The stalled Washington agreement between the DRC and Rwanda highlights the limited effectiveness of Trump’s “transactional diplomacy” as a tool for resolving “hot” regional conflicts. By granting the US access to the national mining sector in exchange for promises of peace, Kinshasa receives no reliable guarantees that the conflict will end, writes Irina Yutyayeva, a participant of the Valdai – New Generation project.
On June 27, 2025, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed an agreement in Washington, designed to end hostilities in the eastern provinces of the DRC and legitimise Rwanda’s economic presence in the region. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the day historic and was quick to dub Donald Trump “the president of peace.” However, the implementation of the agreement soon ran into difficulties. On December 4, the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda, Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame, signed a joint declaration reaffirming their commitment to implementing the agreement. However, shortly thereafter, militants intensified their offensive in eastern Congo. As a result, the security situation in the Great Lakes region continues to deteriorate.
The conflict between the two countries dates back to the 1990s, when, following the Rwandan genocide, tens of thousands of Tutsis fled the country, and were later joined by approximately two million Hutus doing the same. Many refugees settled in the eastern provinces of the neighbouring DRC (North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri), where Hutus and Tutsis have lived since the Belgian colonial era. Some Hutus who had fled to the DRC subsequently formed the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, which waged armed resistance against the Rwandan government and also attacked Congolese Tutsis (Banyamulenge). In 2006, with Rwandan support, the National Congress for the Defence of the People was established in the DRC. It accused Kinshasa of failing to ensure the security of the Banyamulenge and seized control of part of North Kivu. Following the agreement of March 23, 2009, the rebels were integrated into the Congolese army, but in 2012, they accused the government of violating the agreement, seceded and formed the March 23 Movement (M23).
In 2021, M23 resumed its activities with the support of Rwanda. Kinshasa saw this as an attempt by Kigali to gain control of coltan and cobalt mining operations in the eastern provinces of the DRC. Kigali, in turn, accused its neighbour of discriminating against the Banyamulenge and collaborating with Rwandan rebels.
UN peacekeepers have been deployed in the DRC for a quarter of a century, but they have failed to achieve lasting stabilisation. Since 2022, regional mediation efforts have been underway within the framework of the Nairobi and Luanda processes, involving the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the African Union (AU), but they have been poorly coordinated and have failed to de-escalate the conflict. In early 2025, M23, supported by Rwandan troops, captured Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North and South Kivu, respectively. UN Security Council Resolution 2773 strongly condemned the M23 advance. On March 18, the day talks between the DRC government and M23 were scheduled to take place in Luanda, the presidents of the DRC and Rwanda, Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame, met in Doha and announced an immediate ceasefire, a move that came as a complete surprise to the mediators. Angolan Foreign Minister Tete António expressed surprise and emphasised that “all efforts to resolve the conflict are welcome, but African problems require African solutions.” Luanda soon announced the end of its mediation efforts.
Following this, the United States suddenly intervened in the peace process, assuming the role of primary mediator in the preparation of a peace agreement between Kinshasa and Kigali. American diplomatic interest in the conflict is no coincidence: stable access to cobalt and coltan reserves are strategically important for the development of high-tech industries in the United States.
The agreement, signed on June 27 in Washington, obligated the DRC and Rwanda to cease support for armed groups and establish a joint security mechanism. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda were identified as the primary threat, while M23 was presumed to be included in the disarmament and reintegration process. Rwanda agreed to withdraw its troops in exchange for legal access to mineral resources in the eastern DRC through a regional economic mechanism (REM) operating “in partnership with the US government and American investors.” A Joint Oversight Committee, comprising the AU, Qatar, and the United States, has been established to monitor implementation.
With the exception of Angola’s demarche, the African countries have generally responded positively to the US/Qatari initiative. Kenya called their participation “a key factor in its success,” while Algeria praised the agreement as “an important step toward restoring peace and security.”
