoping to shape the future international order in a way that aligns with European expectations. However, the current trend in international relations is not multipolarity as Europe envisions it but rather “de-Westernization.” Instead of arrogantly dictating to the “Global South” or the world beyond the US and Europe, Europe must first confront its own disconnect from the times – a disconnect exacerbated by the constraints of the transatlantic relationship. It must learn the lessons of the past three years of conflict involving China, Russia, and Ukraine, lest it be pushed into an even deeper abyss by the strategic bindings of the United States.
Despite countless high-level speeches and discussions within the European Union since the breakdown of US-European relations, few voices have critically examined the transatlantic relationship from within Europe or called for profound changes. Having lost the firm US commitment to its security guarantees, Europe appears adrift in a rapidly shifting international landscape.
The Munich Security Report suggests that Europe is attempting to leverage its fading influence to promote a Westernized vision of “multipolarity,” hoping to shape the future international order in a way that aligns with European expectations. However, the current trend in international relations is not multipolarity as Europe envisions it but rather “de-Westernization.” Instead of arrogantly dictating to the “Global South” or the world beyond the US and Europe, Europe must first confront its own disconnect from the times – a disconnect exacerbated by the constraints of the transatlantic relationship. It must learn the lessons of the past three years of conflict involving China, Russia, and Ukraine, lest it be pushed into an even deeper abyss by the strategic bindings of the United States.
The very concept of a “security umbrella” is absurd when it comes to a physical threat from an enemy of comparable strength. Since we are far from thinking that a threat to Europe could come from North African countries, China, or the Middle East, the only such enemy is Russia. However, it is linked to the United States by a relationship of strategic deterrence, based on the direct and immediate threat of causing unacceptable damage to each other’s territory and population. Any state, especially a strong and powerful one, is responsible only to its own citizens in matters of such fundamental importance, Timofei Bordachev writes.
Opinions
The “obedience test”: three years of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and US-European relations
First, in the area of defence, the structural weaknesses in defence cooperation between the United States and Europe are constantly being highlighted, and the resurgence of NATO has essentially brought about the demise of European autonomy. For a long time, due to the fragmentation of the defence industry system within Europe and the European Union’s “disempowerment” at the level of integrated defence strategy, the Eurasian continent’s conflicts have not become a catalyst for internal integration within Europe at the de facto level. Over the years, the EU’s integration in the low-political sphere has for many years been superior to that at the high political level, and the basis for an orderly, integrated and efficiently functioning unified European defence system has simply not existed. Europe was gradually emptied of its internal strategic resource reserves after the outbreak of the conflict, but continued to engage in deep wars of attrition under the US position, increasing its deep dependence on external supply chains. However, as the main “contractor” providing security guarantees, the United States and NATO under its leadership in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict have further undermined Europe’s defence capabilities, and have even become a new threat to European security.
Although the United States has repeatedly stated its support for autonomous European strategic development since the early days of the Transatlantic Partnership, European defence autonomy is in essential conflict with the US vision of order. For years, Europe’s security landscape has relied almost exclusively on US domination and maintenance, thanks to strong strategic ties to the US and exaggerated threats from outside powers such as Russia. At the 2024 NATO summit, the US and Europe signed the Washington Declaration, but the documents released by the White House show that the US and Germany have strengthened their deployment of intermediate-range missiles and have increased the number of warships deployed to the Spanish Sea, among other things, demonstrating that the security programme designed by NATO for Europe remains bound by the same old rhetoric of the Americanisation of European defence. In the waning months of the Biden administration, the United States was still actively promoting its unrealistic NATO Indo-Pacificisation in Europe. Currently, the United States is ready to “abandon” Europe’s priority status; President Trump even called on NATO member states to spend a quarter of GDP for defence construction each year, and over the past three years, the steep increase in military spending has intensified political disputes, economic difficulties and social conflicts within Europe. The already overwhelmed European NATO countries are exhausting themselves in order to keep pace with the United States.
