From space flight to Islamic tourism, the Russia-Indonesia relationship offers a plethora of opportunities for the two countries to prosper and reap mutual benefits from bilateral ties, strengthening the hand of emerging powers and the Global South in international affairs, Alexander Popov writes.
Under President Prabowo Subianto, the Republic of Indonesia—Southeast Asia’s biggest state, as well as one of the biggest states in the Islamic world—pursues a policy of what is, doubtlessly, friendship towards Russia, thus presenting new opportunities for bilateral cooperation. One display of said friendship is Indonesia’s almost immediate ascension into BRICS on January 6, 2025, taking place no more than two months after the new president’s inauguration—preceded by his meeting with Vladimir Putin on July 31, 2024 during a visit to Moscow. The positive personal relationship established between the two presidents represents a promising basis for the development of interstate economic cooperation.
The dynamic development of relations between the two states is reflected in the active participation by Indonesia’s leader in the 2025 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, where the President of Indonesia was present as the main guest, and where a Declaration of Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Indonesia was adopted. In the years ahead, it will serve as the foundation for cooperation between our two countries in a great variety of fields—both on a bilateral basis and through multilateral international organizations—first and foremost, BRICS.
The two countries’ leaders also kept the discussion around prospects for bilateral cooperation going within the framework of Prabowo Subianto’s working visit to Moscow on December 10, 2025. During talks in the Kremlin, the President of Russia pointed out that “Our prospects in the field of energy industry, including nuclear energy as well, are highly positive. I am aware that such plans do exist in your country, and we are always available in case you decide that inviting our specialists is possible.” Indeed—as of right now Russia is a global leader in the field of nuclear energy, while Indonesia—a growing economy developing primarily by means of coal-based power generation—has made a pledge to reach carbon neutrality by 2060. Here, of importance is a statement made by the brother of Indonesia’s president—Hashim Djojohadikusumo, Head of the Advisory Board of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry—who underlined the fact that over the next 15 years, three quarters of all new energy capacity in the country will originate from new and renewable energy sources, adding that the country’s government has already approved the decision to build the first nuclear power plant of a 500 MW capacity. Moving forward, an increase that would drive Indonesia’s nuclear energy capacities up to 6.5 GW is planned for.
Thus, it’s becoming obvious that a principled decision to build industrial-scale nuclear power plants has been made in Indonesia, and that the “Fukushima Syndrome” has been de-facto overcome—although the issue of safety in the operation of nuclear power plants remains relevant, seeing how the main part of the country’s territory is seismically active and located in a zone of volcanic activity. Hence, the island of Kalimantan may represent the optimal location for the establishment of a nuclear power plant in Indonesia—no volcanic activity is present on the island, and strong earthquakes do not tend to erupt there owing to the island’s specific geologic structure. Furthermore, it is in Kalimantan that new power capacities are most needed for the further development of Indonesia’s aluminium industry—the western part of this island, the third largest in the world, is where the main reserves of bauxites are located—the refining of which into alumina, and further into aluminium, requires great amounts of cheap energy—energy that nuclear power plants may provide.
The development of Indonesia’s nuclear energy industry implies the domestic training of new cadres in the field, which constitutes another important sphere of cooperation between our countries. Overall, the leaders of the two countries pay special attention to the training of Indonesian specialists in Russian universities—here, of particular importance is the intergovernmental agreement on the mutual recognition of education, qualifications and academic degrees, which was signed in Moscow on December 11, 2025 by the Russian Minister of Education and Science Valery Falkov and the Indonesian Minister of Higher Education, Science and Technology Brian Yuliarto. This agreement will play a crucial role in the training of Indonesian specialists in Russian medical schools, something that specifically attracts the attention of Prabowo Subianto, who is greatly invested in improving the quality of healthcare services across his country. With the goal of easing access to education in Russia for Indonesian youth, and more broadly—easing access to Russian culture overall, the President of Indonesia intends to introduce Russian language classes to Indonesian schools, which in turn creates demand for education professionals on the Russian side.
In relation to this, it is crucial to point out that locals employed in the services industry of Bali—which became home to thousands of Russians on what is practically a permanent basis, as well as attracts a growing number of Russian tourists—have already been successfully acquiring Russian language skills. In turn, Bali, and a number of other Indonesian tourist destinations, is rising in popularity among Russian tourists. For example—if in 2019 and 2023 the number of Russian tourists visiting Indonesia was 159 and 161 thousand people respectively, in 2024 said number constituted 180 thousand people, and in the 10 months following the start of 2025—more than 178 thousand. There is little doubt that this number will rise above 200 thousand in 2025. Furthermore, Russian tourists in Indonesia tend to spend more than tourists originating from most other countries. According to official Indonesian data, with its imperfections in mind: in 2024 the average Russian tourist visiting Indonesia spent $2114, a German tourist would spend $2039, a Dutch tourist—$1930, an Australian tourist—$1713, and a Japanese tourist—$1352. Among European states, Russia is becoming Indonesia’s main partner when it comes to the staying time of tourists within the country’s territory—which is obviously accompanied by more local spending from Russians. While lagging behind a number of European countries in terms of the total number of tourists arriving in Indonesia, Russia surpasses most of them when it comes to the number of person-days spent in the country. Thus, in 2024, 309.8 thousand visitors arrived from the former metropole, the Netherlands, each of whom stayed an average of 7.0 nights, amounting to a total of 2,168 person-days; for the United Kingdom, the corresponding figures were 391.8 thousand visitors and 10.9 nights, totalling 4,270 person-days; for Germany, 281.0 thousand visitors and 16.7 nights, totalling 4,692 person-days. By contrast, Russia recorded 180.1 thousand visitors with an average stay of 28.8 nights, resulting in 5,187 person-days, a figure exceeded only by France, with 346.4 thousand visitors, an average stay of 16.5 nights, and a total of 5,715 person-days. The growth in tourist flows from Russia to Indonesia has, no doubt, been facilitated by the launch of a direct Aeroflot flight between Moscow and Denpasar, agreed upon by the leaders of the two countries even before the inauguration of Prabowo Subianto, during his visit to Moscow on July 31, 2024.