To a certain extent, Washington hedged against accusations of neo-colonialism by ensuring consultations with the AU and inviting it to the Joint Oversight Committee. At all stages, the organisation insisted on maintaining African leadership in the negotiation process, but also acknowledged the constructive contributions of external players. AU Commission Chair Mahmoud Ali Yusuf, who was present at the signing of the agreement in Washington, praised the role of the US and Qatar in achieving consensus. The UN structures also responded positively: Secretary-General António Guterres, High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi and the acting head of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC, Vivian van de Perre, welcomed the signing of the agreement and commended the mediators for their efforts. The International Contact Group for the Great Lakes Region, which brings together the United States, the EU, and several non-member European states, also gave a positive assessment. Russia and China welcomed the ceasefire agreement, emphasising the role of regional organisations and the UN, as well as respect for the territorial integrity of the DRC.
On July 19 in Doha, the DRC and M23 authorities signed a declaration of principles aimed at ending the fighting. The parties agreed to a ceasefire, facilitating the return of refugees, and engaging in an "inclusive dialogue" to address the root causes of the conflict. The parties have yet to reach a full peace agreement, although they were able to agree on a list of measures necessary to achieve one.
At first glance, the US and Qatar achieved a quick settlement, but implementation of the Washington agreement immediately ran into difficulties. First, the M23 did not withdraw from the occupied territories, and the ceasefire declaration lacked clear parameters for the withdrawal of forces. Second, the agreement does not include a plan for security sector reform in the DRC, the absence of which has undermined the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping efforts for many years. Third, the document does not stipulate accountability for M23 fighters for crimes committed, which could send the wrong signal to other armed groups involved in the conflict.
The economic component of the deal is no less controversial. The REM presupposes coordination by the United States, effectively placing the DRC’s mining sector under external control. Development of processing capacity within Congo itself is not envisaged, so key stages of the production chain will likely remain outside the country. Potential costs include the loss of economic sovereignty and increased dependence on natural resource exports.
The economic component of the deal, finalized in December, is no less controversial. The REM envisages US coordination, effectively placing the DRC’s mining sector under external management. Although the document declares “full sovereign control” of the parties over their resources and emphasizes the importance of developing processing capacities within African countries, no corresponding guarantees are included. Potential costs include the loss of economic sovereignty and increased dependence on natural resource exports.
Trump presented the essence of the REM in a highly pragmatic manner: “We’re getting, for the United States, a lot of the mineral rights from the Congo as part of it.” This not only reflects the American president’s personal style but is also evidence of a shift in American policy toward Africa. While in the 2000s and 2010s, US influence in Africa was largely built on “soft power,” now, in the face of growing competition with Russia and China, Washington is seeking quick results and increasingly prefers a “carrot and stick” tactic, alternating threats of sanctions with promises of financial support.
The Washington agreement fits in with other attempts by Trump to resolve complex conflicts through investment. Previous attempts included the “Deal of the Century” for Palestine, the Abraham Accords between Israel and Arab countries, and the 2020 Serbia-Kosovo initiative. However, in the DRC, this is not about diplomatic normalisation, but a “hot” conflict with features of a regional proxy war. Security is paramount here, and the US cannot guarantee it without leverage over the parties to the conflict. However, without sustainable peace, the business portion of the agreement risks remaining unimplemented.
Washington expects to derive not only economic but also geopolitical benefits from the deal. Trump’s peacekeeping initiative is designed to strengthen the US position in the region and weaken the influence of China, the largest investor in the DRC’s mining sector. The implementation of the REM is linked to the development of the Lobito transport corridor, which Washington is using to contain China's presence in Africa.
As a result, the DRC is left with a fragile peace without mechanisms to maintain it, handing de facto control over the mining sector to the US. It is unlikely that such a radical American solution is suitable for this and other long-standing African problems. One can only hope that regional mediators will remain vigilant and will be able to return to the forefront of the settlement process when the “president of peace” loses interest in this conflict.
