Unlike economic heavyweights or ideologically driven mediators, Turkey is leaning on its geographic centrality and shared civilisational ties to claim legitimacy as an interlocutor. Its style is often improvised, yet rarely indifferent. Turkey does not seek to become a new Geneva; it aspires to remain an Ankara – engaged, partial, and effective, Taha Özhan
writes.
In what has been called the age of confusion – an era marked by collapsing norms, resurgent rivalries, global (geo)political depression and fragmented alliances – Turkey has emerged as a consequential diplomatic actor. Amid the centrifugal forces that have diminished the coherence of traditional power centres, Ankara has pursued a proactive, multidirectional foreign policy that spans regions and crises. As a middle power endowed with historical depth, regional influence, strategic ambition, and a military willing to project force, Turkey has cultivated a posture that privileges engagement over isolation, and agility over ideological rigidity.
Turkey benefits from a unique type of capital that only a handful of nations possess. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has spent more than two decades cultivating relationships with global leaders, transforming Turkey into a pivotal diplomatic hub. Since the early 2000s, he has actively engaged with heads of state and government across a wide spectrum of countries and policy domains. Drawing on this deep reservoir of diplomatic experience, Erdoğan now leverages his unique position to shape Turkey’s foreign policy with agility and strategic intent.
Likewise, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, whose tenure as intelligence chief over a decade unfolded in one of the world’s most turbulent geopolitical theatres, provides Turkey with a unique strategic advantage. Fidan’s current role as foreign minister is underscored by his exceptional depth of relational capital, cultivated over years of high-stakes intelligence work. His ability to engage with actors typically beyond the reach of traditional diplomacy attests to a practice of statecraft informed by discretion, durability, and a nuanced grasp of the subterranean currents that shape both regional and global dynamics.
Turkey’s diplomatic reach is notably expansive: mediating grain export agreements between Russia and Ukraine, hosting talks between Somalia and Ethiopia, facilitating negotiations in Mindanao, and maintaining open channels in the South Caucasus. These are not merely opportunistic forays but reflect a broader ambition to position Turkey as a pragmatic actor capable of navigating today’s polarised geopolitical terrain. In an increasingly fragmented multipolar order, Turkey’s ability to engage actors ranging from NATO allies to revisionist powers has sustained its diplomatic relevance.
This orientation is rooted in what Turkish officials describe as an “entrepreneurial and humanitarian foreign policy” – a framework that emphasises responsiveness and flexibility, particularly in arenas overlooked or abandoned by more institutionalised powers. Unlike economic heavyweights or ideologically driven mediators, Turkey leans on its geographic centrality and shared civilisational ties to claim legitimacy as an interlocutor. Its style is often improvised, yet rarely indifferent.
Geography remains Turkey’s cardinal asset. Situated at the nexus of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Ankara enjoys a unique vantage point from which to engage across divergent political and security ecosystems. Its diplomacy is not anchored in the architecture of large alliances or buoyed by vast development aid budgets. Instead, it is shaped by bilateral diplomacy, security cooperation, humanitarian outreach, and symbolic capital.
Ankara has also embraced “minilateralism”: forming issue-specific coalitions or ad hoc mechanisms that allow influence without binding commitments to broader power blocs. In Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus, this strategy has preserved a measure of strategic autonomy and enabled rapid engagement in dynamic theatres. It reflects a preference for bilateral leverage and targeted interventions over consensus-driven multilateralism.
Nowhere is Turkey’s balancing act more visible than in Ukraine. When much of the West severed direct channels with Moscow, Ankara maintained a dialogue with both Kiev and the Kremlin. Turkey hosted early rounds of negotiations and brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which enabled Ukraine to export grain despite the conflict. The deal not only alleviated pressure on global food markets but also confirmed Turkey’s utility as a functional mediator amid diplomatic deadlock.
For the past two years, Ankara has again demonstrated its diplomatic value by facilitating a major prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine, including foreign nationals. While Turkey condemned Russia’s military operation in official rhetoric, it refrained from imposing Western sanctions. This calibrated neutrality has drawn criticism for being ambiguous, yet supporters argue that it reflects pragmatic realism aimed at sustaining dialogue rather than severing it.
Turkey’s approach to Africa has followed a similar arc. In the Horn of Africa, Ankara’s long-standing humanitarian engagement has bolstered its credibility. In early 2024, Turkey convened talks between Somalia and Ethiopia on maritime access and sovereignty, culminating in the Ankara Declaration – a rare diplomatic breakthrough in a region mired in zero-sum logic. By offering security support without the baggage of a colonial legacy or great-power patronage, Turkey has positioned itself as a more approachable, context-sensitive actor.
