If we imagine that the “Trump spring” consisted of two parts – the hope for the collapse of the unfair world order and a hope for peacemaking, then its first component, since in reality it turned out to be purely American-centric, rather pushed public opinion in other countries away from Trump than brought it closer to him. As for the second component of the “Trump spring”, its peacemaking potential, it was connected mainly not with the whole world, but with the two countries, Oleg Barabanov writes.
Recently, in connection with the drastic actions of US President Donald Trump on the world stage and his radical departure from traditional US priorities in global politics, the topic of changing the world order has once again acquired particular relevance. Sometimes there is a temptation to even characterise Trump's actions and plans as a global revolution or a kind of “Trump Spring”.
We have already addressed the analysis of world political incentives and constraints Trump has witnessed in implementing his policies on the Valdai Club website. The first “victims” (albeit partly rhetorical) for Trump were his closest NATO allies. Trump lobbied for the decision to raise the share of defence spending in the GDP of other NATO members, he openly declared territorial claims to NATO allies Canada and Denmark, and he has exerted trade pressure on the EU - all this is unlikely to win him supporters among the authorities of the allied countries. Their key task now is to try to somehow calm Trump down, but nothing more. Furthermore, after Trump’s announced plans to increase trade tariffs for most countries, regardless of whether they are US allies or not, he lost political supporters among the authorities of developing countries.
In this regard, the assessment of public expectations in different countries regarding Trump’s policies is of particular interest, since the reaction of the authorities is one thing, and society may think differently.
The results of a Pew Research Center survey published in mid-June, conducted in 24 countries, show the following dynamics of public opinion regarding Donald Trump's policies. The majority of respondents in the US NATO allied countries expressed negative opinions about him. According to the data, 77% of respondents in Canada distrust Trump, 62% in Great Britain, 78% in France, 81% in Germany, 68% in Italy, and 60% in Poland. Hungary stands out here, with the majority of respondents (53%) trusting Trump. In Latin America, too, in the three countries where the survey was conducted, the majority do not trust Trump: 91% in Mexico (the highest percentage against Trump among the countries where the survey was conducted), 62% in Argentina, and 61% in Brazil. The situation is more mixed in other regions of the world. In Israel 69% trust Trump (quite naturally), and he scores high in India (52% approval), in Nigeria (79%,the highest result among all the countries where the survey was conducted), and in Kenya (64%). On the other hand, there is a preponderance of distrust in Japan (61%), Indonesia (62%), South Korea (67%), Turkey (80%) and South Africa (54%). The survey was not conducted in Russia and China.
Naturally, in the context of popular public distrust toward official data, one should not blindly trust sociological surveys. They also quite often become a tool in political struggle, and in this case they could well become one for Trump's opponents both inside and outside the US. But if we assume that everything is in order with the representativeness of this survey, that it was actually conducted, as it should be in unbiased sociology, among supporters of various political forces (which may be questionable), if we trust these figures, then they require an explanation.
The reasons for such results, naturally, vary from country to country. But they can also trace common patterns. One of them is that even if we consider Trump a global revolutionary, breaking the unpleasant and unfair world order, in his real foreign policy he is unlikely to think about replacing it with a more just and representative one. His fight against the dominance of the global financial oligarchy is also unlikely to pursue these noble goals. It is aimed at only one thing - to strengthen the economic power of the United States in the world by any means – to make America great again, so that its allies stop being parasites, prospering for free at American expense – and nothing more. To think otherwise was, perhaps, one of the illusions of the “Trump spring”.
As a result, we repeat, if we believe the representativeness of the survey, the residents of many countries, primarily in Europe and the Americas, could see in Trump a threat not just to the old world and national order (to which, it seems, many citizens of these countries are sceptical, and the result of which is the successful performance of non-systemic parties in the elections), but a threat to their own wallets. After all, where will Canada and the European countries get 5% of GDP for defence? From other budget programmes, social ones etc. In Latin America, the situation is different, but the possibility of loopholes for emigration to the United States and trade concessions are also a key point; Trump's pressure here also hits personal interests.
The majority being for Trump in Hungary is an interesting precedent. It can probably be explained by the fact that the fatigue with the EU and EU hypocrisy in Hungary exceeds personal fears of their situation worsening if Trump really starts a trade war with the EU. Of course, Hungary will also suffer from this. But this threat is perceived as less significant than the current dissatisfaction with the established European order. If we leave out the aforementioned Israel and Russia, then Hungary appears as the only country to which Trump has done nothing good, but which is still for him, because it believes that Trump’s opponents in the EU are even worse. This is where the potential for external public support for Trump’s policy is visible. The only question is whether Hungary will remain the only such exception, or others will follow.
How can we explain the advantage in Trump’s favour in India? He is also going to introduce new tariffs against India. Perhaps, public support here comes from the understanding that the key target for Trump’s pressure in Asia is not India, but China. Here the principle “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” is already starting to work. Or (as partly in the case of Hungary) the majority for Trump is explained by the fact that now in power in India there are political forces with a similar spectrum, which profess economic nationalism which is similar to Trump’s. Then we can talk about an “alliance of right-wing nationalists”, about the maturation of that very “Trumpist international”, the actual absence of which is a key limitation for external political support for Trump's global plans.
As for Africa, the rejection of Trump in South Africa is quite understandable. South Africa has become one of the main targets for Trump’s pressure and criticism. It seems that Elon Musk, a native of South Africa, could have played a role here. But of particular interest is the support of Trump in other large African countries - Nigeria and Kenya. There may be a range of explanations here. One is related to the perception of Trump as a “strong man”, which is important. The other is that most African countries are unlikely to be the primary target for Trump’s trade pressure. His target is precisely Africa’s formal colonial masters in Europe. Which, naturally, evokes support in Africa. Plus, the US-Africa summit in July, according to the entire scenography of such events, should include not only a stick (as with Europe), but also a carrot. Finally, another motive is possible, related to a certain jealousy towards South Africa among other large African countries. The fact that Trump attacked South Africa specifically, according to this logic, may add to his sympathy in other countries.
Thus, if we imagine that the “Trump spring” consisted of two parts - the hope for the collapse of the unfair world order and a hope for peacemaking, then its first component, since in reality it turned out to be purely American-centric, rather pushed public opinion in other countries away from Trump than brought it closer to him. The exclusion of Hungary so far only confirms the rule that the fear of the new turns out to be stronger than dissatisfaction with existing injustice and hypocrisy, to which societies in different countries have somehow adapted. But, as they say, apart from Trump, I have no other world revolutionaries for you. Does this mean that his revolution is doomed? We'll see.
As for the second component of the “Trump spring”, its peacemaking potential, it was connected mainly not with the whole world, but with the two aforementioned countries. But they, at least for today, stand apart in the global Trumpist project.
