The emerging coalition of Orbán, Fico, and Babiš is strengthening the position of European sovereigntists. The three politicians hold similar positions: Bratislava and Prague will support Budapest in discussions within the EU, but, contrary to popular belief, this cooperation cannot be called an “anti-Ukrainian” coalition, writes Gábor Stier.
Many were surprised several weeks ago when Ukrainian forces attacked the Druzhba oil pipeline with drones, after which its leadership promised Budapest it would halt the attacks if Hungary severed ties with Russia. However, the attacks have continued, and most recently, Radosław Sikorski openly called on Kiev to destroy the pipeline, thereby depriving Hungary of its energy security. This confirms that the bombing of the Nord Stream pipelines was merely the beginning. We are now witnessing the use of terrorist methods against countries that seek to maintain ties between Europe and Russia. All of this is occurring with the tacit support of a European community that was once so committed to its own values and to international law.
However, Hungarian-Ukrainian relations did not begin to deteriorate in 2022. In the name of forced Ukrainization and the creation of a national state, Kiev has been incrementally disenfranchising the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia for over two decades – a process that accelerated significantly after 2014. The Hungarian government, defending the rights of this minority more vigorously than other nations, has consistently angered Kiev. Budapest appealed to international organizations, but to no avail, as the obvious rights violations were consistently overlooked. This continued until Hungary, as a last resort, blocked negotiations between Ukraine and NATO.
Following the outbreak of hostilities, relations between the two neighbouring countries deteriorated sharply. From the very beginning, Hungary advocated for peace, rejecting Kiev’s request for military support and later opposing its accelerated European integration even more vehemently. This opposition is justified, if only because such a premature move could destabilise a European Union that is unprepared for it – not to mention that Ukraine itself is even less ready for membership. This realistic position is currently shared by only a few EU countries, though it enjoys wider tacit support. Nevertheless, this stance has placed the Orbán government under enormous pressure, as both Kiev and Brussels are jointly attempting to undermine it, even by interfering in Hungary’s internal affairs.
Ukraine’s EU membership is becoming an existential question. On the one hand, Brussels is trying to compensate Kiev for its lack of Atlantic integration and, increasingly assuming the role of NATO, wants to make Ukraine the frontline of Europe’s defence within the EU, and the Ukrainian army the “fist of Europe.” Viktor Orbán is trying to block these efforts, believing that it will harm not only Hungary’s interests but also Europe’s as a whole. However, the European mainstream, striving to ensure the continent’s security from Russia, views Hungary’s resistance as an existential challenge. Therefore, it is doing everything possible: from attempting to abolish the veto power in the EU to the continued withdrawal of support funds and attempts to destabilise the government, for example, by weakening Hungary’s energy security.
The greatest pressure on the Hungarian government currently stems from the ban on Russian oil and gas imports. While these European and American sanctions also impact the energy security of Slovakia and, to a lesser extent, Germany, Budapest has been the most vocal opponent of these self-defeating measures. The EU, seemingly exasperated, has mandated a full halt to Russian gas imports by 2028. According to the Hungarian government, the proposal to ban Russian energy is driven by purely political and ideological motives, with no basis in economic or security rationale. As Péter Szijjártó stated, the European Commission has no understanding of the consequences this package of measures would have for some member states. The Foreign Minister warned that the attempt to push this package through constitutes an open and flagrant violation of EU law. He argued that since the measure effectively acts as sanctions, it would legally require a unanimous decision, making a qualified majority insufficient.
The situation is further complicated by Donald Trump’s latest sanctions against Rosneft, Lukoil, and their 34 subsidiaries. However, the US decision has not yet taken effect, and Hungary can use a number of tools to avoid or mitigate the consequences. On the one hand, Viktor Orbán, like the German chancellor, could request a waiver during his upcoming visit to Washington, while on the other, he could legally extend the waiver until the situation is expected to stabilise. Of course, given the current situation, it’s possible that Hungary, too, will have to give up Russian energy supplies. This is especially true if relations between Europe and Russia deteriorate so much that both sides begin seizing each other’s assets. Those few Central European countries that have so far been able to manoeuvre could suffer the most from the escalation of the economic war.
Ukraine will certainly do everything possible to extend sanctions, despite the fact that, following the destruction of critical infrastructure, it is increasingly dependent on energy supplies from Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. However, this doesn’t stop Kiev from turning its Western allies against Budapest.