Turkey’s claim to neutrality, however, is not always tenable. In Libya and Syria, Turkish involvement – whether through military deployments or support for particular factions – has frequently aligned Ankara with one side of a conflict. These engagements blur the line between mediation and participation, and underscore the inherent tension in Turkey’s dual role as both stakeholder and facilitator.
Ankara’s diplomatic reach has also extended into Southeast Asia. Invited by both the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Turkey has contributed to the Mindanao peace process. This engagement signals Ankara’s ambition to export its diplomatic model beyond its neighbourhood and into the Indo-Pacific. It also reflects a broader receptivity among Global South actors to non-Western intermediaries in long-frozen conflicts.
The South Caucasus illustrates Turkey’s two-track diplomacy. While offering unequivocal support to Azerbaijan – especially during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war – Ankara has also pursued normalisation with Armenia. This balancing act reflects a broader pattern in Turkish foreign policy: cultivating strong alliances while seeking dialogue with historical adversaries. Long-term success, however, hinges on the perception of sincerity and fairness in these engagements.
At home, Turkey’s foreign policy remains highly centralised. Sustaining Turkey’s diplomatic momentum will likely require a shift toward more institutionalised, multilevel policy-making. Ankara’s ability to cultivate a more nuanced and strategic foreign policy is closely tied to the degree of its domestic political consolidation. The more Turkey minimises democratic deficits, the greater its potential to project geopolitical surplus and accumulate strategic leverage.
Economic constraints pose additional challenges. Unlike wealthier middle powers, Turkey lacks the fiscal bandwidth to offer large-scale reconstruction aid or sustained financial packages that are often essential to post-conflict stabilisation. Domestic economic vulnerabilities also constrain Ankara’s autonomy, increasing its reliance on transactional ties with actors such as Russia, China, and the Gulf States.
Turkey’s balancing act between NATO and Russia captures the essence of its current diplomatic posture. As great power rivalry intensifies and regional alliances solidify, Ankara’s aspiration for strategic autonomy may face limits. While diversification offers flexibility, it also inhibits deep alignment. Should the global context compel Ankara to make definitive choices, its room to manoeuvre could narrow – particularly if its trust in traditional allies remains tenuous.
Turkey’s distinctive mediation: active, not neutral
Turkey’s role as a mediator stands apart from the archetype typically associated with middle-power diplomacy. Unlike Switzerland or Norway, Ankara’s mediation is not predicated on dispassionate neutrality. Rather, Turkey often holds a defined position in the conflicts it seeks to mediate. Even as it plays a part in the very crises it engages – such as in Syria or Libya – it manages, at times, to mediate discrete elements of those same crises involving third parties. This posture reflects an active foreign policy agenda in which mediation is not a moral imperative but a strategic tool for advancing national interests. Turkey does not seek to become a new Geneva; it aspires to remain an Ankara – engaged, partial, and effective.
That said, Turkey’s contributions during periods of institutional paralysis are not lost on global actors. In settings where traditional diplomacy has stalled, Ankara has often filled the vacuum, offering interim solutions or de-escalatory mechanisms. It does not aspire to reshape the global order, nor does it champion a normative vision of international relations. Instead, it excels at facilitating dialogue, opening backchannels, and sustaining minimal diplomatic momentum when systemic actors falter.
Looking forward, Turkey’s sustained relevance as a diplomatic hub depends on several factors. First, it must institutionalise its foreign policy apparatus; ad hoc initiatives yield headlines, but long-term influence requires bureaucratic depth and cross-sectoral coherence. Second, Ankara must navigate regional rivalries judiciously – overreach or entanglement in zero-sum conflicts may erode its credibility as a broker. It bears repeating: Turkey will not subordinate its core security or economic interests merely to preserve a diplomatic posture. Finally, Turkey must evolve with the global environment, which is increasingly shaped by US-China competition and stress of the emergence of a G-2 world, climate insecurity, the retreat of globalisation, and disruptions in energy markets.
Turkey encapsulates the promise – and the peril – of middle-power diplomacy in a fractured international system. It reveals the utility of versatility when alliances are fluid, institutions brittle, and norms contested. By operating in the interstices between blocs and leveraging transactional openings, Turkey has found room to manoeuvre, persuade, and mediate. Yet this strategy demands a constant balancing act: between ambition and restraint, engagement and entanglement, autonomy and alignment.
In sum, Turkey’s ascent as a diplomatic hub underscores the potential of states that blend geography, historical literacy, and strategic adaptability. Its contributions may not redraw world maps, but they help patch the gaps left by larger powers. For now, Turkey offers a compelling case study in how a middle power, through diplomatic entrepreneurship and calibrated activism, can remain relevant in an age of disarray – and perhaps even shape the scaffolding of cooperation in a divided world.