Secondly, diplomatically, the United States and Europe, at many levels, position their coordination so that Europe suffers an irreparable loss in terms of its global reputation and its interests suffer. However, this sacrifice did not bring long-term strategic benefits for Europe, nor “awards” from Washington. On the one hand, although NATO has recovered from its previously derided “brain death,” global hostility and scepticism toward NATO have increased rather than decreased. Despite the West’s unanimous response to Russia’s military operation in Ukraine, Europe has failed to abandon Washington’s new Cold War mentality of clamping down. It has missed the window of positive contact and practical cooperation with China, India and other important international players. Its position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and other conflicts reflect a double standard, prompted by Europe’s relations with the United States, going against the grain of developing countries.
In the end, Europe was passively included in Washington’s “democracy vs. authoritarianism” narrative. In terms of global governance, Europe has also lost the advantage, and further caused its own isolation in the international community.
On the other hand, concessions to US strategic imperatives have led Europe to send Russia confusing and ineffective diplomatic signals, while it has ignored or misinterpreted messages from Russia. For its part, Europe actually has many negotiating resources at its disposal vis-à-vis Russia, such as Russian overseas assets frozen by the EU, sanctions tools, and the energy sector, but in its overreaching quest to align itself with the US stance, Europe’s approach to Russia has been one of pure confrontation-featuring sanctions, military deterrence, and strategic containment, which further demonizes the Russian threat. Such an attitude has not only triggered panic within Europe, but the massive military investment has in turn led to rising inflation and energy depletion there, weakening its ability to conduct diplomatic negotiations with Russia on its own. Europe has not even formed a backup programme for the resolution of the Ukrainian problem.
The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, has publicly stated that the war in Ukraine should lead to the defeat and disintegration of Russia. But the Ukrainian crisis, which has been repeated in the past, has reminded Europe many times – Russia should not and cannot be excluded from the Western security order indefinitely. Europe should design a new framework to prevent future conflicts while preserving international norms. Now, as a result of the failure of diplomacy, the United States and Russia are likely to use the peace talks to strike a cooperation deal, reap the benefits, transfer the costs of rebuilding Ukraine and the losses of the war to Europe, and further contribute to a shift in global strategic resources and their economic centre of gravity from the West to Asia.
Thirdly, on the geopolitical front, as Eastern Europe has been pushed to the front line of war, internal divisions in Europe have gradually intensified, while Washington’s repeated breach of Europe’s trust has further deteriorated the security landscape and strategic environment in the continent. Europe has long depended on the protection and deterrent effectiveness of nuclear powers such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Currently, security defence in the centre of Europe is mainly underpinned by French and German defensive capabilities, and most of Britain’s post-Brexit influence has been external and unable to truly become a European defence integration enabler. The countries of Eastern Europe, in close proximity to the Ukrainian theatre of war, have emerged as another important component of the security architecture, closely linked not only to the interior of Europe, but also to US-Russian security interests.
As the economic and domestic pressures of war mount, tensions between the different security architectures are emerging. But as an ally of the integrating force, the US “betrayed” Europe in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, exacerbating the dilemma of European collective action. During the Biden administration, the Inflation Reduction Act provided US companies with high subsidies to support production and investment in electric vehicles, clean energy and other industries, a policy that undoubtedly caused heavy losses to the European economy, which was already embroiled in the war. Trump even claimed that he would pursue reciprocal economic relations between the United States and Europe, announcing tariffs on European automobiles, aluminium resources, and semiconductors, among other products, causing a distracted Europe to suffer further strategic overdrafts.
The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, has publicly stated that the war in Ukraine should lead to the defeat and disintegration of Russia. But the Ukrainian crisis, which has been repeated in the past, has reminded Europe many times – Russia should not and cannot be excluded from the Western security order indefinitely. Europe should design a new framework to prevent future conflicts while preserving international norms. Now, as a result of the failure of diplomacy, the United States and Russia are likely to use the peace talks to strike a cooperation deal, reap the benefits, transfer the costs of rebuilding Ukraine and the losses of the war to Europe, and further contribute to a shift in global strategic resources and their economic centre of gravity from the West to Asia.
