The long-term developmental trajectory of Turkey’s international status depends on the country’s capacity to bridge the rift between ambitions and capabilities. The most important domestic prerequisites are economic stabilisation and political consolidation, while the necessary external opportunities are created with structural shifts in the international system, writes Nubara Kulieva.
Turkey is traditionally categorized as a middle power. Yet today, amid a shifting international order, states like Turkey acquire a window of opportunity to enhance their global standing. This, among other factors, makes it necessary to rethink the approach used in assessing the international activity and position of those states that are considered to be middle powers.
On the one hand, counting Turkey among the middle powers was justified under a hierarchical approach, one based on ranking material indicators. In this case, emphasis was placed on factors such as: 1) a growing population, with the youth making up a large share of it; 2) for the 2000s, economic growth rates and GDP values at relatively high levels; 3) an army ranking second in military power among NATO states, and a substantial share of military spending; 4) a geographic position advantageous from the standpoint of establishing logistical and transportation corridors.
On the other hand, to do so was also possible by applying a behavioural approach. The following qualities of the country’s foreign policy served as the main arguments: 1) widespread utilization of soft power tools; 2) a proactive diplomatic agenda; 3) active participation in institutions of global governance and multilateral cooperation frameworks; 4) Turkey’s promotion of itself as a role model of socio-economic development for neighbouring states.
Yet, periodically, such approaches tended to look less convincing in light of various indicators—for example, in times of economic decline or when the military component in Turkish foreign policy grew in importance. Furthermore, from a constructivist angle, the middle power status of Turkey is not made out to be part of its international identity—unlike in South Korea or Australia.
Quite the opposite—attempts at forming a “renewed” image of Turkey as a global actor can be observed. In this context, special attention should be paid to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s very own model of the international system’s development, characterized as “The world is bigger than five” and promoted by him since 2013. At the foundation of this model lies a thesis calling for change in the post-WWII international order, first and foremost through reform of the UN, with the goal of bringing about a more “just” world. At the same time, the formation of international order would be a prerogative of the great powers.
The regional dimension of this approach acquires particular importance. In addition to its established role among the regional leaders in the Middle East, Turkey pursues a policy of expanding influence across three key vectors: the Islamic, the post-Ottoman, and the Turkic/post-Soviet. The last, represented by Central Asian states and those of the South Caucasus, becomes a space where a lack in resources is compensated through institutionalization of cultural ties. Within this context, of importance is the gradual transformation of the Organization of Turkic States from a cultural-humanitarian association to a multifaceted structure with ambitions in the fields of economics, transportation and security. This is reflected in the establishment of frameworks such as “OTS+”, the Turkic investment fund, and the Council of Turkic Central Banks, as well as in jointly held military exercises. Here, Turkey is gradually implementing a strategy of blending soft power tools with elements of economic and military-political influence.
No less important is the “Turkish Century” foreign policy and development concept, announced by Erdoğan ahead of the 100th Anniversary of the Turkish Republic. It reflects a “renewed” vision of Turkey’s global place, arguing that Turkey must achieve it through a shift— from being a country led (by NATO and the EU) to one leading others (the Islamic and Turkic worlds). Emphasis is placed on curbing the influence of not just foreign “partners”, but also domestic forces limiting the freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy—such as the military or FETO.
As a whole, those concepts illustrate Ankara’s desire not only to adapt the rules of the international system, but also strengthen those domestic foundations that are necessary for a more prominent role in said system.
Despite the rise in foreign policy activism under the AKP, the country’s domestic political and socio-economic conditions create obstacles for the transformation of its international status. First and foremost, as Turkey undergoes a systemic economic crisis, the material base of its political regime is not fit for the country’s international ambitions. At the onset of the 2000s Turkey experienced rapid growth, entering the ranks of emerging markets, yet current financial instability, persisting inflation and the national currency’s volatility impaired the country’s ability to acquire greater international influence. This led to a decrease in quality of life, the growth of social discontent, and the polarization of Turkish society.
The Turkish case illustrates the difficulties of positioning states within the framework of the contemporary multipolar international system. Today, no single opinion exists regarding Turkey’s status in the international system. On the one hand, it is still viewed as a new or rising middle power, yet one structurally and behaviourally different from traditional middle powers (Canada, Australia, etc.). On the other hand, attempts are being made at conceptualizing Turkey’s transitional state, including by means of new approaches, for example—by characterizing Turkey as a “modified” middle power. And one of the main reasons behind this uncertainty is the overall lack of a unified approach towards defining terms such as “middle” or “great” power .
Various potential scenarios of evolution in Turkey’s international status exist. The first—an optimistic one, within the framework of which Turkey may become an emerging great power in the long-term, if 1) it succeeds in stabilizing the economy, bringing down inflation, and maintaining high growth rates to accumulate the material basis necessary for greater international influence; 2) builds a defence-industrial complex with self-sufficiency in critical technologies and competitive arms exports, which will strengthen strategic autonomy; 3) lessens the degree of domestic polarization, allowing for more consensus in foreign policy that will present Turkey as a trustworthy and predictable global player; 4) the West’s decline continues, or the institutions of global governance undergo fragmentation, which will present Ankara with the opportunity to position itself as a representative of the “Global South”.
The second scenario is more realistic—it assumes that in the medium-term Turkey will keep the uncertain status of a “modified” middle power, positioned between a middle and a great power. In this case economic conditions may remain unstable and political polarization will persist as well, which will put consistency in foreign policy under strain, but won’t prevent Ankara from pursuing an active regional policy. Turkey will continue playing the role of an actor capable of shaping regional developments. Yet systemic limitations and lacking resources will not permit the country to convert regional influence into sustainable global leadership. Within the framework of this scenario Turkey will proceed to act beyond its material resources, but shall not achieve great power status.
The third scenario—pessimistic, implying a downgrade in Turkey’s international status. This remains a possibility in case of continued economic downturn, a rise in domestic discontent, and decline in the legitimacy of the ruling elite. Social polarization may undermine political stability even further. Simultaneously, overextension in numerous conflict zones can drive up spending to levels unbearable for the Turkish economy and armed forces. Under such conditions Ankara would become compelled to curb its international ambitions and concentrate on domestic stabilization. Turkey will remain of importance regionally, but the authority of its global initiatives will collapse. Turkey will, in essence, decline to a more limited status of a middle power, constraining even they country’s capability to influence its immediate surroundings.
The long-term developmental trajectory of Turkey’s international status depends on the country’s capacity to bridge the rift between ambitions and capabilities. The most important domestic prerequisites are economic stabilization and political consolidation, while the necessary external opportunities are created with structural shifts in the international system. Otherwise, Turkey will likely remain a regional power—a state wielding significant influence in the region, but possessing only limited capabilities to shape global order.
