By shifting to informal channels and a tight-knit group of advisors, the president gains personal control and pace but undermines the institutional support needed for long-term success. His tough stance, disconnected from traditional structures, fails to translate into sustainable results. Rather than a deliberative process of refining options, management is now defined by real-time decisions based on speed and loyalty, writes Natalia Tsvetkova, Acting Director of the Arbatov Institute of the USA and Canada at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Donald Trump’s foreign policy is defined by personal diplomacy and a disruptive “first impulse” that can rapidly change the course of conflicts and negotiations. The sustainability of these outcomes, however, is consistently uncertain, because they lack an institutional framework or “docking”. This analysis provides a new outlook on Donald Trump’s foreign policy decision-making and personal diplomacy, and shows how the president’s foreign policy style creates channels for conflict resolution, which would seem to be institutionalized and lead to the long-term consolidation of the White House’s achievements. However, this is happening only partially in US foreign policy.
President Donald Trump’s Management Style and White House Adhocracy
The first and second administrations of Donald Trump have been characterized by a pronounced personalization of the foreign policy process and attempts to break free from the bureaucratic constraints of traditional diplomacy and decision-making. Trump has consistently demonstrated impatience with established procedures and showed little inclination to utilize standard diplomatic mechanisms. His management style resembles that of a family business, prioritizing loyalty and immediate results over institutional norms.
During his second tenure, Trump has successfully established an “adhocracy” – a decentralized, horizontal system built on direct contacts between the president and a rotating cast of personally selected advisers. In this system, those who support the president’s views and demonstrate tangible success thrive, while those who disagree or are deemed disloyal are quickly removed. This dynamic was clearly evidenced during his first term, when the president sought to reshape the traditional foreign policy apparatus to suit his personal style, an effort that necessitated the frequent replacement of advisors, including the high-profile dismissals of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and National Security Advisor John Bolton.
Today, Trump has managed to assemble one of the most loyal teams and form a very narrow circle of trusted persons, including family members and personal emissaries. Moreover, the president has encouraged competition among advisers in both his first and second terms, which has allowed him to quickly obtain high-quality expertise on foreign policy issues. For example, in dealing with Ukraine, Trump employed unofficial representatives (including his personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani) in the first administration, and today – trusted emissaries who have conducted and are conducting parallel diplomacy, bypassing official channels. On the North Korean track, the US State Department and the National Security Council have competed, which has allowed the president to receive a set of options for making a decision.
However, from the point of view of institutionalization of the process, such approaches often lead to a gap between the president’s line and the position of institutions, weakening the long-term consolidation of the results of personal diplomacy. At the end of his first term, Donald Trump demanded the creation of a small National Security Council apparatus, formed from loyal experts ready to carry out the president’s instructions. As a result, the NSC “dried up”, and today we see a continuation of this policy with a strict optimization of the State Department and a number of other structures in the US foreign policy mechanism. On the one hand, Trump has always been a supporter of the “honest broker” model (the approach of Scowcroft and other famous advisers to past presidents), according to which the national security adviser brings together all the departments’ positions and conscientiously presents them to the president. However, in practice, the main function of Donald Trump’s foreign policy apparatus often comes down not to discussion, but to the implementation of the president’s aspirations.
Today, Trump has managed to adapt the bureaucratic apparatus to his own needs. For example, the barriers between the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council have been eliminated, which has strengthened the focus of force in the foreign policy contour and policy. Decisions and signals are often sent down to the level of deputy departments, where loyalty and efficiency outweigh the traditional interdepartmental struggle. Trump has, at the same time, built network diplomacy among trusted persons. Special envoys and emissaries act in parallel, while the vice president and key advisers increase public and negotiating pressure. Unlike the first administration, this Trumpian system of decision-making and the resolution of global conflicts looks like a more rigid institutionalization of the president’s personal style.
The president’s shift to informal channels and a narrow circle of trusted persons gives his decisions a personal colouring and a high pace, but weakens the mechanisms that should support the achievements of the White House in the long term. His pressure diplomacy needs institutional support or “docking”. Without a connection with traditional institutions, the president’s tough posturing does not translate into stable combinations. If Trump’s diplomacy is not supported by a contractual architecture (as in a number of episodes in Ukraine), the effect of pressure dissipates. Moreover, a loyal but narrow club of advisers creates the risk of “groupthink”: advisers dependent on the mood of the leader are more inclined to conformism than to put forward solutions that differ from that of the president.
Concepts that explain Trump’s behavioural contour: neorealism, pressure diplomacy, groupthink, and docking
Trump’s actions to resolve conflicts fit into theories in the field of international relations, as well as foreign policy analysis. His key intellectual driver is neorealism. Trump’s political doctrine is based on a picture of the world as a zero-sum game, where external relations are threats, and economic nationalism is aimed at achieving deals and making relative gains.
