Amid the US-Israeli strikes on Iran and the all-out regional war that followed, BRICS finds itself at a crossroads. The fate of the organisation may be decided by the lessons it chooses to draw from the conflict, by its approach to resolving internal contradictions and providing member states with a sense of security in a dangerous world, writes Georgy Toloraya.
The unprovoked US-Israeli aggression against Iran, which has torpedoed the foundations of international law and the established world order, has become the first serious stress test for “Greater BRICS”. The 2024–2025 enlargement (with Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia joining) is widely regarded as a historic success in building a platform for the “global majority”, yet it has also exposed the institutions of BRICS as unprepared for conflict situations. The war in the Middle East has placed members of the grouping on opposite sides of the barricades: two new BRICS members (Iran and the United Arab Emirates) are engaged in a kinetic conflict, while BRICS as a whole has no unified position.
BRICS members were divided during the March vote at the United Nations on Resolution 2817, which was effectively directed against Iran. Russia and China abstained, while India and the United Arab Emirates co-sponsored the resolution. Brazil adopted a moderate stance, although it condemned the strikes on Iran, as did South Africa. Egypt condemned the strikes against “brotherly Arab nations”, while Ethiopia expressed concern primarily over its own energy security. At the BRICS consultations in New Delhi (24 April 2026), it proved impossible to agree on a joint statement—only a brief chair’s summary was issued, demonstrating the internal split. The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in mid-May in New Delhi—effectively the most important gathering after the summit within the annual cycle—also failed to overcome these divisions.. For the first time, the final Chairman's Statement is a non-consensus document, where disagreement of individual members is recorded on a number of points (and we know which ones).
In effect, three camps have emerged within BRICS. The “sovereign-legal” camp (Russia, China, Brazil, South Africa) condemns the actions of the United States and Israel, emphasising the violation of Iran’s sovereignty. The “regional-strategic” bloc (India, Egypt, Ethiopia) is primarily concerned with its own security and energy supplies, and therefore supports measures taken against Iran. Iran and the United Arab Emirates are themselves parties to the conflict, to which one might also add the “half-member” of BRICS—Saudi Arabia. This situation is unprecedented, as previous clashes—for example, those between China and India—were not brought into the open, and the parties refrained from allowing their disputes to interfere with the advancement of long-term BRICS projects. There are also smouldering conflicts in other places: for example, Egypt and Ethiopia are arguing over water resources.
In the West, the situation has prompted a degree of schadenfreude. As Singaporean expert Nazia Hussein (RSIS) notes: “BRICS finds reformist language easier to agree on than a common posture when conflict threatens to impact concrete national interests.” The core principles of BRICS—consensus, respect for sovereignty, and pragmatism—function in peacetime, but in periods of disorder in the international system and geopolitical confrontation, they result in decision-making paralysis. A fundamental flaw has been exposed in the “minimalist institutionalism” of which BRICS has been so proud—for it grants countries rights and benefits without obligations, flexibility without diktat, which is precisely what attracts so many new applicants and aspiring members.
A secondary consequence of the war for BRICS has been an energy and financial split: disruptions in energy markets benefit some members (including Russia), but are detrimental to the majority. Furthermore, the tightening of sanctions against Iran and its supporters has forced BRICS members to choose between risking secondary sanctions or distancing themselves from Tehran. Yet, these points of friction notwithstanding, the war may accelerate de-dollarisation and promote the creation of independent payment and settlement systems within BRICS—one of the grouping’s core objectives.
Possible trajectories for BRICS
Within expert discussions on this issue in Russia, “some participants insist on development based on the lowest common denominator”, while others argue that “if BRICS does not assume this role (of a fully-fledged institute of global governance), the world will become increasingly chaotic, and many countries of the global majority will find themselves less stable and secure. As a result, the grouping may begin to lose its attractiveness and influence”. Сноска Ibid
In Russian analyses, the principal scenario considered is an ambitious and reformist path—transforming BRICS into a “central institution of the global majority”, capable of filling the vacuum in global governance, This would involve strengthening the agenda across seven areas: financial settlements (including the “Mariana” system as a prototype), disaster response (BRICS Rescue), a new climate agenda (BRICS Nature), the creation of BRICS Power (an analogue of the International Energy Agency), food security (BRICS Feed), dialogue on the military use of artificial intelligence, and value-based and educational cooperation. Further expansion is not encouraged—a position that appears reasonable.
However, although these directions of growth are well chosen and merit vigorous effort, there is a substantial risk that the combat injury suffered by BRICS will seriously complicate such a positive trajectory. In our view, BRICS+, hastily expanded on the eve of a global storm, and the newly created group of partners has at the initial stage encountered challenges of such magnitude that they cannot be ignored—nor can less optimistic scenarios:
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The first is the fragmentation of BRICS (let us term it “G20-isation”)—a degradation into yet another dialogue platform comprising several groups of countries with opposing interests, and a loss of geopolitical weight. In this case, political and security issues would recede from the agenda, while economic development, climate, trade, and humanitarian cooperation would again come to the fore, as in the early stages of the grouping’s formation. Two wings could emerge within BRICS—a pro-Western one and an “irreconcilable” one.