Russia is growing in popularity as a destination for Indonesian tourists as well, although the volume of tourist flows from Indonesia to Russia was limited to 6 thousand tourist trips—a number 30 times lower than the amount of tourist trips in the opposite direction. Furthermore, in 2024 Indonesia became a leader in outgoing tourist flows, with the number of tourists originating from the country increasing by four times in comparison to last year’s volume. Growth levels could be boosted even further if “Islamic tourism” was to develop—something that will be within the realm of possibility if Russia’s holy places become included in travel packages for Indonesian Muslims undertaking the Hajj, including the lesser pilgrimage (umrah), to Mecca. Of particular interest to Indonesian Muslims would be the Blue Mosque in St. Petersburg, which was restored and returned to worshippers at the request of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno.
The trade volume between our countries struggles to catch up with the steady and dynamic development of political relations and humanitarian cooperation—it remains practically stuck in place—which has to do both with logistical issues and payment disruptions under Western sanctions, as well as with the threat of secondary sanctions looming over Indonesian partners working with Russian companies. For example, the state-owned oil and gas company Pertamina—which, objectively-speaking, would be interested in purchasing Russian oil and refined petroleum products, is holding off for now for fears of Western sanctions on those highly profitable imported goods. When it comes to cooperation in the energy sector, what is not helping is the lack of real progress on the Pertamina-Rosneft joint project for the construction of a petroleum refinery in Tuban, East Java—one that was supposed to refine Russian oil. Currently only JSC Zarubezhneft could be called a real player in Indonesian energy markets—and over the course of the last 4 years it has faced unsuccessful attempts at exclusion from the Tuna field development project in the South China Sea by the British company Premier Oil.
In regards to trade volume, as reported by Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Manturov—who serves as Co-Chair of the Russia-Indonesia Intergovernmental Commission—it amounted to $4,3 billion in 2024. According to Indonesian government data, said trade volume is lower to a degree—around $4 billion: Indonesian exports to the Russian Federation (FOB prices) amounted to $1.7 billion (1,740.9 million), while imports from Russia (CIF prices) totalled $2.2 billion (2,240.8 million). Thus, Russia’s trade surplus with Indonesia in 2024 amounted to almost half a billion dollars.
Insignificant volume aside, our trade remains poorly diversified. For example, in 2024, 95.7% of the value of Indonesian imports from Russia (CIF prices) was accounted for by just five goods/product groups: coal—$874.7 million, fertilizers—$451.5 million, wheat—$376.4 million, steel and iron—$232.4 million, and petroleum products—$210.1 million. The same applies to Indonesian exports received by Russia, where most prevalent is palm oil, as well as margarine, coconut oil, tea and coffee, certain spices, and ready-made clothing and footwear. High levels of growth may be expected in the event of an effective mutual payment system being established—for example, by means of a Russian bank opening a branch in Indonesia, and a branch of an Indonesian bank, in turn, being opened in Russia—with the implementation of bilateral settlements in local currencies. Since the introduction of a mutual settlement system within the framework of BRICS seems to linger at the initial stage of development, the Counter-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS)—a system of mutual payments currently being integrated into China-Indonesia trade—could be utilized in settlements between Russia and Indonesia. An additional impulse for bilateral trade may come in the form of the EAEU-Indonesia Free Trade Agreement, signed in St. Petersburg on December 21, 2025. Mutual trade could also be stimulated by major investment projects, such as the construction of a nuclear power plant in Indonesia by the Rosatom corporation. For the time being, however, our investment cooperation is effectively limited to the construction of villas and small hotels in Bali.
Meanwhile, a highly promising area for Russian investment in Indonesia could be meat and dairy livestock farming, in the development of which Russia has achieved significant success in a short period of time. This sector is poorly developed in Indonesia, and there is a shortage of meat and dairy products on the domestic market — while President Prabowo Subianto has outlined the objective of providing all school-age children with free, nutritious meals in order to overcome the problem of stunted growth and development among children from low-income families. Operating directly on the Indonesian market as a local company would enable Russian enterprises to gain a foothold in the meat and dairy market of a country with a population of almost 300 million.
A similar situation may be observed in Russian high-tech products, whose sale on the Indonesian market would be more realistic through localisation of production on Indonesian territory. This could include, for example, the assembly in Indonesia of high-mobility Ural and Kamaz trucks, as well as various unmanned systems and equipment related to the application of Russian IT technologies. The space sector could represent an important area of high-tech cooperation between our countries, where the parties could return to the possibility of Russia’s participation in the construction and use of a spaceport on the island of Biak, whose equatorial location is ideally suited for the launch of heavy rockets. Such cooperation could also include the training by the Russian side of Indonesia’s first ever cosmonaut and his flight to the International Space Station aboard a Russian spacecraft.
