Wider Eurasia
Indonesia With BRICS, A Bridge to the Future: Challenges and Opportunities

Indonesia’s unique opportunity with BRICS emphasises how it can navigate the new multipolar order while preserving its non-aligned and democratic values. As Indonesia considers joining BRICS, it stands at a crossroads, where aligning with emerging powers could unlock new growth while also challenging its traditional diplomatic principles, taking public benefits and strengthening global collaboration, writes Joko Susilo, a participant in the Valdai – New Generation project.

Indonesia faces both opportunities and challenges in joining BRICS. Its participation in this group could either align with or conflict with its foreign policy and economic objectives. As Indonesia embarks on a new chapter in global relations through BRICS, it will likely experience tensions amid the collaboration and competition among countries. This dynamic is influenced by the ongoing struggle between domestic national interests and international pressures. Indonesia characterises its involvement as active participation in all international forums, reflecting its commitment to an active and independent foreign policy that aligns with its national development agenda. Ultimately, all these interests and tensions come down to pragmatism and realistic decision-making.

We know that one of the emerging and increasingly powerful alternatives to global governance is BRICS. In the coming years, the world post-2025 will see global policies and new forms of governance as the drivers. The initiation of new global institutions is also based on the inability of existing ones to resolve various multidimensional crises globally. On the other hand, polemics have emerged when the consensus of the global forum was not achieved due to the dominant power of a handful of countries and the dominance of privilege in current institutions.

Countries like Indonesia are increasingly drawn to BRICS, particularly following the government transition from President Jokowi to President Prabowo. The new administration is demonstrating a more proactive approach to foreign policy and diplomacy. This shift is highlighted by Prabowo’s inauguration speech and the strategic appointment of Sugiono, a secretary with military experience, as Minister of Foreign Affairs – usually the foreign minister is a bureaucratic career diplomat. Furthermore, Indonesia’s official announcement to join BRICS as a new partner at the 2024 summit in Russia signifies a decisive commitment. This bold move sharply contrasts with Jokowi’s two terms, which were marked by hesitation and a wait-and-see attitude. Embracing BRICS represents a significant step forward for Indonesia on the global stage.

The BRICS-Indonesia Dilemma

However, Indonesia’s attention to being involved in BRICS has prompted public polemics. We need to analyse the challenges and opportunities more comprehensively.

Indeed, Indonesia’s involvement in BRICS as a partner, or in the future as a permanent member, will create economic, political, and multidimensional risks. Economically, by aligning with BRICS, Indonesia could face a shift in trade dependencies, potentially relying more heavily on BRICS economies, some of which (like Russia and South Africa) are prone to economic volatility due to sanctions, inflation, or political unrest. This could disrupt Indonesia’s export and import stability, especially if BRICS faces collective economic setbacks. The legitimacy of BRICS is also insufficient to convince global investors to invest in the country. This differs, for example, from membership in the OECD, which reflects the legitimacy of a country in economic development terms. This will undoubtedly be an obstacle for Indonesia if it wants to pursue economic growth of 8% per year, as promised by President Prabowo. It mitigates market sentiment, investors, and major trading partners that already exist and are dominant in Indonesia, such as Singapore, Japan, and the USA.

There are concerns about how BRICS membership impacts Indonesia’s democratic image and economic stability. Several countries have implemented centralised politics and limited democratic space. This can potentially contradict Indonesia’s status as one of the four largest democratic countries in the world, with characteristics such as open general elections, a decentralised government and local autonomy.

Indonesia risks being drawn into the conflicts of some BRICS countries, either directly or indirectly, due to its membership in the bloc. This could lead to geopolitical instability and other risks. However, it’s important to note that BRICS’ support for Palestinian independence aligns with Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation, a stance that will not only gain solid public legitimacy but also reassure the international community about Indonesia’s commitment to its principles. Indonesia has not yet finished addressing our internal issues, which is why going global is such a new challenge for the country. It’s double homework that faces Indonesia. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s basic constitution mandates world peace and is oriented towards eliminating all forms of colonialism.

On the other hand, we also need to recognise the prospective benefits and opportunities that BRICS offers Indonesia, like shared national interests, opening new trade access, and strengthening the Global South. These “shared national interests” can include economic growth, geopolitical influence, and the promotion of democratic values.