Thirdly, on the geopolitical front, as Eastern Europe has been pushed to the front line of war, internal divisions in Europe have gradually intensified, while Washington’s repeated breach of Europe’s trust has further deteriorated the security landscape and strategic environment in the continent. Europe has long depended on the protection and deterrent effectiveness of nuclear powers such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Currently, security defence in the centre of Europe is mainly underpinned by French and German defensive capabilities, and most of Britain’s post-Brexit influence has been external and unable to truly become a European defence integration enabler. The countries of Eastern Europe, in close proximity to the Ukrainian theatre of war, have emerged as another important component of the security architecture, closely linked not only to the interior of Europe, but also to US-Russian security interests.
As the economic and domestic pressures of war mount, tensions between the different security architectures are emerging. But as an ally of the integrating force, the US “betrayed” Europe in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, exacerbating the dilemma of European collective action. During the Biden administration, the Inflation Reduction Act provided US companies with high subsidies to support production and investment in electric vehicles, clean energy and other industries, a policy that undoubtedly caused heavy losses to the European economy, which was already embroiled in the war. Trump even claimed that he would pursue reciprocal economic relations between the United States and Europe, announcing tariffs on European automobiles, aluminium resources, and semiconductors, among other products, causing a distracted Europe to suffer further strategic overdrafts.
The United States used the bill to speed up “re-industrialization”, but its beggar-thy-neighbour trade and energy policies have only succeeded in hollowing out the economic foundation of Europe.
In order to ensure national defence, European countries continue to cut health care and social welfare spending while repeatedly mobilizing for war. Right-wing political parties have taken advantage of the situation to rise in the European political landscape. Political instability and economic hardship have further worsened the effectiveness of governance of the European social crisis, leading to a sharp reduction in the space for policy coordination among European countries once again.
The reason for the current awkward dilemma is simple. Europe, which pursues strategic autonomy, is pathologically dependent on the security guarantees and political commitments of the United States. The panic brought about by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and other crises has led to the gradual deterioration of Europe’s pursuit of internal cohesion within the alliance. Ultimately, as a direct party, Europe’s roll in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has gradually become a test of loyalty to the United States, and it has lost its bargaining chips and ability to negotiate with Russia.
The Post-Ukrainian Crisis Era: The Order Structure Dilemma in the United States and Europe
Continuing to curry favour with the United States is indeed an option. The trip to the US by Maroš Šefčovič, the European Commission member responsible for trade and economic security, among other things, is undoubtedly an attempt to continue to seek to bridge US-European relations. However, it is clearly not Europe’s best option. When the transatlantic relationship was closer, American scholars such as Mearsheimer already discovered the unsustainability of Europe’s security diplomacy with the United States, which will eventually withdraw from Europe under the trend of its own strategic pullback. Therefore, revisiting the link between the transatlantic relationship and the European and global order is crucial for the EU now.
Europe is struggling to adapt to this new multipolar world, but to be able to turn around, it has to radically change its self-perception and modus operandi, stepping out of the West-dominated path of arrogant and obsolete order planning. With the rise of the Global South, the arrival of the AI revolution, and especially the return of Trump, the inner workings of Europe’s understanding of the world order actually reveal fears of different outcomes for the future evolution of that order. First, the fear that the world will be “disorderly and unpolarized”. Former High Representative for the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the European Union Borrell once exclaimed that the world is like a jungle, and Europe is like a garden, reflecting this mentality.
Secondly, it is worried about “disorder and polarity”, i.e. China and the United States becoming the two poles of the world, and the competition among the big powers leading to the reconstruction of the world order facing fragmentation and disintegration. European Commission President von der Leyen recently pointed out that the world is at risk of facing a “bipolar game of China and the United States”. Brussels is worried about disorder, as China and the United States do not follow the international norms set by the European Union, which is why the European Union wasn’t included in the peace negotiations between Washington and Moscow.
