Before the 2023 elections, the issue of Turkish policy in the Middle East, directly related to national security and the economic situation, turned out to be especially important in the context of the domestic political struggle, Nubara Kulieva writes.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s victory in the 2023 elections turned out to be uncertain, as the current president won the second round with a margin of only 4%. Moreover, opposition candidates won in the country’s major cities (Istanbul, Ankara, etc.) in the 2024 municipal elections. This confirms the trend of declining trust in the Turkish leader and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) he leads. According to MetroPOLL, Erdogan’s support among citizens has decreased almost 5% over the year and amounted to 42.8% as of March 2025.
The situation worsened after the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoglu, the main potential rival of Erdogan in the event of early elections. On March 18, Istanbul University annulled Imamoglu’s diploma, which had made it impossible for him to participate in the presidential race. After that, he was detained on charges of participating in corruption schemes, organizing illegal economic activities, as well as links to the PKK, which is recognised as a terrorist organisation in Turkey. This caused a negative reaction from a significant part of the Turkish public, resulting in a wave of protests throughout the country.
Ekrem Imamoglu began to develop the image of a “martyr”, contributing to the growth of his popularity. As a result of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) primaries held on March 23, more than 14.8 million people supported his nomination as a candidate for president. Intra-party (within the CHP) consolidation is also growing, which, coupled with recent events, has contributed to the mobilisation of the CHP electorate and strengthened the party’s position. According to poll results, the CHP is the most popular party in the country (33.1%), while the AKP is in second place (30.2%).
Before the 2023 elections, the issue of Turkish policy in the Middle East, directly related to national security and the economic situation, turned out to be especially important in the context of the domestic political struggle. This area presented a set of problems: cross-border operations; Kurdish issues; refugees; and bilateral relations with border states (primarily Syria and Iraq).
Traditionally, supporters of the CHP do not approve of the proactive course of the ruling bloc in the region and Turkey’s excessive involvement in regional processes. In addition to rhetoric, this has been expressed in individual actions, for example, disagreement with the extension of the Turkish army’s mandate in Syria and Iraq, as it was in 2021. From a security point of view, the CHP’s attention is focused on issues such as terrorist activity on Turkish territory; the danger of an unregulated flow of refugees; as well as instability in border regions. In terms of economic losses, issues of military-industrial complex costs and overseas military operations are highlighted; as well as the impact of the refugee flow on growing unemployment. The CHP is critical of the AKP’s policy in the field of ensuring regional security and has even accused it of collaborating with terrorists and violating the principle of territorial integrity of neighbouring states, primarily Syria.
However, the CHP has typically lacked a comprehensive and clear vision of foreign policy in general and regional policy in particular. On the one hand, this is due to the historical context of the formation of the CHP ideology, which is focused on maintaining order and security primarily within the borders of the national state created after the empire. On the other hand, the CHP has been in opposition since 2002, limiting its influence on the country’s foreign policy and reducing it to criticism of the approach of the ruling party. This was confirmed after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, banned in Russia) came to power in Syria in 2024. The subsequent intensification of Turkish-Syrian relations and the beginning of the process of returning Syrian refugees to their homeland actually proved the validity of the AKP’s approach to Syria, complicating the situation for the CHP. In the new conditions, the CHP retains a tendency to criticize the AKP’s regional policy, shifting the focus to the shortcomings of the new Syrian regime (for example, the level of inclusiveness of the transitional government).
