The situation taking shape in Yemen now is an excellent example of this substitution of notions. Yemen has always existed on the border between a fragile and a failed state.
After a thousand years, it seems we are back in the 9th or 10th century.
In the mid-9th century, power in Baghdad went to Caliph Ja’far al-Mutawakkil. He ordered everyone “to give up speculation and discussion of disputed issues, follow religious orthodoxy, and obey the rules of the Sunnah and conciliarity.” Al-Mutawakkil did not like the Shia or philosophical disputes, but his faithfulness did not help him respond to the concerns of society. Nor did it promise any changes for the better. He also did not want to share power with anyone. Meanwhile, the number of Shia was growing throughout the Muslim world. Anti-Sunni uprisings flared up in various places, preachers around the Muslim world claimed to be the Mahdi (Messiah), and new Shia states emerged from the remnants of the Caliphate until Baghdad itself was seized by the Shia Buwayhids in the mid-10th century.
Today both Shia and Salafis oppose the traditional followers of al-Mutawakkil who are unable to meet the needs of modern Arab society. Occasionally both of them use religious discourse in their pursuit of power, imposing on the world community and generations of their descendants the denominational paradigm of the present-day Middle East. Ultimately, it is much more interesting to argue about Shia and Sunnis or Salafis and moderates than to address the real problems of the region.
The situation taking shape in Yemen now is an excellent example of this substitution of notions. Yemen has always existed on the border between a fragile and a failed state. It has essentially been in a perpetual state of conflict for a quarter century, with only brief interruptions. These conflicts flowed into each other, changing only in terms of the configuration and the combination of participants – North against South in the 1990s, Houthis against Ali Abdullah Saleh in the 2000s, not to mention the activities of al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups.
There are several fundamental reasons for this state of perpetual instability, primarily, limited socio-political modernization, which means there is essentially no civil society in Yemen, as well as a personalized political system and weak civil identity. Instead, identity is based on regional (North-South), religious (Sunni, Shia, moderate Shafi’i, Wahhabi Salafi, etc.) and tribal affiliation. Another reason is the traditional culture of violence in Yemeni politics, which is further aggravated by Yemen’s heavily armed society (according to some sources, there about 65 million weapons in this country of 25 million people). Finally, the scarcity of resources is also playing a role. Behind essentially every struggle for power is a struggle for access to resources.
All these are permanent, systemic factors that are largely present throughout the region. However, in Yemen they are extreme and mutually reinforcing.
The 2011 protests eventually replaced the Saleh regime and launched the UN-supervised National Dialogue, which was unanimously supported by the world community.
There were three forms of National Dialogue during the Arab Spring – in Tunisia, Bahrain and Yemen. The first one did not envisage foreign interference – the dialogue was monitored by civilian institutions (organized labor, the Human Rights League and the like) and ended with success. In Bahrain, it was controlled by the authorities. An international commission was set up under the guidance of Egyptian lawyer Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni to make this dialogue more objective. The commission made some recommendations to the government but not all of them were carried out. By the fall of 2014 the opposition and the government reached an impasse, having made mutually unacceptable demands, and the dialogue ground to a halt. It may be resumed, but obviously now is not the time.
Finally, in Yemen the National Dialogue was much more complicated than in Tunisia and Bahrain. Moreover, Yemen did not have strong civilian institutions or a powerful central government capable of running it. So in Yemen it led to the consolidation of the Houthi (Zaidi) organization Ansar Allah, which was a marginal player in politics in 2011. In 2014, the Houthis scored a number of major military victories over al-Qaeda and occupied Sana in September.
If the current conflict is viewed in strictly domestic political terms, it can be considered a struggle of the elites for access to resources. Religious, tribal, regional or ideological affiliations of the actors are important factors in mobilizing (and sometimes organizing) the population, but in most cases (at least for the time being) do not imply an existentialist confrontation. Typically, both Zaidi and Shafi’i law is based on the teachings of Imam ash-Shafi’i. Furthermore, Ali Abdullah Saleh (a Zaidi himself), who fought the Houthis throughout the 2000s, is now siding with them. In Yemen’s recent history there have been examples of completely unexpected alliances of former ideological foes, for instance, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) that united in 2002 the Sunni Islamist al-Islah, the Yemeni Socialist Party (southerners) and al-Haqq Party (the Houthis).
The only dividing line that does not allow for compromise lies between Salafi jihadists and the Houthis. The fight between them, if the conflict continues, may spread to the country’s entire political space, thereby leading to a repeat of the Syrian scenario.
At the same time, the regional context is having an impact. Naturally, the confrontation between the Houthis and the government is not identical to the Sunni-Shia split in the Middle East or the Saudi-Iranian struggle behind it. To some extent, both the Saudis and Iranians have recently tried to develop loyal proxies inside Yemen. The similarity between Zaidi religious practice and the imam rituals that are widespread in Iran is typical in this respect, as is the prevalence of Wahhabi teachings among the supporters of the al-Islah Party.
However, both forces put their own political interests above those of their foreign patrons. It would be wrong to view the Houthis exclusively as Iranian agents. Were they to consolidate power, they would have to take into account Yemen’s objective dependence on Saudi Arabia and respect the traditions of neighborly relations. But in all probability, they would try to diversify foreign political contacts and probably use their ties with Iran to pressure Riyadh and consolidate Yemen’s sovereignty.
However, the Saudi apprehensions that Iran’s goal is to create a Shia belt around the kingdom (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen) and use its influence with Shia inside Saudi Arabia to destabilize the country are also justified. The Houthis would play a major role in this destabilization because they are related to many Saudi Shia tribes.
These apprehensions explain Saudi Arabia’s severe and somewhat ill-considered response to Houthi military successes.
The legality of the Saudi-led military operation in Yemen is dubious (the UN Security Council has consistently advocated a peaceful settlement of the conflict) and its goals are not entirely clear. Judging by the evidence, its central aim is the physical destruction of the Houthi leaders, the weakening of the Zaidi movement and the subsequent resumption of the National Dialogue. However, the experience of the past few years shows that peaceful political transitions are very difficult after an armed intervention that weakens government institutions (which are already more dead than alive in Yemen), especially if there are no clear plans for a transition.
In theory, if a pragmatic approach prevails, discussions of Yemen’s federalization may resume, all the more so since in the past few years it has become a universal Western recipe for the countries of the region (Iraq, Syria and Libya).
However, inadequate government institutions, the fragmentation of society and other factors may turn federalization into the division of power between the elites (as in Iraq), which could easily destroy the integrity of the Yemeni state and cause it to collapse again.
If the Houthis believe that the Saudis primarily want to destroy them, they will have to fight for their survival rather than power. This may lead to a protracted guerrilla struggle that will render the National Dialogue pointless.
Moreover, Iran may become openly involved in the conflict (Tehran will have to defend the Zaidis), and the Houthis may attempt to strike back at the kingdom with the help of kindred tribes on its territory.
In case of a more dramatic scenario, a direct armed conflict may break out between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The Saudi-led operation may also consolidate Arab integration, primarily, in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is demonstrating military unity in countering common threats for the second time (the first time was in Bahrain in 2011), and the Arab League, which has announced the formation of joint armed units.
At the global level, the announced operation again points to the weakening of the UN and the growing independence of regional actors, which are ready to make such decisions without clear support from global players.