Thirdly, Europe is worried about an “ordered and unpolarised” world (the G0 Era). A MSC report published some years ago referred to “post-West” and “post-truth”, reflecting this concern about the further aggravation of the chaos in the international system. Fourth, they worry about a “multi-polarisation in Europe” dilemma. A few days ago, French President Macron advocated at the AI Action Summit that Europe forge a “third way” in the sector to evade Sino-American dominance. In the above strategic anxiety about the post-Russian-Ukrainian conflict era, Europe actually still has not identified the appropriate role and status of the order for itself, unwilling to awaken from the history of arrogant Western supremacy, and has not made up its mind to untie itself from the United States.
Indeed, a new and transformative transatlantic alliance is possible. First of all, Europe should prioritize its efforts to advance its internal unity rather than constantly playing up the fear of Russia. Predictably, while the United States has made China a geopolitical rival, it is also reluctant to hand over the position of the leader of the so-called “democratic world” to Europe. In the future, the Trump administration will continue to try to use security leverage to force Europe to comply with US strategic deployment in defence, trade and even technology regulation.
The reason for the current awkward dilemma is simple. Europe, which pursues strategic autonomy, is pathologically dependent on the security guarantees and political commitments of the United States. The panic brought about by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and other crises has led to the gradual deterioration of Europe’s pursuit of internal cohesion within the alliance. Ultimately, as a direct party, Europe’s roll in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has gradually become a test of loyalty to the United States, and it has lost its bargaining chips and ability to negotiate with Russia.
The Post-Ukrainian Crisis Era: The Order Structure Dilemma in the United States and Europe
Continuing to curry favour with the United States is indeed an option. The trip to the US by Maroš Šefčovič, the European Commission member responsible for trade and economic security, among other things, is undoubtedly an attempt to continue to seek to bridge US-European relations. However, it is clearly not Europe’s best option. When the transatlantic relationship was closer, American scholars such as Mearsheimer already discovered the unsustainability of Europe’s security diplomacy with the United States, which will eventually withdraw from Europe under the trend of its own strategic pullback. Therefore, revisiting the link between the transatlantic relationship and the European and global order is crucial for the EU now.
Europe is struggling to adapt to this new multipolar world, but to be able to turn around, it has to radically change its self-perception and modus operandi, stepping out of the West-dominated path of arrogant and obsolete order planning. With the rise of the Global South, the arrival of the AI revolution, and especially the return of Trump, the inner workings of Europe’s understanding of the world order actually reveal fears of different outcomes for the future evolution of that order. First, the fear that the world will be “disorderly and unpolarized”. Former High Representative for the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the European Union Borrell once exclaimed that the world is like a jungle, and Europe is like a garden, reflecting this mentality.
Secondly, it is worried about “disorder and polarity”, i.e. China and the United States becoming the two poles of the world, and the competition among the big powers leading to the reconstruction of the world order facing fragmentation and disintegration. European Commission President von der Leyen recently pointed out that the world is at risk of facing a “bipolar game of China and the United States”. Brussels is worried about disorder, as China and the United States do not follow the international norms set by the European Union, which is why the European Union wasn’t included in the peace negotiations between Washington and Moscow.
Thirdly, Europe is worried about an “ordered and unpolarised” world (the G0 Era). A MSC report published some years ago referred to “post-West” and “post-truth”, reflecting this concern about the further aggravation of the chaos in the international system. Fourth, they worry about a “multi-polarisation in Europe” dilemma. A few days ago, French President Macron advocated at the AI Action Summit that Europe forge a “third way” in the sector to evade Sino-American dominance. In the above strategic anxiety about the post-Russian-Ukrainian conflict era, Europe actually still has not identified the appropriate role and status of the order for itself, unwilling to awaken from the history of arrogant Western supremacy, and has not made up its mind to untie itself from the United States.
Indeed, a new and transformative transatlantic alliance is possible. First of all, Europe should prioritize its efforts to advance its internal unity rather than constantly playing up the fear of Russia. Predictably, while the United States has made China a geopolitical rival, it is also reluctant to hand over the position of the leader of the so-called “democratic world” to Europe. In the future, the Trump administration will continue to try to use security leverage to force Europe to comply with US strategic deployment in defence, trade and even technology regulation.
