Eurasian Perspective
Consequences of the Iran War for the United States, China, and Russia
Valdai Discussion Club Conference Hall, Tsvetnoy Boulevard 16/1, Moscow, Russia
List of speakers

On April 23, 2026, the Valdai Club hosted an expert discussion titled "Great Power Relations After the War in Iran". Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club, was the moderator.

Jennifer Kavanagh, Senior Fellow and Director of Military Analysis at Defence Priorities think tank (USA), noted that despite tactical success, the Iran war represents a strategic defeat for the United States. As a result, in the short term, its behaviour on the international stage will be even more unpredictable and destabilising. However, in the long term, there is hope that the US will play a more constructive role. Historically, the current situation is not unique in many ways. Since World War II, the US has carried out dozens of military interventions, including in the Middle East. Most of them were unnecessary and driven by ideology or artificially inflated threats. Most of them were also unsuccessful, both for the United States itself and for the countries in whose affairs it intervened. The war in Iran has much in common. Its goals cannot be achieved through military force. Moreover, for the Iranians, this is an existential conflict, while for the United States it is not, making Washington's position untenable: Trump needs a quick victory, while Iran is prepared to fight forever. Essentially, it boils down to a battle of wills, in which Tehran has the advantage. Ultimately, it's not just America that bears the brunt, but the entire world, which suffers from the destabilisation of the international situation. However, there are also unique aspects to what's happening. First, the United States is no longer what it once was; its resource and military capabilities are limited, and the population is war-weary and unwilling to "rally around the flag." Second, new technologies have "democratised" access to military power. For the United States, this is a new state of affairs, and they don't yet know how to cope with it. Third, the world is shifting to multipolarity, and in this new environment, the United States can no longer act without resistance or make major foreign policy mistakes without facing consequences. According to Kavanagh, this could lead to the United States becoming more willing to adapt to a multipolar world, exercise restraint, and reconsider its strategic approaches.

The war with Iran is a typical war of choice, as most analysts believe there was no immediate threat to the United States from Iran, according to Zhao Minghao, a Professor and Deputy Director of the Centre for American Studies at Fudan University and a China Forum expert. He believes Donald Trump's decision to attack Iran was largely motivated by personal considerations and aimed at repairing his image, which had been damaged for domestic political reasons. Moreover, even the American political elite remains divided regarding the reasons for this decision. Furthermore, there is a clear gap between the US's declared renunciation of regime change attempts in other countries and the actual policies it is pursuing. Addressing the international implications of the crisis, the researcher emphasised that Trump's actions against Venezuela and Iran, important energy partners for China, will seriously impact the dynamics of relations between Washington and Beijing. He also noted the reluctance of US allies to support this aggression and the dissatisfaction of Gulf elites that, due to what they see as reckless US policies, their countries have become targets for Iranian missiles. Against this backdrop, Trump's visit to China promises to be a challenge, especially since many link the American president's military operations to his confrontational policy toward China and perceive them as a continuation of Washington's expansionist course, Zhao Minghao concluded.

Nelson Wong, Vice President of the Shanghai-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, discussed China's reaction to the current situation. According to him, it appears relatively calm because the Chinese are generally not inclined to react impulsively—it doesn't fit their national character. China is generally peace-loving and prone to restraint. Nevertheless, instability in the Middle East and the problems of long-standing partners like Iran are not at all encouraging for Beijing, especially since it has invested significant resources in developing the region's infrastructure and is seriously counting on local markets. Despite this, Wong remains optimistic about the future of relations between the great powers—China, Russia, and the United States. He doesn't foresee major military conflicts between them in the foreseeable future. The United States, he believes, will eventually retreat, curtail its expansionist policies, and abandon its "war economy." As for China and Russia, they must jointly create a security structure for Asia.

Andrey Kortunov, Research Director at the Russian International Affairs Council (2023–2025), refuted the widespread idea that Russia should be considered one of the beneficiaries of the conflict. Despite the situational and tactical advantages he acknowledges, the problems associated with this war, in his opinion, clearly outweigh them. In particular, Iran is Russia's strategic partner, and although Moscow is not obligated to provide military assistance, it may be uncomfortable seeing it attacked and not possess the ability to assist it. Moreover, if the conflict drags on and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, the world could slide into a recession, which would also affect Russia. One should also not forget the “Pandora's Box” effect of the arms race and nuclear proliferation, including the collapse of the NPT regime in its current form. Furthermore, Kortunov believes that being forced to choose sides is the worst thing that could happen to Russia in the Middle East, as its main strength in the region lies in its ability to maintain balance, something the current conflict significantly complicates. Kortunov also considers the question of what lessons Russia could learn from these events. The crisis has paradoxically demonstrated that, despite fragmentation, the world remains global, and countries are interconnected and interdependent. It would be a mistake to think that regionalisation has finally triumphed over globalisation, he argued.