From the point of view of theories of diplomatic practice, this is a diplomacy of pressure (or bullying): threats and deliberately harsh demands are used as a tool to disorient the opponent and force concessions. This logic explains a significant number of Trump’s steps – from pressure on NATO to making tough demands of Ukraine or Iran. The ideological framework of such diplomacy is normatively formalized. The documents of the National Security Council record the installation of maximum pressure (on Iran). This strategic document formed the framework for force and quasi-force instruments.
Concepts of foreign policy analysis provide a clear idea of President Trump’s foreign policy style. Trump’s actions fit into the presidential model of the decision-making process, in which the leader’s personality, his values, cognitive abilities and ideas about control over advisers have a significant impact on planning and the final decision. In analysing the decisions of 2025, it is important to consider three levels of the decision-making process. The first level is the individual (personal convictions and the presidential team’s management style), the second is the small group level (the dynamics of the inner circle and the risk of conformism), and the third is the institutional-bureaucratic level (rules and procedures, filters and experts). All of this together helps explain why certain decisions were made. In Trump’s case, the individual level often dominates. Interaction with a narrow circle of advisers and the president’s aspirations play a disproportionately large role, while institutional formats are weakened, which creates the reality we observe: the president acts spontaneously, using unofficial channels, but receiving support from a loyal team. Trump’s foreign policy decision-making process creates conditions for quick and unconventional steps, but complicates the important docking of the president’s personal steps with domestic and international institutions. The term “docking” refers to the long-term consolidation of the impulsive diplomatic steps of the president’s team in the architecture of conflict resolution.
In other words, the president’s impulse decisions, such as a sudden truce or kicking off summit of leaders, as in Alaska in August 2025, must somehow be anchored in traditional pillars – institutions, treaties and guarantees. Without this, the effect of Trump’s diplomacy is very short-lived, as we see in the example of the Israel-Iran diplomatic track. Several criteria can be identified, the presence of which indicates that Trump’s detente may (or may not) turn into a lasting peace.
The first criterion concerns de-escalation. Trump is skilfully negotiating the terms of the ceasefire. However, further measures are needed to reduce tensions. Consistent de-escalation allows Trump’s first impulse not to fade away, but to develop into a full-fledged settlement. However, among all the peace deals announced by Donald Trump, there is no stable trend towards a complete end to the conflict.
The second criterion is the so-called coalition anchor. The involvement of a wide range of external actors, including international organisations, leading powers and regional associations, acts as a guarantor of long-term peace and creates additional inertia: the more parties invest resources in the peace process, the more difficult it is for it to fail. However, Donald Trump’s diplomacy follows the “America First” doctrine, which does not allow him to form broad coalitions to resolve conflicts. An example is the situation around Ukraine and Europe, where NATO countries are not integrated into the president’s plans to resolve the conflict in the way that Europeans are accustomed to.
The third criterion for consolidating the successes of personal diplomacy is usually the verification regime. The creation of a mechanism for monitoring and controlling agreements – joint commissions, inspections, data exchange – increases trust. Without monitoring, any pause in hostilities is fragile. And in the example of the settlement of the Israel-Iran conflict, we see a situation where any ceasefires reached are introduced without a long-term verification regime, which makes them fragile.
The fourth criterion is the institutionalization of agreements. The formal consolidation of accords – through treaties, resolutions, or even detailed roadmaps – establishes joint institutions and secures the achievements of personal diplomacy. However, Trump’s impulse to resolve conflicts often neglects this legal and organizational groundwork. Very few of his agreements are translated into legally binding instruments ratified by all parties. As a result, the outcomes of his personal diplomacy remain fragile and can easily be ignored or reversed.
The fifth criterion is the elimination of a conflict’s root causes. In parallel with de-escalation, the parties usually formulate the key contentious issues that underlie the confrontation. If the resolution of fundamental differences becomes the central objective of diplomacy, then the risk of the situation rolling back to what it had been previously decreases. Trump’s diplomacy risks being only a respite before the resumption of conflicts, when accumulated problems spill out again. Any diplomatic impulse must be accompanied by negotiations on the essence of the conflict, and not limited to a superficial freezing of the status quo, which, for example, Russia constantly talks about with regards to Europe.
The sixth criterion crucial to institutionalizing diplomacy, particularly of Trump’s variety, is domestic legitimization. For any agreement to endure, it must be approved by key domestic actors – the parliament or the elites – and integrated into national legislation. Trump’s ad-hoc diplomatic style routinely fails to secure this foundation. His moves are often met with public scepticism abroad (e.g., in India or Pakistan) and resistance from establishment elites at home. This internal conflict was recently illustrated by a Politico columnist’s attack on Witkoff’s diplomacy efforts and Vice President Vance’s strongly-worded response to its author.
