The General Assembly vote on a resolution directed against a particular country does not always reflect the actual nature of other states’ relations with that country. Nevertheless, symbolic solidarity (or lack thereof) with a particular position on a particular state during a vote is also significant, writes Valdai Club Programme Director Oleg Barabanov.
December has traditionally been the month when the UN General Assembly adopts the bulk of its annual resolutions. Some of these are recurring resolutions, adopted regularly, year after year, sometimes for decades, while others address new topics.
Clearly, these resolutions are not binding under international law and are merely advisory in nature. Therefore, voting on them, unlike on binding UN Security Council resolutions, often has a symbolic character for many states. The General Assembly vote on a resolution directed against a particular country does not always reflect the actual nature of other states’ relations with that country. Nevertheless, symbolic solidarity (or lack thereof) with a particular position on a particular state during a vote is also significant. As part of our expert work at the Valdai Discussion Club, we have previously repeatedly analysed the results of votes in the UN General Assembly. In particular, the following topics were considered: votes of BRICS member states and partners on resolutions against Russia and Iran; votes in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on the Ukrainian conflict in February 2025; votes of African states on anti-Russian resolutions; votes on Israel and Palestine; as well as, in a historical context, the vote against the USSR on Afghanistan in the 1980s.
In December 2025, the UN General Assembly adopted three resolutions, to varying degrees, directed against Russia, and one resolution against Iran. At the regular 80th session of the UN General Assembly, resolutions 80/111 of 10 December 2025 on Chernobyl, 80/223 of 18 December 2025 on human rights in Crimea and the New Territories, and 80/222 of 18 December 2025 on human rights in Iran were adopted. In another format, during the resumed 11th special emergency session of the UN General Assembly, dedicated to the Ukrainian conflict, resolution ES-11/9 of 3 December 2025 on the return of Ukrainian children was adopted.
Since both Russia and Iran are BRICS member states, let us consider the extent to which solidarity among BRICS members is reflected in the votes on these resolutions. It should be noted that this solidarity within BRICS is traditionally enshrined in the annual BRICS summit declarations as a shared value of the BRICS countries. Starting in 2022, solidarity has been annually mentioned in these declarations as an integral part of the BRICS spirit. Let’s also consider how other countries voted on these resolutions. Let’s first examine the voting dynamics compared to previously adopted resolutions (twelve General Assembly resolutions have been adopted on Russia since February 2022), and note which countries changed their position in December 2025.
The resolution on the return of Ukrainian children was adopted with 91 votes in favour, 12 against, 57 abstentions, and 33 abstentions. This is the lowest number of votes in favour cast for resolutions of the 11th Special Emergency Session of the General Assembly. Previously, resolutions of the 11th session had received between 93 and 143 votes.
Of the BRICS members, South Africa voted in favour of the resolution (a first in its history; previously, South Africa always abstained on anti-Russian resolutions). Abstaining were India (it had always abstained previously), China (it had previously voted against six times), Brazil (it had previously voted in favour four times), the UAE (it had previously voted in favour four times, but never since joining BRICS), Egypt (it had previously voted in favour five times, including once after joining BRICS), Ethiopia (it had previously voted against three times), and Indonesia (it had previously voted in favour six times, including twice in February 2025, when it was already a BRICS member). Russia itself voted against (it had previously voted against all 12 times), as did Iran (it had previously voted against five times).
Of the BRICS partners, none voted for the resolution; abstaining were Kazakhstan (previously twice against), Uzbekistan (previously once against), Vietnam (previously once against), Malaysia (previously six times in favour, including twice in February 2025, when it was already a BRICS partner), Thailand (previously five times in favour, including twice in 2025, when it was already a BRICS partner), Nigeria (previously six times in favour, including twice after becoming a BRICS partner), and Uganda (previously always abstained). Bolivia did not vote (previously once against). Belarus voted against (previously all 12 times against) and Cuba (previously six times against).
Of the other countries, SCO member Pakistan abstained (previously it always abstained). Among CIS members (except Ukraine and Moldova), Armenia abstained (previously, in February 2025, it voted for the US resolution, abstaining or not voting in other cases), Tajikistan (previously, it voted against once), and Azerbaijan did not vote (it had never voted before). Turkmenistan, an associate observer in the CIS, did not vote (it had never voted before).
