While Putin emphasizes Russia’s desire to have constructive relations with all parts of the world, and avoids threatening retaliation in response to actions he criticizes , both the tone and theme of his comments represent a throwback to the hard line speech he gave to the Munich Security Conference in 2007
Anyone who, as I do, believes that a working strategic partnership between Russia and the United States is both desirable and feasible will read Prime Minister Putin’s February 27 article on foreign policy with disappointment. Nor will anyone who, as I do, believes that Europe, the United States, and Russia should be taking concrete steps to transform this vast area into a genuine Euro-Atlantic security community focused on 21st century security challenges and capable of bringing critical leadership to an increasingly fragmented and stressed global order find in it much inspiration.
While Putin emphasizes Russia’s desire to have constructive relations with all parts of the world, from the United States to China, Latin America to Southeast Asia, and avoids threatening retaliation in response to actions he criticizes (including NATO’s missile defense plans), both the tone and theme of his comments represent a throwback to the hard line speech he gave to the Munich Security Conference in 2007. That is how the article will likely resonate within Western governments.
His mind appears to be principally on three things: what he sees as the principal threat to Russian interests—although not necessarily framed as a threat to Russian security. It is a dual challenge raised by the West and, in particular, the United States. One half of the threat is NATO and the United States’ disregard for Russian concerns as they go about their military plans coupled with their readiness to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs (their “political engineering” projects, as he calls it). The other half stems from these countries’ willingness to intervene militarily in the Arab Middle East and wherever they believe so-called humanitarian interventionism justifies it.
His second focus is on positioning Russia in a global setting where the West remains important, but power is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific. Without suggesting that Russia can afford to turn its back on Europe and the United States, he stresses the rising importance of BRICS—now with an “S,” because he adds South Africa. He implies that not only can Russia increase its leverage in international affairs by collaborating with these states, but that his country’s values are more in tune with theirs.
But it is his third concern that seems to be central: namely, a preoccupation with gaining economic advantage in a turbulent global economy–a world in which the European economic anchor for Russia’s external economic relations is in deep trouble, and the Asia-Pacific beckons as an economic opportunity, but one that Russia is not well-placed to seize.
Each of these three concerns raises important questions that he does not answer and for which he may not have an answer. In the case of the first, does Russia really want to see itself alienated from the values that animate Western culture (of which Russia is historically so much a part), simply because he and his team do not like the human rights standards that Europe and the United States urge on Russia—standards that a growing portion of Russian citizens insist on as well? Granted Putin’s legitimate concern over the unknown consequences when outside powers intervene against violent regimes, such as that in Syria, should the emphasis be exclusively on what Russia objects to in Western behavior as opposed to how the international community can act together to deal with the chaos and violence erupting in this part of the world?
As for the “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific—a phrase he borrows from Hilary Clinton—Putin evidently does not see this as an alternative to a Western option, but does he view it as a way of balancing Russia’s western option, that is, a way of generating leverage in dealing with Europe and, above all, the United States? Or does he envisage it as complementary—as the basis for a constructive synergy between an ever more positive relationship within the Euro-Atlantic region and an ever more elaborate relationship with Russia’s Asia neighbors? Indeed, has he even thought through the implications of these choices?
Third, when it comes to reorienting Russia’s international economic priorities, how far and fast does he think Russia can go, when its energy market dependency will for the foreseeable future be on Europe and when the foreign investment requirements that Russia has can only be met by the West? Moreover, since the prospect of incorporating Russia into the economic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region will require adapting and modernizing Russia’s Far East to these processes, is he developing a viable, concrete strategy for achieving this? Beyond this challenge, how ready is Russia to enlist in the priority that ASEAN and much of APEC now assign to economic integration, not merely to trade and investment cooperation, when it has yet to resolve how it intends to relate to the more advanced process of integration to its West?
There is a fourth area that is surprisingly missing from the February 27 article—viz., any serious discussion of Russia’s relations with its immediate post-Soviet neighbors. That, intentionally or not, may be a healthy thing. It avoids what is often a sour subject when dealing with Europe and the United States and a prickly subject with many of the neighbors themselves. And it spares him from dwelling on futuristic and ill-formed ideas like his October proposal for a Eurasian Union.
At the same time, there are minor encouraging notes in his commentary, such as not ruling out the possibility of reaching an agreement on missile defense cooperation and a readiness to pursue further arms control measures with the United States; a positive reading of Russia’s accession to the WTO and a commitment to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty. Still, the essay is dominated by grumbling over the way Russia is being treated by the outside world and a testy warning that Russia will not be pushed around. When it comes to the guidelines Russia means to follow “in a changing world,” there is a considerable element of wanting to have one’s cake and eat it too. Coming from the United States, a country whose leaders have on more than one occasion been guilty of the same, I can attest that this serves policy very poorly—and is certainly not solid ground on which to build a coherent and sustainable foreign policy strategy.