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In the West, a “Sinicisation” of BRICS is also discussed. Faced with the threat of the grouping’s collapse (for instance, due to a weakening of Russia, or increasing dependence on the West among India and other members amid a deepening geopolitical rift), China may be compelled to assume the role of “arbiter” and “security guarantor”, offering technological and diplomatic support to BRICS members. In such a scenario, the influence of Russia and other major members would decline, BRICS could become an instrument of Chinese foreign policy, and some members might withdraw or maintain only a formal association with the grouping.
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In our view, a more realistic scenario is a “two-speed BRICS”, in which the grouping comprises a core (China, Russia, Iran, and others—an anti-Western front) and a periphery (India, Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia), opportunistically seeking to diversify their policies on a “comprador” basis. This implies differing directions and levels of integration: the core deepens cooperation in geopolitics and security (reaching into the military-technical dimension as well), while the periphery participates only in economic and humanitarian projects. Developments such as India’s “Special Strategic Partnership” with Israel (February 2026), and the United Arab Emirates’ withdrawal from OPEC, point in this direction.
Naturally, all these scenarios will also affect BRICS partner countries, which will likewise choose their own models and “sub-groups”, rather than following any unified approach.
How can the situation be corrected?
One may hope that the crisis in the Persian Gulf is not a death sentence, but a moment of truth. The behaviour of the United States under Donald Trump—including aggression against Iran and Venezuela, threats against Cuba, tariff wars, and pressure on South Africa to leave BRICS—objectively pushes the grouping towards greater consolidation, even if it creates short-term paralysis. At the same time, BRICS should not—and cannot—become an anti-Western bloc, as this would diminish its attractiveness for the global majority, which does not wish to choose between the United States and China.
Thus, in order to remain relevant, BRICS will have to establish permanent structures for mediation, monitoring, and coordination in the field of security. This should occur alongside deeper financial and payment integration (central bank digital currencies and BRICS Pay may gain momentum precisely as a means of insulating against dollar-based sanctions). The energy dimension may also play a role: the United Arab Emirates’ withdrawal from OPEC could trigger a domino effect and a restructuring of the global energy market. BRICS—encompassing both energy producers and consumers—could become a new platform for coordination in this sphere. Artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, developed independently of the West, may likewise serve as instruments of consolidation.
A bureaucratic remedy
The central element that the entire structure must be anchored to is “soft institutionalisation”—not in the direction of a unified alliance, but towards a flexible, multi-level structure.
For many years, the author has consistently argued for the urgent necessity of the evolutionary institutionalisation of BRICS, beginning with a technical-bureaucratic format aimed at coordination, monitoring, and the preservation of institutional memory—it is gratifying that these ideas are now reflected in the aforementioned report.
Previously, the model of “minimalist institutionalism” provided high flexibility and lowered the barrier to entry for new members. However, a systemic problem is now evident: the rejection of bureaucracy results in a lack of continuity. Each chair country shapes the agenda according to its own priorities; previous decisions often remain unresolved, and institutional memory relies on the enthusiasm of individual states (a role currently performed de facto by Russia). With the expansion of BRICS to ten members and the creation of a “partner countries” group, the problem has become critical. New member states objectively lack familiarity with the full historical agenda, and some do not possess sufficient bureaucratic resources to manage chairmanships involving hundreds of events.
What might the modalities of “soft” institutionalisation be? The model proposed in the aforementioned report—a technical “distributed” secretariat spread across countries—appears somewhat detached from bureaucratic realities and the practical functioning of international organisations, with which the author is well acquainted. The creation of a BRICS Secretary-General, whose office member states are unlikely to endow with meaningful powers, combined with a geographically dispersed staff, risks turning the structure into little more than a façade.
There is no need to reinvent the wheel. What is required is a compact secretariat composed of one official from each member state at approximately the D-2 level (according to the United Nations classification), as well as officials at a slightly lower level (D-1 or P-5) from each partner country. A certain number of administrators (P-2 to P-4) would also be needed, with national quotas determined by a formula based on population size and GDP per capita (the same principles should underpin budget formation). Provision should also be made for a technical staff recruited without quotas (G1–G7). The head of the secretariat would be appointed for a one-year term from the chair country and would, inter alia, be responsible for liaison with the chair’s government. The budget of such an organisation, comprising approximately 50–60 staff positions, can readily be estimated.
A physical headquarters would nonetheless be most effective, preferably located in a relatively neutral setting. Potential examples include Macau or Goa, given their distance from national capitals and the “Lusophone factor”, which is important for linguistic balance. Naturally, this does not preclude the presence of secretariat representatives in national capitals, including local nationals, provided the host country is willing to finance them.
The technical secretariat would perform a limited set of functions, including:
— Monitoring the implementation of decisions, maintaining documentation, and preparing reports and recommendations for leaders and governments;
— Preparing agendas for high-level meetings and contacts in cooperation with the chair country, along with relevant briefing and analytical materials;
— Coordinating sectoral tracks, as well as ensuring their alignment and synchronisation;
— Maintaining contacts with global and regional international organisations;
— Organising training and capacity-building for partner countries and new members, as well as for states and organisations provisionally referred to as members of the “Friends of BRICS Club”.
The fulfilment of such functions falls far short of transforming BRICS into a classical international organisation with binding obligations and supranational bodies, which should alleviate concerns among states wary of external diktat akin to that of the European Union. Yet without such a mechanism, BRICS is unlikely to pass the stress test of the current crisis, develop its own governance system, establish a crisis-response mechanism, or formulate, coordinate, and implement a unified strategy—let alone aspire to the role of a global arbiter.
