Oleg Barabanov, programme director of the Valdai Discussion Club, ponders the shifting dynamics of UNGA votes on the conflict in Ukraine, highlighting telling changes in the tone of the annual resolution, as well as pointing out new developments in the voting patterns of UN member states—both those that are close to Russia and those hostile towards Moscow.
On February 24, 2026, the fourth anniversary of the conflict in Ukraine, the United Nations General Assembly once again convened its Eleventh Emergency Special Session. This emergency session was institutionalised following the outbreak of the conflict and is convened periodically, typically at Ukraine’s initiative. On this occasion, Ukraine once again submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly (document A/ES-11/L.17). It was adopted as resolution A/RES/ES-11/10. The voting results were as follows: 107 in favour, 12 against, 51 abstentions, and 23 not voting.
Previously, within the framework of expert analysis at the Valdai Discussion Club, we have repeatedly reviewed voting outcomes in the UN General Assembly. In particular, we examined the voting behaviour of BRICS member states and partners on resolutions against Russia and Iran, voting in the General Assembly and the Security Council on the conflict in Ukraine in February 2025, voting by African states on anti-Russian resolutions, voting on Israel and Palestine, and, in historical perspective, voting against the USSR on Afghanistan in the 1980s. The most recent of these studies concerned the results of a vote on anti-Russian and anti-Iranian resolutions in December 2025.
It is useful to compare the current vote with previous ones. Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, the General Assembly has adopted sixteen resolutions condemning Russia. Ten of these were adopted during the Eleventh Emergency Special Session: following the outbreak of the conflict (ES-11/1), on the humanitarian consequences of the conflict (ES-11/2), on suspending Russia from the UN Human Rights Council (ES-11/3), on the incorporation into the Russian Federation of four new regions (ES-11/4), on reparations (ES-11/5), on the return of Ukrainian children (ES-11/9), as well as resolutions adopted on the anniversaries of the outbreak of the conflict—in 2023 (ES-11/6), in 2025 (ES-11/7 and ES-11/8), and the present one in 2026 (ES-11/10). A further six resolutions were adopted during regular annual sessions of the General Assembly—on human rights in Crimea and the new territories (77/229, 78/221, 79/184, 80/223), on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (78/316), and on the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (80/111).
It may be noted that the number of votes in favour of the current resolution—107—exceeds the support received by all eight preceding resolutions adopted at the end of 2023, 2024, and 2025, which attracted between 78 and 99 votes in favour. The last time a higher number of votes was recorded was in February 2023, on the resolution marking the first anniversary of the conflict, which received 141 votes in favour.
Among the reasons for this noticeable increase in support is, inter alia, the comparatively less radical anti-Russian tone of the resolution text submitted by Ukraine on this occasion. If one compares it with the text introduced a year earlier by Ukraine and European countries (ES-11/7), all condemnation of Russia has now been confined to the preambular section, and is absent from the operative part, unlike last year’s text.
The resolution itself has become shorter and comparatively less emotionally charged. This year the preamble consists of four paragraphs, whereas a year ago there were twelve. The language is more restrained than previously. In particular, references to the non-recognition of territorial acquisitions obtained by force, to violations of the UN Charter, to decisions of the International Court of Justice, and to the destruction of food security, the global economy, and the environment have been removed. From the description of the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, separate references to “aggression” against women and children, to the destruction of mental health, and to psychological trauma for future generations have disappeared. Condemnation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the context of the conflict has also been omitted.
The operative section has likewise been significantly shortened—four paragraphs instead of ten. The first paragraph now “calls for an immediate, full and unconditional ceasefire between the Russian Federation and Ukraine”. There was no such provision a year ago. Two further paragraphs, in less emotive language than before, call for a “comprehensive, just and lasting peace”, and for the exchange of prisoners of war and other detained persons. A fourth paragraph is technical in nature, concerning the possibility of resuming meetings of the Eleventh Emergency Special Session.
In our previous analyses of General Assembly voting, we noted that over the past two and a half years something of a rule emerged—the more neutrally worded the draft resolution prepared by Ukraine, the greater the number of votes it receives. This was particularly evident in the case of the resolution on the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. At that time, it was supported by such partners of Russia as Kazakhstan, Armenia, India, Ethiopia, the UAE, and Vietnam, among others. Nevertheless, even that resolution received ten fewer votes than the current one—97 as compared with 107.
This difference may be explained by the present political environment, the ongoing negotiation process, and the expectations among a number of previously neutral states for an early end to the conflict. Within this logic, a vote in favour by some of these countries may be regarded primarily as a vote for an early peace, rather than a vote directed against Russia.
The voting results by different groups of states were as follows. Among Russia’s partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States—excluding Ukraine and Moldova—none voted in favour. The Russian Federation itself, as well as Belarus, voted against, while the others either abstained or did not vote. Among BRICS members, Egypt voted in favour—having previously voted in favour once after joining BRICS. Iran voted against. The remaining members abstained, including Ethiopia and China, which had previously often voted against. Among BRICS partners (apart from the aforementioned CIS states), Bolivia voted in favour—its first vote in favour during the four years of the conflict. Malaysia, Thailand, and Nigeria also voted in favour, having previously set precedents for votes in favour after being invited as BRICS partners. Cuba voted against, while Vietnam and Uganda abstained. Pakistan, a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, abstained.
Among other groups of states, it is notable that several countries which in recent years frequently abstained voted in favour. In Asia these included Jordan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Israel. Georgia voted in favour, having twice abstained, or not voted, in 2025. In Africa—Benin, Ghana, Zambia, Kenya, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Mauritius, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia voted in favour. In Latin America—Honduras, Paraguay, and Peru did so. In the Caribbean—Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago voted in favour. In Oceania—Nauru, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Tuvalu did likewise.
Conversely, among European states, the abstaining states were Hungary— a country that has, since 2025, mostly refrained from voting in solidarity with other EU members—and Serbia, that previously voted in favour in approximately half of cases. The United States also abstained. Since President Trump’s return to office, the United States has adopted a distinctive position: of the five resolutions in 2025, it voted against twice, abstained once, and voted in favour only twice. Other states that had previously generally voted in favour but now abstained or did not vote include the Seychelles—following a change of president in 2025—Malawi, Vanuatu, Kiribati, and Ecuador. In addition to the aforementioned Belarus, Iran, Cuba, and Russia, those voting against included the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Mali, Niger, Sudan, and Eritrea.
These are the results of the vote. Naturally, they should not be overstated or blown out of proportion. As is well known, resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly do not have binding force.