Europe should speed up to overcome the decision-making mistakes brought about by panic, form political synergy as soon as possible, and take advantage of the changes in the transatlantic relationship to promote not only political and economic unity, but also with respect to security and other areas of Europe’s response strategy.
Europe will no longer be seen as the centrepiece of global strategy due to the Trump administration’s fundamental differences with Europe in a number of areas, including NATO, Ukraine, technology, trade, climate, the international order, and policy toward China. Europe should seek to gradually reduce its security ties to the United States and gradually replace its leadership within NATO with European officials and create a unified European deterrent defence.
Finally, Europe should vigorously promote a renaissance of diplomacy, synchronise strategic autonomy with diplomatic autonomy, put aside arrogant moralising, and reach benign cooperation and communication with the countries of the “Global South”. Especially in the context of US strategic competition with China, Europe must abandon “new Cold War” thinking, and reach effective strategic cooperation with China, India and other countries, so as to establish a good backup plan for the future fluctuation of transatlantic relations, thus gradually restoring Europe’s influence and reputation in the global order, and obtaining more discourse power in the reconstruction of the consensus on US-European relations.
As a matter of fact, China and Europe have a natural foundation for cooperation in the area of security. In terms of traditional security, China and Europe can jointly support the global security architecture led by the UN Security Council, strengthen cooperation in peacekeeping operations based on the UN architecture, communicate closely, and engage in practical dialogues on global regional conflicts and security crises, and work together to bring stability to the world. In terms of non-traditional security, China and Europe can set up new global governance and consultative mechanisms in areas such as terrorism, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, green transformation and the food supply. Emerging technology risk management and control as well as the joint promotion of artificial intelligence can harness technology to establish perfectly systematic and fair development rules.
In short, Europe must learn a lesson from the past three years of Russia-Ukraine conflict, to provide a set of Europeanised programs for the rectification of transatlantic relations. Otherwise, in the era of Trump’s return and accelerated changes in the global order, Europe can only become a “lost continent” in world power dynamics amid the panic.
Finally, Europe should vigorously promote a renaissance of diplomacy, synchronise strategic autonomy with diplomatic autonomy, put aside arrogant moralising, and reach benign cooperation and communication with the countries of the “Global South”. Especially in the context of US strategic competition with China, Europe must abandon “new Cold War” thinking, and reach effective strategic cooperation with China, India and other countries, so as to establish a good backup plan for the future fluctuation of transatlantic relations, thus gradually restoring Europe’s influence and reputation in the global order, and obtaining more discourse power in the reconstruction of the consensus on US-European relations.
As a matter of fact, China and Europe have a natural foundation for cooperation in the area of security. In terms of traditional security, China and Europe can jointly support the global security architecture led by the UN Security Council, strengthen cooperation in peacekeeping operations based on the UN architecture, communicate closely, and engage in practical dialogues on global regional conflicts and security crises, and work together to bring stability to the world. In terms of non-traditional security, China and Europe can set up new global governance and consultative mechanisms in areas such as terrorism, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, green transformation and the food supply. Emerging technology risk management and control as well as the joint promotion of artificial intelligence can harness technology to establish perfectly systematic and fair development rules.
In short, Europe must learn a lesson from the past three years of Russia-Ukraine conflict, to provide a set of Europeanised programs for the rectification of transatlantic relations. Otherwise, in the era of Trump’s return and accelerated changes in the global order, Europe can only become a “lost continent” in world power dynamics amid the panic.
In a situation where the European international order has found itself in such a massive crisis that radical military solutions have become possible, the most natural solution may indeed be Germany acquiring its own nuclear weapons. It does not matter at all that this arsenal will officially be called “European”, like, for example, the Frankfurt-based European Central Bank, which manages financial policy in the Eurozone, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Timofei Bordachev.
Opinions
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Russia and Europe at a New Turn in History
21.04.2025