BRICS can be an option for strengthening and accelerating Indonesia’s economic development. Indonesia’s recovery in 2021 is insufficient to return the country to upper middle-income status. Based on the gross national income (GNI) per capita projection of 4,460 in 2022, in order to get out of the middle-income trap and become a developed country by 2045, Indonesia has only two decades. It requires constant annual economic growth of 7% or higher (Ministry of Development and Planning of Republic Indonesia, 2022). At the same time, in 2025-2035, the momentum that the demographic bonus offers via a productive workforce is limited for Indonesia. A productive workforce and national product output could lead to economic gains if channelled through BRICS. The risk is that if this window of opportunity is missed, it will trigger Indonesia’s surplus workers in a national economy that is still predominantly informal and consumptive. This is a rare opportunity: through BRICS, Indonesia can for example partner and transfer technology with China and Russia, which have successfully industrialised domestically and are strong in terms of formal economic structures.
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Indonesia can strengthen bilateral economic relations with the BRICS countries as a fellow member. This will positively correlate with widening investment opportunities and access to intense trade flows on both sides. BRICS provides equality regarding contributions between countries. The share of member countries in the New Development Bank (NDB) is equal, at 20%, in line with the hope of policymaking in the form of consensus that has an equal effect on all members, both old and new. Even during a crisis, BRICS members can survive relatively well, and countries are more or less tested when they face a pandemic crisis or economic embargo. This increased economic cooperation could open up new opportunities for Indonesia and strengthen its position in the global economy.

In particular, BRICS priorities are in line with the work program of the “Kabinet Merah Putih” Prabowo government like national priorities for energy and food security, poverty eradication, and human resources development. Joining BRICS could provide strategic partnerships, helping Indonesia reach its growth targets and national development goals.

Last but not least, Indonesia’s membership in BRICS could contribute to the strengthening and solidarity of the Global South. For example, the bilateral economic cooperation between Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China has been growing: Chinese investment in Indonesia in 2013 was USD280 million, and rose significantly to USD8.6 billion by 2023. Southern countries, generally developing countries with small and medium power capabilities, must consolidate their resource potential to mitigate pressure from great powers. As a significant player in the region, Indonesia could play a crucial role in this consolidation, thereby enhancing its influence and counter-balancing Western dominance.

BRICS and Indonesia’s Future

Indonesia has opportunities for realizing its national interests and having broader impact with BRICS. Active involvement in various global forums and institutions has opened up new opportunities and these have opened up new possibilities. At the same time, there will undoubtedly be more intersections between countries with the potential for conflict brought by each member that can be held hostage to other countries’ national interests and decisions. However, this is a challenge that needs to be faced as a group. Indonesia’s potential BRICS membership aligns with its “active and free” foreign policy.

Indonesia’s move to join BRICS embodies an active free foreign policy, which does not mean joining a certain camp but actively participating in all forums.

The evolution of the world order has depended mainly on countries’ roles beyond their borders and approaches to global governance. Amid all the diversity of political interests and diversification of ideologies, every country is encouraged to become an active nation-state. This reality has also marked a paradigm shift from unipolar to multipolar in the new global order. This has the same nuance as the fundamental principles of Indonesian diplomacy, namely “free and active politics” and non-alignment, which have deep historical roots. History records that Indonesia has practically implemented a multipolar approach, for example, when initiating the Asia-Africa Conference and ASEAN. So, Indonesia should be able to adapt to this condition.

Indonesia must also be more sensitive because the world order will depend on and be influenced by three main aspects: political-economic factors, power, and institutions. These power factors are influenced by the balance between dominant global powers, the US, China, and Russia, and the ability of new global powers, such as India, Turkey and Brazil to consolidate influence and become independent centres of power or poles in the new global balance of power (see Valdai Club Report, 2024).

At the same time, these inter-state relations have implications for forming new coalitions and have become institutional factors. These institutional factors include the ability of non-great Western powers to serve as the institutional basis for a new world order among the “global majority” countries and the ability of the elite leaders of global power to reach a consensus on a new institutional framework. The world’s future will change with the increase in meaningful participation and representation of developing countries and emerging economic powers in international organisations and their contribution to global economic development.

Indonesia’s unique opportunity with BRICS emphasises how it can navigate this new multipolar order while preserving its non-aligned and democratic values. In my opinion, Indonesia can be a strong leader with a strong economy in ASEAN by joining BRICS. As Indonesia considers joining BRICS, it stands at a crossroads, where aligning with emerging powers could unlock new growth while also challenging its traditional diplomatic principles, taking public benefits and strengthening global collaboration.
Views expressed are of individual Members and Contributors, rather than the Club's, unless explicitly stated otherwise.