Israel, which in February 2025 voted against the resolution introduced by EU countries (ES-11/7) and abstained on the resolution introduced by the US (ES-11/8) but after amendments by European countries changed its content, now voted in favour, as it has often done in the past (9 times in favour). Turkey did not vote, which is significant, as Turkey has previously voted in favour of all 12 anti-Russian resolutions. Hungary voted in favour (previously, in February 2025, it was against a resolution introduced by EU countries – the first case of non-unanimity among EU members on anti-Russian resolutions – and abstained on the US resolution with amendments from EU countries; the other 10 times were in favour). Slovakia was in favour (previously, it was in favour all 12 times). Serbia did not vote (previously, it was in favour seven times, and abstained in the other cases). Georgia voted in favour (previously, in February 2025, it did not vote on an EU resolution and abstained on a US resolution; it was in favour the other 10 times). Saudi Arabia abstained (previously, it was in favour four times, but never after receiving the invitation to join BRICS). The United States voted in favour (previously, in February 2025, it was against an EU resolution and abstained on its own resolution after it was amended by EU countries; in the other 10 cases, it was always in favour). All EU members voted in favour. Something more interesting is notable here. Previously, in 11 of the 12 previous anti-Russian resolutions (except the one in February 2025), all EU members, along with Ukraine, were officially among the countries submitting the draft resolution to the UN General Assembly from the outset. Now, however, three EU members – Cyprus, Hungary, and Slovakia – were not among the original co-sponsors of the draft resolution. Cyprus joined the co-sponsors later, while Hungary and Slovakia never did. This is the first such case in the EU’s practice of anti-Russian resolutions since 2022 (excluding the February 2025 episode).
Now, to the Chernobyl resolution. The UN General Assembly periodically, but not every year, adopts resolutions on addressing the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. It should be noted that the previous resolution, Resolution 77/288 of May 16, 2023, although adopted after the current phase of the Ukrainian crisis had already begun and its draft was introduced by Ukraine, the text of that resolution was completely neutral, contained no mention of military action, and differed little from previous resolutions from the pre-conflict era. That 2023 resolution was adopted by consensus, without a vote. Now, however, two different draft resolutions have been submitted to the UN General Assembly for consideration. One was introduced by Belarus (A/80/L.3) and was neutral in nature, like previous resolutions on Chernobyl. The other (A/80/L.27) was co-sponsored by Ukraine and several Western countries and condemned military strikes on the protective arch built over the sarcophagus of Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. However, Russia was not directly mentioned. The Belarusian draft was not adopted, but the Ukrainian one was (97 votes in favour, 8 against, 39 abstentions, and 49 abstentions).
On Chernobyl, the following countries voted in favour: Armenia, Kazakhstan (for the first time on anti-Russian resolutions), Brazil, India (for the first time on anti-Russian resolutions), Indonesia, Ethiopia (for the first time on anti-Russian resolutions), the UAE (for the first time since joining BRICS), Malaysia, Uganda (for the first time on anti-Russian resolutions), Vietnam (for the first time on anti-Russian resolutions), as well as Serbia, Slovakia, Georgia, and Turkey. South Africa, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, Thailand, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Hungary, and Israel abstained. Russia, Belarus, China, Cuba, and the United States voted against. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Bolivia did not vote.
The resolution on human rights in Crimea was adopted by 79 votes in favour, 16 against, 73 abstentions, and 25 abstentions. Since 2016, the UN General Assembly has adopted such resolutions annually; after February 2022, between 78 and 82 countries voted in favour.
Abstaining were Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Serbia. Voting against were Russia, Belarus, China, Cuba, and Iran. Not voting were Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Bolivia. Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Slovakia, Turkey, and the United States voted in favour.
The resolution on human rights in Iran was adopted by 78 votes in favour, 27 against, 64 abstentions, and 24 abstentions. Such resolutions have been adopted by the UN General Assembly almost annually since the mid-1980s. In the aforementioned report, we noted that BRICS member countries’ and partners’ solidarity with Iran was previously higher than their solidarity with Russia.
For the 2025 resolution, the breakdown was as follows. Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, China, India, Indonesia, Cuba, Vietnam, Pakistan, and Iran itself voted against. Kyrgyzstan, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia abstained. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Bolivia, Georgia, Serbia, and Turkey did not vote. As in the previous two years, following Iran’s accession to BRICS, none of the BRICS members or partners voted for the anti-Iran resolution. The number of votes against it, as in the past two years, was higher than for anti-Russian resolutions.
These are the main results of the UN General Assembly votes in December 2025. Among the new developments, we note South Africa’s first vote in favour of an anti-Russian resolution – on Ukrainian children. Also, since the Chernobyl resolution was drafted in a more neutral tone than others, and its condemnation of Russia was only implicitly implied but not explicitly mentioned, a relatively large number of BRICS members and partners voted in favour of it, including Kazakhstan, India, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Vietnam, for the first time on anti-Russian resolutions, and the UAE, for the first time since joining BRICS. On the other hand, we note the US vote against the Chernobyl resolution and Turkey’s abstention from the vote on the resolution on Ukrainian children.