These six elements are capable of “docking” Trump’s initial diplomatic breakthroughs. What we see in the examples of India-Pakistan, Rwanda-DRC, Cambodia-Thailand, Israel-Iran, Egypt-Ethiopia, etc. shows that the momentum is there and the channels are open, but the sustainability of conflict resolution is uneven. In many cases, docking is absent, and the result of Trump’s efforts may be ephemeral. When legal support, monitoring, and coalition guarantees are in place, the chances of the long-term consolidation of results will be higher.
Conflict Resolutions: Donald Trump’s Algorithm
Let’s look at the most revealing trajectory of Donald Trump’s impulsive diplomacy, with regard to Israel and Iran. Direct confrontation between Israel and Iran escalated during the second Trump administration following the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal, political changes in Syria, and overall rising tensions. In the second half of 2025, there was a new surge. Israel launched a series of strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure facilities, to which Tehran responded with missile attacks on Israel. For 12 days, the region teetered on the brink of a major war. The Trump administration claimed that it was thanks to its efforts that the conflict was stopped. A ceasefire was declared between the parties at the end of June. Moreover, the US itself used force, striking key facilities in Iran, after which, as Trump claimed, Tehran’s nuclear potential was significantly limited. Thus, the impulse was twofold: military (US intervention at the request of an ally) and diplomatic (the initiative for a ceasefire).
The channels of settlement were personalist in nature. President Trump acted through direct contacts with the Prime Minister of Israel, but there was no full-fledged dialogue with the Iranian side. The actual formula looked like this: Washington convinces Israel to stop after achieving a number of military goals, while simultaneously deterring Iran with the threat of further strikes. This was a coercion to peace, reminiscent of force arbitration. The United States acted as a guarantor of the pause, remaining on the side of the ally, but controlling the scale of its actions and signalling to the enemy the price of escalation.
However, the truce was not secured by written agreements: the parties essentially returned to the status quo. Iran stopped conducting missile strikes, and Israel stopped bombing. If before the escalation the prospect of resuming negotiations on the nuclear agenda was discussed, then after the crisis these discussions froze. The truce was tactical in nature. The root causes of the conflict – Iran’s nuclear ambitions, proxy confrontation with Israel in Syria and Lebanon, ideological hostility – remained unresolved. Ultimately, without docking in the form of multilateral efforts and a verifiable contractual architecture, the next escalation is a matter of time. This case shows the limits of Donald Trump’s impulsive approach. A power deal, or rather stopping a war without addressing the problems, gives a short-term effect. We have seen several weeks of silence, but strategically, this Trump deal did not solve anything.
The same situation developed during Trump’s first administration amid his negotiations with North Korea. Trump achieved spectacular pictures, even declarations, but failed to turn his successes into irreversible achievements.
An example of effective institutionalization in Trump’s diplomacy is the 2020 Abraham Accords on the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. The agreements received a formal legal framework and relied on the support of the United States and a number of regional players. The institutional form and mutual benefit ensured the viability of Trump’s diplomacy.
Conclusion
Why is Trump unable to institutionalize his accords? His decision-making style leads to the fact that the management contour becomes excessively narrow. If the president’s management contour is based on institutional consensus and well-developed expertise, then his diplomatic efforts are capable of generating decisions with a long-term effect. But, again, under Trump the emphasis is on personal intuition and a narrow circle of advisers. Instead of a multi-stage selection and polishing of solution options, management occurs in real time, the main elements being speed and loyalty to the leader’s course.
The traditional bureaucratic process for which the US political system is renowned may appear slow, but it is precisely this mechanism that ensures the thorough recording and preservation of diplomatic achievements. This system filters the president’s impulses, transforming them into coordinated plans that secure allied support and account for potential consequences. While Trump’s approach generates a high pace of action, the strength of his outcomes remains fragile. In contrast, the traditional foreign policy apparatus, though deliberate, guarantees the sustainable consolidation of results.
The Donald Trump administration demonstrates a unique style of decision-making and implementation: decisions are made through personal channels, often informally, bypassing traditional institutions. This allows for sudden breakthroughs – ceasefires, summits, declarative agreements. However, without integrating these breakthroughs into permanent peace mechanisms, their effect remains temporary. Where the momentum is supplemented by structural steps, as in the case of the 2020 Middle East agreements, there is a chance to consolidate the agreements. Where only tactical manoeuvre remains, a reverse wave occurs: a pause is replaced by a relapse (as the cases of Rwanda-DRC or Israel-Iran show).
Donald Trump’s foreign policy style of conflict resolution can be described as follows: he moves the conflict forward, but does not close the issue. High tempo, pressure without a supporting structure create movement, which we are seeing both on the European track and in the Middle East, but in themselves do not lead to a final resolution of the situation.
The lesson that Trump’s style brings to the analysis of diplomacy and foreign policy decision-making is simple: personal diplomacy must be complemented by institutional peacebuilding. Unconventional moves can break a deadlock, but sustainable peace requires de-escalation, coalition engagement, verification regimes, and legal fixation. Without these, even the most powerful Trumpian impulses fade away, leaving no lasting trace.