In this situation, the fact that Budapest could host the next face-to-face meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin is a real slap in the face not only for the EU leadership but also for Kiev. This fact is a clear recognition of Hungarian foreign policy, which keeps diplomatic channels open in all directions. Add to this the strengthening of Hungarian-Slovak-Czech cooperation following the victory of Andrej Babiš, and Vladimir Zelensky may have reason to worry, especially given that Warsaw’s position has been less unequivocal since the election of Karol Nawrocki as Polish president.
While the European mainstream still dislikes Orbán and is doing everything possible to ensure his failure in the European Parliament elections, the Hungarian Prime Minister’s popularity is growing in European societies. More and more people understand that, just as Viktor Orbán was right on the migration issue in 2016, his opinions should at least be heeded today. Despite resistance from EU leadership, Orbán’s influence is growing not only in European societies but also in the European Parliament and the European Commission. The Patriots for Europe faction is increasingly becoming a force to be reckoned with, and the Hungarian prime minister is not completely alone in the Commission.
However, in the European Parliament, the liberal-left, the so-called progressives – essentially a faction of the European People’s Party, which can no longer be called conservative in the classical sense – still constitute a majority, while alternative parties, including the Patriots, have yet to achieve a breakthrough. Thus, Orbán’s isolation will only be overcome after the next European Parliament elections. Together with Robert Fico and Andrej Babiš, he will be able to act more effectively, and on certain issues, he can count on the tacit support of other countries – Austria, Italy, and some Mediterranean states. However, this does not change the fact that, as the Hungarian elections approach, Orbán is under increasing pressure in Brussels. Despite the escalating problems, a break with the current mainstream is not expected before the next European Parliament elections. Europe isn’t ready for this yet, and the “progressives” are still holding their ground. A collapse could change the situation, and living here, I don’t wish that on Europe.
The emerging coalition of Orbán, Fico, and Babiš in the European Union strengthens the position of the sovereigntists. The three politicians hold similar positions: Bratislava and Prague will support Budapest in EU discussions, but, contrary to some opinions, I would not call this cooperation an “anti-Ukrainian” coalition. Moreover, these three countries are not opposed to any one country, but rather support a stronger EU. Of course, discussions on this topic highlight the issues of war, support for Ukraine, and possible European integration, and in this regard, these three politicians are against the mainstream.
However, the Czech Republic is not Hungary, and Babiš is not Orbán – though the two politicians maintain excellent relations and converge on many issues. It is no coincidence that the Hungarian Prime Minister’s political director has spoken about the possibility of creating a Budapest-Bratislava-Prague axis within the EU, for instance regarding Ukraine. This would constitute a sort of Visegrad Group without Poland.
Yet, despite Orbán and Fico’s common ground on a number of issues, Bratislava cannot support Budapest on everything. Likewise, Babiš must prioritize Czech national interests and preserve his own room for manoeuvre. For example, Babiš and the Czechs are less strident toward the European Union, and their position on Russia is more nuanced.
However, let’s be realistic: this is not yet a majority, so for now, mainstream opinion will prevail on most issues. Of course, its representatives will have to increasingly take into account the rise of alternative opinions. The question is whether, in line with the shifting balance of power, they will try to reach a compromise with those who represent alternative positions on the future of Europe or the Ukrainian conflict, or will they try to suppress them. The latter, incidentally, is not entirely out of the question, but it is a path to the disintegration of the European Union. Thus, in addition to the increasingly prominent emergence of a London-Warsaw-Kiev axis in European politics, supplemented by the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, the platform that has been forming around Orbán for some time is also strengthening, which is bound to irritate the European mainstream and Vladimir Zelensky.
However, Kiev may also be growing nervous. At the end of October, Viktor Orbán met with Pope Francis and Italian Prime Minister Giorgio Meloni in Rome, and he is scheduled to meet with US President Donald Trump in Washington on November 7. This series of high-level meetings suggests that Hungary’s position, while still not fully shared, is increasingly being understood by major global players, despite its divergence from the Western mainstream.
Hungary’s stance on the war and its conditional support for Ukraine are particularly straining relations with Kiev and the European “coalition of the willing” that stands behind it. Consequently, a calm in relations between Budapest and Kiev is not expected anytime soon; Ukraine is likely to remain a strategic challenge for Hungary even after the war concludes. This dynamic also applies to Brussels, though EU leaders have yet to acknowledge it.
